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1.1 The parliamentary resolution of 6 December 1994 
On 6 December 1994, the Norwegian parliament – the Storting – passed a resolution 
that approves of Norwegian participation in military operations for NATO that are 
undertaken beyond the territory of NATO (out-of-area operations) even in cases when 
the United Nations’ Security Council has not authorised such action (Beslutning S. nr. 
2, 06.12.94).1 Until this resolution was passed, Norway’s policy had been that out-of-
area operations would only be undertaken upon Security Council authorisation. The 
parliamentary resolution, therefore, represents an abrupt shift in Norway’s official 
foreign and defence policy: Norway no longer considers itself – or NATO – restricted 
by a lacking Security Council mandate for the conduct of out-of-area operations. This 
policy was sealed in March 1999, when Norwegian aircrafts participated in NATO’s 
bombing of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro despite the lack of an explicit Security 
Council mandate.  
The precise content of Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 is given by the wording of 
the Defence Committee’s recommendation to the Storting (Innst. S. nr. 23 (1994–95): 
5, my translation)2 which the Storting adopted:   
[N]orway must adhere to the principle that Norwegian participation in military 
operations outside of NATO’s and the WEU’s areas of responsibility takes place on 
the basis of a UN or a CSCE3 resolution. Any potential Norwegian military participat-
ion in humanitarian operations, rescue operations or peace operations without a formal 
mandate from the UN or the CSCE, but in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations’ Charter together with the principles in the Helsinki Final Act and the 
intentions of the Paris Declaration must be considered separately and put before the 
Storting. 
The resolution’s wording gives rise to several questions. I will clarify these questions 
and make some important distinctions concerning the resolution in section 1.2.3. For 
now, however, it suffices to note that the parliament, in principle, approved of 
                                              
1 Stortingsforhandlinger 6. desember 1994 [Official report of the proceedings of the Storting 6 December 1994] pp. 1530–
1554, henceforth Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94.  
2 Innst. S. nr. 23 (1994–95) Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om bruk av norske styrker i utlandet [Recommendations from the 
Defence Committee concerning the use of Norwegian forces abroad]. All translations from Norwegian to English are my 
own.  
3 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, from 1 January 1995 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE). 
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Norwegian participation in NATO out-of-area operations that are undertaken without a 
Security Council mandate.  
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was passed with dissenting votes. The 
Conservative Party and the Progress Party, which are both right-wing parties, the 
Liberal Party, which belongs to the political centre and the Labour party constituted a 
majority voting in support of the cited resolution. The two other centrist parties, the 
Centre Party and the Christian Democratic Party, and the left wing, the Social Left 
Party and Red Electorial Alliance, voted against participation in out-of-area operations 
in cases of a lacking Security Council mandate.  
The dissent reflects opposing views about Norway’s moral obligations. As I 
will demonstrate in section 2.3, the majority grounded its position that Norway should 
participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations primarily on an assumption 
that Norway’s membership in NATO requires that Norway undertake this kind of task. 
Norway, being a NATO member, is required to make contributions to the alliance. The 
NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994 established that international peace 
operations constitute one of NATO’s principal tasks in the years to come. This, it was 
argued, implies that Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate in out-of-area 
operations irrespective of the existence of a Security Council mandate. 
One of the assumptions that the minority grounded its position on, however, is 
that participation in the mentioned kinds of military operations represents a violation 
of the UN Charter. What the minority has in mind is presumably chapter VII in the 
Charter, which gives the Security Council a primary responsibility for international 
peace and security. Since Norway ratified the Charter in 1945, there is reason to 
suspect that Norway by declaring that it will participate in out-of-area operations 
despite the lack of a Security Council mandate renders itself guilty of violation of the 
Charter.  
The Storting’s dissent points to a moral dilemma. Norway should both adhere to 
the rules concerning the resort to military force in international law and to undertake 
its obligations as a NATO member. In the case at hand, both the parliamentary debate 
and vote suggest that the requirements of international law and the requirements of 
membership in NATO are incompatible. It should be noted that this tension in 
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Norway’s foreign relations has not abated since. Both the bombing of Kosovo in 1999 
and the events in the wake of the terrorist attacks against World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on 11 September 2001 suggest that Norway’s obligations as a NATO 
member and its obligations under international law conflict: The Security Council did 
not formally approve neither of NATO’s bombing in Kosovo nor of the American 
military operation in Afghanistan, which NATO supports both politically and 
logistically.4  
Of importance here, however, is that by having decided that Norway will 
participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations, the Norwegian parliament 
solved what appears to be a moral dilemma in favour of the requirements of NATO 
membership. Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 represents the first political step towards a 
policy according to which the Security Council’s approval for undertaking out-of-area 
operations is given secondary importance.  
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was passed almost without public attention. Eight 
days earlier, on 28 November, the Norwegian people had voted against membership in 
the European Union in a referendum. Most public debate was centred round the 
implications of the Norwegian people’s no. Despite the fact that the EU referendum 
had just taken place, it is surprising that the decision to participate in non-UN-
mandated out-of-area operations did not enjoy more public attention. Although the 
parliamentary resolution and NATO’s bombing in the spring of 1999 are separated by 
roughly four years only, it was unlikely that NATO would undertake military action 
beyond its geographical boundaries without the Security Council’s approval in 1994. 
Throughout NATO’s involvement in the war in the former Yugoslavia, which had just 
begun when the resolution was passed, NATO saw the UN’s role in conferring the 
alliance legitimacy in conducting military operations as crucial (Smith 1996: 36–37). 
In light of NATO’s security political context, therefore, the Norwegian parliamentary 
resolution is somewhat unintelligible.  
                                              
4 On 12 September 2001, the North Atlantic Council made the following statement: ‘If it is determined that [the appalling 
attacks perpetrated against the United States] was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an 
action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty’ (North Atlantic Council 2001). Article 5 constitutes the cornerstone of 
the North Atlantic Treaty and establishes the allies’ mutual defence commitment: An attack against one member is 
considered as an attack against all members. For the first time in NATO’s history, Article 5 was invoked. Neither the United 
States nor NATO sees the lack of a Security Council mandate as problematic: The military operation is conducted on the 
basis of an assumed right to self-defence. I will have more to say of the international right to self-defence in chapter 4.  
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1.2 Research question, rationale, aim and scope 
This dissertation has an evaluative purpose. The aim is to determine whether the 
resolution passed by the Norwegian parliament on 6 December 1994 is morally 
justifiable. My research question is the following:  
 
Did the Storting pass a morally justifiable resolution when it decided that Norway was 
going to participate in NATO out-of-area operations that were about to be undertaken 
without a mandate from the United Nations Security Council? 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Storting’s main reason for passing 
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was the assumption that Norway has an obligation 
towards NATO to participate in out-of-area operations. It was also noted that the 
minority voted against the resolution on the assumption that it constitutes a violation 
of the UN Charter. For reasons that I return to in section 2.4, I will primarily be 
concerned with assessing whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 represents a violation 
of the rules concerning the resort to military force in international law and whether 
Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate in out-of area operations that the 
Security Council has not approved of throughout this thesis. Given this scope, there 
will be reason to say that Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 is justified if  
 
(i) Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 does not represent a violation of the rules 
concerning the resort to military force in international law and5 Norway 
is obligated towards NATO to participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-
area operations, or 
(ii) Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 represents a violation of the rules 
concerning the resort to military force in international law, but there 
were adequate reasons for having given priority to the obligation 
towards NATO to participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area 
                                              
5 Strictly speaking, the appendage is unnecessary. If Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 complies with the UN Charter, there does 
not seem to be any reason to say that it is unjustified. However, Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 will be superfluous if Norway is 
not obligated towards NATO to participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations. For this reason, I have chosen to 
present the obligation towards NATO as a precondition for the resolution’s being morally justifiable.  
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operations to the detriment of the obligation to adhere to rules of 
international law. 
 
The research question, being normative, requires that I conduct a normative analysis. 
While positive analysis consists in description and explanation, the purpose of 
normative analysis is to assess the degree to which particular actions, practices and 
institutions are justified from a moral point of view. However, normative and positive 
analyses are not only different in terms of purpose, they also proceed differently. I will 
return to the important issue of how normative analysis should be conducted in the 
next chapter. Firstly, however, I am going to dwell on another important issue, namely 
the reasons why I am subjecting Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 to normative analysis. Is 
it at all fruitful to explore the moral grounds of political decisions? What can 
normative analysis actually reveal?  
 
1.2.1 Moral considerations and political decisions  
In 416 BC, in the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian War, imperial Athens sought to 
take over the island state of Melos. In The History of the Peloponnesian War, 
Thucydides tells us that Athens sent a large force to the island. Before commencing 
hostilities, however, the Athenians sent envoys ahead to persuade the Melians to 
surrender without a fight. They proposed to spare Melian lives at the expense of their 
freedom (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2002).  
Thucydides has reconstructed a dialogue between the Athenian generals 
Cleomedes and Tisias and the magistrates of Melos. Through the dialogue, Thucydides 
presents Athens’ claim to Melos as a ‘necessity of nature’ (Walzer 1977/92: 5). 
Cleomedes and Tisias argue that Melos must surrender because its neutrality ‘will be 
an argument of our weakness, and your hatred of our power, among those we have rule 
over’ (quoted in Walzer 1977/92: 5). Melos’ neutrality would inspire rebellion 
throughout the islands. Despite a near-certain defeat, however, the Melians fought for 
their independence. The men of Melos were eventually killed, the women and children 
sold into slavery, and the island repopulated by Athenians.  
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In Michael Walzer’s (1977/92: 7) interpretation of Thucydides’ historical 
reproduction, Thucydides argues that resort to force and the conduct of war forms a 
realm of its own, with laws that are distinct and separate from the laws of moral life. 
To Thucydides, moral arguments have no relevance for decisions concerning the resort 
to lethal force and the conduct of war in particular and political decisions in general. 
Political decisions should be taken irrespective of their moral implications. This 
standpoint is generally known as political realism, and today, about 2400 years after 
Thucydides’ time, it still has proponents. An important opposing normative position 
holds that political decisions, just as any other actions, should have a moral basis. The 
underlying assumption is that there is no justification for doing what is morally wrong. 
Can Thucydides be right when he argues that the decision to go to war against Melos 
must be taken irrespective of moral considerations? In the following, I will attempt to 
demonstrate that there is no reason to listen to the argument that morality and politics 
have nothing to do with one another. 
Politics is about making and implementing decisions. Political decisions, also 
those relating to foreign affairs, are taken in order to direct society in specific 
directions. Political decisions, therefore, result both from the visions or goals that 
political decision-makers have for society and from their ideas about how the goals are 
achieved. Since political decisions are meant to direct society in specific directions, 
they are carriers of reasons to pursue a particular course of action. This implies that 
arguments must be important to politics.  
Arguments about feasibility, about how political goals actually can be achieved, 
have a prominent place in most public debates. Presumably, the prospect of actually 
defeating Melos was decisive for the Athenians. Such arguments are important 
because political decisions should direct society in specific directions. This implies 
that political arguments, to succeed, must be effective when it comes to influencing 
beliefs and actions (Malnes 1992: 118).  
If one allows the practical impact to count for everything, however, the success 
of a political argument will not at all depend on its logical and analytical qualities. 
Hence indoctrination will be as good as persuasion. This implies that political 
arguments should be held to another standard of success as well: to their analytical 
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qualities (Malnes 1992: 117). In other words, political arguments must also be 
rationally convincing to succeed. To what degree can political arguments be rationally 
convincing if they are detached from moral arguments? Let us return to the arguments 
of the Athenian generals. 
What characterises the Athenian generals’ arguments for going to war is the 
lack of moral considerations. Their arguments rest on empirical assumptions uniquely: 
The risk of loosing the Athenian empire is in itself a sufficient reason to wage war 
against Melos. In Cleomedes’ and Tisias’ opinion, there simply are no other alternative 
actions as the Athenian empire is at stake. They are in fact saying that to resort to force 
is something Athens cannot be held responsible for because the choice is with Melos: 
The island state can either surrender or it must face the Athenian troops. 
It might well be that the Athenian generals are right when they claim that 
Melos’ neutrality could inspire rebellion throughout the islands. But even if one 
assumes that the whole empire could be lost if Melos is left to remain neutral, there 
will be something unsatisfactory about the Athenian generals’ arguments. Naturally, 
the option of not invading Melos remained. This means that there are no good reasons 
for giving the Athenian generals’ arguments particular importance. Rather, there is 
reason to believe that the lack of moral considerations explains why the arguments put 
forward by Cleomedes and Tisias are not convincing: It seems that they pledge the 
argument of necessity in order to disclaim responsibility for actions for which Athens 
actually will become responsible. As Michael Walzer notes, ‘the proverb ‘all’s fair’ is 
invoked in defense of conduct that appears to be unfair’ (1977/92: 4). In this case, the 
proposed arguments have not succeeded as political arguments as they are not 
rationally convincing.  
Although the case of Melos demonstrates the relevance of moral arguments for 
politics, this does not imply that moral arguments are equally important in all spheres 
of politics. As mentioned above, political decision-makers must take into account 
arguments about effectiveness; about actually achieving political goals. When it comes 
to decisions concerning the resort to military force, however, political decision-makers 
cannot escape moral considerations. As such decisions concern life and death and 
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often terminates in severe human suffering, arguments about effectiveness cannot 
count for all.  
As noted above, Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was passed on an assumption that 
Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate in non-UN-mandated NATO out-of-
area operations. Is there reason to examine whether the resolution is morally justifiable 
when the members of parliament seem to have recognised the relevance of moral 
considerations? In the next section I am going to show that such reason exists by 
explaining what I consider to be the purpose of normative analysis. 
 
1.2.2 The purpose of normative analysis 
In this section I will account for two different approaches to what normative analysis 
can reveal. These approaches go back to the dispute between Socrates and Protagoras 
in antiquity (Malnes 1992: 118–119). Both Protagoras and Socrates observed that 
people often have diverging conceptions about right and wrong. Protagoras believed 
that disputes in moral matters do not express genuine disagreement. Quite the contrary, 
he believed that people tend to share the same moral values. Disagreement expresses 
bewilderment. Socrates, on the other hand, believed that disputes about right and 
wrong arise because people actually have diverging conceptions, and he believed 
disagreement could be dangerous: ‘Disagreement about the just and unjust, the fine 
and shameful, the good and bad [will] give rise to enmity and anger’ (quoted in 
Malnes 1992: 119). Accordingly, he believed that one must go to the root of the 
disagreement.  
Michael Walzer is a contemporary proponent of the first view. In his opinion, 
disputes about right and wrong are in fact evidence that people have a moral 
understanding in common: ‘Had there been no common meanings, there could have 
been no debate at all’ (Walzer 1977/92: 11). When people appear to disagree in moral 
matters, it is because their moral compass needle is out of course. Particularistic 
interests, for example, can disturb people’s true conceptions about right and wrong. 
Since people in general have concurrent conceptions in moral matters, normative 
analysis, to Walzer, should not be about constructing new ethical principles, but in 
interpreting what already exists: One should ‘interpret to one’s fellow citizens the 
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world of meaning that we share’ (1983: xiv). Normative analysis can only reveal 
conceptions about right and wrong that already exist. It should be noted that what 
Walzer presumes to exist is not necessarily clear and precise conceptions about right 
and wrong, but rather certain ‘sensibilities and intuitions’ (Walzer 1983: 28). The task 
of the political philosopher consists in revealing the sensibilities and intuitions that 
people in general have. To Walzer, therefore, normative analysis is for the most part 
an empirical undertaking.  
According to Walzer’s approach, actions, practices and institutions are 
evaluated by holding them to widely accepted moral ideas. If they comply with 
people’s perceptions of right and wrong, they will be justified. This implies that the 
present study, to succeed, should be conducted so that it provides a precise 
interpretation of a set of shared meanings about Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94. In order 
to assess the resolution’s justifiability, one should ask whether the Norwegian 
population consider it morally right that Norway participates in military operations 
that lack a UN mandate beyond NATO’s geographical boundaries. 
Michael Walzer’s ontological assumption that people have a moral outlook in 
common is questionable. Is there really a ‘common meaning’ about the rightfulness of 
participating in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations in Norwegian society to 
reveal? We have no reason to believe that this issue is marked by any more consensus 
in Norwegian society than in the Norwegian parliament. It seems, rather, that people 
tend not to share the same moral values. This goes for questions concerning the resort 
to military force in particular: The public debates that followed NATO’s military 
operations in Kosovo in 1999 and in Afghanistan in 2001 suggest that no shared 
meaning exists. An investigation of the Norwegian people’s beliefs would thus 
probably not take us further than the polarised debate in the Storting.  
As Raino Malnes (1992: 121) and Anne Julie Semb (2000: 16–17) have pointed 
out, Walzer’s problem is his unwillingness to move beyond moral conventions or 
ordinary beliefs. Not only does his approach appear methodologically difficult, or even 
impossible. It would also be unsatisfactory to evaluate actions, practices and 
institutions by holding them to existing moral beliefs. In evaluating the parliamentary 
resolution, it is not really interesting what people believe to be right or wrong. What is 
 15
interesting is whether the Storting had good reasons for deciding that Norway will 
participate in NATO out-of-area operations that lack Security Council authorisation.6  
The approach that Walzer suggests is unsatisfactory in another sense as well. 
Moral beliefs – even widespread ones – can be unjustified. There are many examples 
of such beliefs that were broadly accepted in the past but that we now reject as 
immoral. This, one could argue, is due to historical development and the necessary 
change of moral conventions. Even so, it is important to move beyond existing beliefs 
and construct new ethical principles. It is, in short, essential to develop independent 
standards against which one may assess prevailing political practices and institutions.  
To say that one should move beyond moral conventions does not imply that 
existing beliefs should play no role at all in normative reasoning, (see Semb 2000: 17). 
It is rather a question of what status one should ascribe them. Moral conventions may 
be used as starting points for normative analyses,7 contrarily to Michael Walzer’s 
belief that they are final products of such analyses.   
Socrates was concerned that disagreement in moral matters could lead to enmity 
and anger. As Socrates, I take the aim of normative analysis to be that one should go to 
the root of the disagreement in order to determine what is really right. In subjecting 
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 to normative analysis, my purpose is not to establish what 
people think about the resolution, but to determine whether the members of the 
Norwegian parliament had good reasons for passing it. This implies that I will be 
concerned with investigating the validity of moral ideas in this thesis. By critically 
examining whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 rests on valid moral beliefs or not, I 
may draw conclusions about its justifiability.  
In determining whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 is justified, I will critically 
examine those normative premises upon which it rests. This will make it possible to 
establish the validity of the arguments put forward by the Storting. I will propose a 
method for how I may proceed in order to assess the validity of those beliefs on which 
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was passed in the next chapter. I will devote the last two 
                                              
6 This remark is strongly inspired by Semb (2000: 17). 
7 I will have more to say of this in section 2.2 where I argue that this normative analysis should start with those arguments 
about right and wrong that the members of parliament put forward before passing Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94. 
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sections in this introduction to account for the resolution’s background and to make 
some important clarifications and distinctions related to it. 
 
1.2.3 Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94: Background  
According to Norwegian constitutional law, the Storting must resolve matters in 
compliance with one of two possible procedures. Certain matters require that the 
Storting adopt a legal rule. In such cases, the Storting must divide in two chambers, the 
Odelsting and the Lagting. In other matters, the Storting passes its resolutions in 
plenary. The matter with which this thesis is concerned did not require the adoption of 
a legal rule, and accordingly the debate and the vote took place in plenary.  
The issue – the use of Norwegian forces abroad – was prepared in the Storting’s 
Defence Committee. The matter under consideration was a White Paper8, a document 
consisting of 39 pages prepared by the Government for the Storting about the use of 
Norwegian forces abroad. The agenda in the document is extensive. The purpose of 
the White Paper, the introduction explains (St.meld.nr.46 (1993–94): 3), is to  
present a comprehensive policy for the use of Norwegian forces abroad. The main 
question is what kinds of operations it is sensible that Norway participates in, either 
within a UN or a NATO framework or under the auspices of other organisations that 
have been given the task to carry through a mandate authorised by the United Nations’ 
Security Council.  
It should be noted that the White Paper does not at any point discuss the issue of 
Norwegian participation in out-of-area operations without a UN mandate. This issue 
came up when the White Paper was discussed in the Storting’s Defence Committee. 
The White Paper actualised one question in addition to the question of Norwegian 
participation in out-of-area operations that the Security Council has not mandated: 
Whether Norwegian military personnel should be ordered to military operations 
abroad. The prevailing policy was voluntariness.  
I pointed out in section 1.1 that Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 appears somewhat 
unintelligible in light of NATO’s security political challenges. I explained that at the 
time the resolution was passed, the UN played an important role in conferring NATO 
legitimacy in conducting military operations in the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, I 
                                              
8 Stortingsmelding nr. 46 (1993–94) Bruk av norske styrker i utlandet [White Paper  no. 46 (1993–94) The use of Norwegian 
forces abroad], henceforth St.meld. nr. 46 (1993–94).  
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will attempt at situating Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 in the context of NATO’s post-
Cold War approach to security.  
In accounting for NATO’s post-Cold War approach to security it is essential to 
clarify the distinction between the terms ‘collective defence’ and ‘collective security’ 
(Yost 1998: 5). Both concepts represent attempts to impose an order on the 
unpredictable threats in international politics. The concepts deal, in other words, with 
the problem of organising relations among states for the purpose of preventing war 
and, if war should nevertheless break out, handle its consequences.  
Collective security, in the traditional sense of the term as Immanuel Kant 
(1795) and Woodrow Wilson (1919) expounded it, involves a pact against war. 
According to Kant (1795), the only viable way to a permanent peace between nations 
is the establishment of a federation of free democratic states. By the end of the First 
World War, Woodrow Wilson believed that the future peace of the world only could 
be assured through the establishment of the League of Nations (Cronon 1965: lxv). 
The idea of collective security was fundamental when the League of Nations came into 
existence in 1919.9 Ideally, the pact against war should include all states in the state 
system. All states should be obligated to act against any aggressor because peace is 
indivisible: Every state’s security interests are believed to be affected by any 
aggression anywhere (Yost 1998: 7–9). A collective defence pact, however, binds 
together an alliance of states to deter and, if necessary, defend against one or more 
identifiable external threats (Yost 1998: 7). From the inauguration in 1949 until the 
end of the Cold War, NATO’s primary purpose was collective defence against the 
threat of Soviet aggression or coercion.  
In November 1990, the members of NATO and the members of the Warsaw 
Pact agreed in a Joint Declaration in Paris that they were ‘no longer adversaries’ and 
that they recognised that  
security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably 
linked to the security of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (quoted in Yost 1998: 6, italics added).  
                                              
9 Also the United Nations, which replaced the League of Nations after the Second World War, is grounded on a modified 
version of the idea of collective security. 
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In December 1991, NATO and the former Warsaw Pact States met in their new North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council and repeated the November 1990 declaration that 
‘security is indivisible’ (Yost 1998: 6). These declarations express an aspiration 
towards collective security, in implying that the security of all CSCE states would be 
endangered by any threat to peace. This explains NATO’s goal is to create a peaceful 
order in the Euro-Atlantic area.10 Moreover, investments, exercises and military 
operations and statements about NATO’s priorities have illustrated the shift in 
emphasis away from an almost exclusive focus on collective defence toward more 
attention to collective security (Yost 1998: 272). This implies that although the 
collective defence remains one of NATO’s purposes in the post-Cold War era, NATO 
has undertaken new roles beyond the collective defence embedded in the North 
Atlantic Treaty.  
NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept sketches the alliance’s post-Cold War security 
challenges. According to this concept, the post-Cold War threat is vague: ‘In contrast 
with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are 
multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which make them hard to predict and 
assess’ (NATO’s new Strategic Concept of 1991, Article 8). Moreover,  
[r]isks to allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the 
territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that 
may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic 
rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and 
eastern Europe. [The tensions which may result] could [...] lead to crises inimical to 
European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or 
spill over into NATO countries.    (NATO’s new Strategic Concept of 1991, Article 9) 
These articles explain that instability in central and eastern Europe is not only a 
security issue for the countries directly affected, but also for NATO. Its security 
challenges consist not in a threat posed towards individual member countries, but in 
destabilising circumstances in the geographical rim (Knutsen et al. 2000: 62). 
Therefore, NATO has seen it as crucial to encounter the security challenges in ‘the 
periphery’ (Knutsen et al. 2000: 62). The changed security environment after the Cold 
War explains NATO’s transformation with a redefinition of its purposes and the 
undertaking of new roles. According to David Yost (1998: 72), crisis management and 
                                              
10 This is the territory of all CSCE (now OSCE) states, that is Canada and the United States, Europe, Turkey and the former 
Soviet Union states, including Siberian Russia and the former Soviet Republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia.   
 19
peace operations beyond the territory of NATO allies (out-of-area operations) is 
clearly one of NATO’s two most significant new roles.11  
11 months prior to the Storting’s vote, in January 1994, the NATO Brussels 
summit took place. At this summit, the alliance launched the concept of Combined 
Joint Task Forces (CJTF) (The Brussels Summit Declaration). According to this 
concept, combined (multinational) and joint (multi-service) formations would conduct 
out-of-area operations. The CJTF were established because it was assumed that all 
sixteen members would be unlikely to take action together in all cases falling short of 
aggression against the alliance (Yost 1998: 200). Hence, the CTJF were meant to 
facilitate military operations through flexible and timely responses to crises (Yost 
1998: 76). The importance of the CTJF concept is described in a 1994 report published 
by the British American Security Information Council. The report characterises the 
CJTF as a concept that ‘may overcome some of the serious multilateral military 
planning nightmares (such as lack of common doctrine, planning, training and 
interoperability)’ (BASIC 1994: 46). It impossible to establish a connection between 
the Brussels summit and the parliamentary vote 11 months later. Given the importance 
of the new concept of CJTF, however, it is not implausible that Beslutning S. nr. 2, 




In order to establish the scope of Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 and hence the scope of 
this thesis, it is imperative to answer four questions that relate to the precise wording 
of the adopted resolution (see page 1):  
(i) What is the status of Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94? 
(ii) For which organisations does the Storting envisage Norway’s 
participation in out-of-area operations? 
(iii) What is the meaning of the passage ‘without a formal mandate from the 
UN or the CSCE’? 
                                              
11 The other is co-operation with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in new institutions such as Partnership 
for Peace (Yost 1998: 72).  
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(iv) For what kinds of out-of-area operations does the Storting envisage 
Norwegian participation? That is, for what purposes will Norway 
participate in out-of-area operations for NATO?  
The first question concerns the meaning of the passage ‘any potential Norwegian 
military participation […] without a formal mandate from the UN or the CSCE [...] 
must be considered separately and put before the Storting’ (italics added). What is the 
status of Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 if the Storting is to consider participation again? 
Does Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 actually constitute consent to participate in out-of-
area operations that are undertaken without a Security Council mandate?  
It should be noted that the adopted resolution differs from the minority’s 
proposal in this respect. According to the minority’s proposal, participation in out-of-
area operations is to take place on the basis of the UN’s or the CSCE’s request ‘and 
with the Storting’s consent on every occasion’ (Innst. S. nr. 23 (1994–95): 5, italics 
added). As opposed to the minority’s proposal, the adopted resolution does not say that 
a new parliamentary resolution is required. One interpretation of this could be that the 
majority meant to reduce the importance of a future parliamentary vote.  
There is reason to stress that subsequent events have shown that the clause 
‘must be considered separately and put before the Storting’ has had no practical 
significance: The decision to order Norwegian aircrafts to NATO’s bombing of 
Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro in 1999 despite the lack of a UN mandate was taken 
by the first Bondevik Government. The decision was neither preceded by a debate nor 
a resolution in the Storting. The second Bondevik Government also ordered aircrafts to 
participate in the bombing of Afghanistan without the Storting’s consent. In other 
words, the Storting has demonstrated that it does not consider itself bound by the 
clause ‘must be considered separately and put before the Storting’. In this light, there 
is reason to understand Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 as an approval in principle of 
participation in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations.  
The second question concerns for which organisations Norwegian forces will 
participate in out-of-area operations. Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 says that Norway 
will participate in operations beyond the geographical boundaries of NATO and the 
WEU, but it does not establish whether Norway will participate for these 
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organisations. The introduction of the White Paper, which was cited above, envisages 
that Norway can participate in military operations for ‘NATO or other organisations’. 
Nevertheless, both the recommendation from the Defence Committee and the debate in 
the Storting imply that the point at issue is participation in military operations for 
NATO. Moreover, the events in Kosovo and in Afghanistan have shown that NATO is 
the only organisation that has taken those steps that Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 
envisages. For these reasons I have made the choice to exclusively explore Norwegian 
participation in NATO operations.  
The third amplification that I would like to make relates to the passage ‘without 
a formal mandate from the UN or the CSCE’. In saying this, the Storting equals the 
authority of the CSCE (now OSCE) with that of the Security Council. The issue in 
question is the concept of ‘legitimate authority’, which is crucial in the Just War 
tradition: Which actors in the international community have the authority to take 
decisions concerning resort to military force? While the UN is a global organisation, 
the scope of the CSCE was regional.12 This is one reason why the UN enjoys a special 
status in the international community in general and in matters concerning 
international peace and security in particular. Since the CSCE was a regional 
organisation, there is reason to question the Storting’s assumption that this 
organisation enjoys the competence to make decisions about military operations, even 
within its geographical boundaries. For reasons that I return to in chapter 3, it seems 
that the Storting was wrong in equalling the two organisations’ authority. Accordingly, 
I will be concerned with the authority of Security Council only in this thesis.  
Fourth, and finally, the wording of Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 raises the 
question of what kinds of operations Norway will participate in. According to the first 
sentence, the Storting’s concern is military operations. However, the parliament does 
not draw the important distinction between so-called coercive and non-coercive 
military operations. The distinction is important as the United Nations is founded on 
the idea of collective security. In its ideal form, this idea forbids the use of coercive 
military force, and it is articulated as a principal rule in Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter. Non-coercive military operations are carried through on the basis of 
                                              
12 The OSCE is also a regional organisation.  
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the consent and cooperation of the parties involved. UN’s peacekeeping missions until 
the end of the Cold War were undertaken according to these principles.13  
Coercive military operations are what we usually refer to as interventions. After 
the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has authorised the use of coercive 
military force on several occasions. The UN-authorised operations in Somalia (1992), 
Bosnia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) are examples of military operations of this kind. Of 
importance, however, is that while non-coercive military operations that are 
undertaken by a state or a coalition of states do not contradict the UN’s ideological 
basis, coercive operations do. Thus in subjecting Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 to 
normative analysis, my focus will be on coercive military operations. 
Although I have now said that I limit my scope to participation in coercive out-
of-area operations for NATO, there is reason to identify in some more detail the kinds 
of military operations that the Storting envisages participation in. For what purposes 
The second sentence in Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 mentions humanitarian 
operations, rescue operations and peace operations. This implies that Norwegian 
participation in out-of-area operations will take place for special purposes: either for 
humanitarian purposes, for rescue purposes or for peace purposes. Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94 itself does not establish what such operations are, but other sources do.  
The White Paper thoroughly defines different kinds of military operations that 
Norway might participate in.14 The only concept that is not treated is rescue 
operations. But Defence Minister Kosmo defines rescue operations as operations that 
might take place in the case of a natural disaster, for example an earthquake 
(Stortingsforhandlinger  06.12.94: 1544).  
According to the White Paper, ‘humanitarian helping operations are carried out 
to put an end to people’s suffering, especially in situations where the local government 
itself is not able to, or not willing to, provide the population with the necessary 
support’ (St.meld. nr. 46 (1993–94): 15). Thus human suffering is set as a precondition 
for Norwegian participation in military operations. There is reason to believe that the 
                                              
13 Such missions, which are now generally called first-generation peacekeeping, are status-quo oriented and rest on 
operational principles such as impartiality and the use of force only for purposes of self defence. 
14 The White Paper adheres to the terms ‘humanitarian helping operation’ and ‘peace enforcement operation’ while the terms 
‘humanitarian operation’ and ‘peace operation’ are used in Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94. I do not see any reason to believe 
that the different terms express conceptual differences.  
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expressions ‘not able to’ and ‘ not willing to’ refers to two generally assumed purposes 
of humanitarian operations: Either to help people who suffer dissatisfaction of basic 
provisions and needs or to stop systematic human rights violations. An example of a 
humanitarian intervention of the second kind is Operation Provide Comfort in northern 
Iraq in 1991. This operation was carried out to stop the Iraqi government from 
conducting systematic human rights violations against the Kurdish minority in the 
northern part of the Country. The operation Restore Hope, undertaken by the Unified 
Task Force in Somalia in 1992, is an example of a humanitarian helping operation that 
was carried out because the Somali government was unable to satisfy the population’s 
basic needs.  
Peace enforcement operations, the White Paper explains, are conducted to 
‘restore peace in a conflict area’ (St.meld. nr. 46 (1993–94): 15). The intervention that 
started in January 1991 to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation is mentioned as an 
example of a peace enforcement operation. Thus in principle, a peace operation could 
be conducted if a state is subjected to an attack from another state. I believe that there 
is reason to understand Norway’s willingness to participate in so-called peace 
operations in a broader context as well, namely in light of NATO’s post-Cold War 
approach to security. Given NATO’s security political context, which I accounted for 
in the previous section, believe that the Storting envisaged participation in military 
operations conducted for the purpose of NATO’s own security, in addition to 
promoting humanitarian purposes. 
 
1.3 Concluding remarks 
In this introduction I have spelled out this thesis’ research question. I have explained 
why it is fruitful to subject Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 to normative analysis by 
pointing at the relevance of morality to political life and by explaining what I take to 
be the purpose of normative analysis. I have also made some important clarifications 
concerning the parliamentary resolution for the purpose of defining its scope and 
hence the scope of this thesis. In the next chapter I will account for how I am going to 
proceed in order to answer the research question. 
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2 METHOD FOR NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
The way in which normative analysis is carried out can be decisive for its relevance to 
and usefulness for political life. In this chapter, I will first account for how such 
analysis should be conducted in order to have an impact on political decision-making 
(section 2.1). This section will demonstrate, for one thing, that normative analysis 
should proceed from issues with which people in general are concerned. Accordingly, 
I will account for the debate that preceded Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 to identify 
considerations that were important to the political decision-makers (section 2.2). I will 
then explain why I have chosen to take into account two particular considerations that 
came up during the debate (section 2.3). In the last part of this chapter (section 2.4) I 
will direct my attention to the question of how I should proceed to determine whether 
the Storting passed a morally justifiable resolution. I will propose a method for 
normative analysis with the purpose of determining how one distinguishes between 
justified and unjustified normative statements.  
 
2.1 The impact of normative analysis 
It was noted in section 1.2.1 that political arguments, to succeed, must be both 
rationally convincing and effective when it comes to influencing people’s beliefs and 
actions. I then explained why political decision-makers should incorporate moral 
considerations into decision-making processes. However, no matter how well founded 
they are, moral considerations can prove impossible to accomplish in practical terms. 
Although people – and politicians – for the most part acknowledge the existence of 
moral considerations, such considerations do not always have an impact on how they 
act. The problem is that of moral motivation.  
Moral considerations are meaningful to political life if they can influence the 
attitudes and actions of political leaders. If such considerations did not actually affect 
decisions and practices, normative analyses would not be very applicable when dealing 
with politics. The fruitfulness of normative analysis, therefore, seems to depend upon 
whether such analysis can appeal to the decision-maker’s moral motivation. How 
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should normative analysis be conducted so that they actually have an impact on 
political decision-making?  
It is generally held that particularistic interests play a decisive role when people 
make choices (Malnes 1992: 126): Self-interest and the interests of family and friends 
– not the interest of the whole world – constitute main motives for acting. When one 
acts from particularistic interests, one can easily overlook other important considerat-
ions. It is a common belief that both individuals and politicians have an agenda of their 
own, where moral considerations hardly have any impact at all. For this reason, people 
tend to consider particularistic interests destructive for one’s moral outlook and reject 
them. In a utilitarian perspective for instance, where actions are evaluated according to 
their impact on the overall welfare, acting upon particularistic interests is questionable.  
There is, however, reason to take people’s particularistic interests seriously, 
also for the political philosopher. For one thing, there can be reason to allow personal 
interests to override other people’s interests from a moral point of view. Moral 
philosophy also recognises the existence of so-called special obligations; obligations 
towards people who stand in a particular relationship to us. Just as personal interests 
might override other people’s interests, special obligations can override more impartial 
moral requirements. For present purposes, the methodological implications are 
important. As there seems to exist several possible legitimate bases of partiality, 
Malnes recommends the political philosopher to explore these possibilities: 
‘Normative theory is most likely to get through to people if it starts where practical 
deliberation normally begins: With the urge to do what is best for oneself and one’s 
associates’ (1992: 131). This methodological lesson rests on an assumption that people 
will be more responsive to moral argumentation if their own interests and concerns are 
addressed.  
Will they be equally responsive if the outcomes – the conclusions – of 
normative analyses contradict their personal inclinations? Henry Sidgwick is one 
philosopher who assumes that people are sensitive to moral argumentation, not only 
personal preferences: Men and women ‘commonly assume in [themselves] a 
determination to pursue whatever conduct may be shown by argument to be 
reasonable, even though it be very different from that to which [their] non-rational 
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inclinations may prompt’ (quoted in Malnes 1992: 128–129). Thus by demonstrating 
‘by argument’ what is ‘reasonable’, normative analysis can direct people’s behaviour 
in more impartial directions. An examination of whether an action, practice or 
institution is justified or not might affect the way in which future actions, practices and 
institutions take shape because an audience that is prepared to make words into deeds 
exists. If Sidgwick is right, one important implication is that normative analyses are 
worthwhile projects, also when they foil people’s personal interests.  
The problem of the irrelevance of political philosophy to politics is perhaps not 
only one of motivation, but also of comprehension. As Malnes (1992: 132) explains: 
‘[T]he more political theorists reason in terms that are unfamiliar to their audience, the 
less likely their arguments are to be widely comprehended and heeded’. There is a 
methodological lesson to be drawn from this observation as well. Normative analyses 
should be conducted so that people understand the considerations that are subjected to 
scrutiny and the way in which they are scrutinised. I will take the two methodological 
lessons pointed out in this section seriously: In the next section I will explore the 
parliamentary debate that preceded Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 firstly, to address the 
representative’s concerns, and secondly, to attempt at reason in terms that are well 
known to them.  
 
2.2 The debate in the Storting 
The purpose of accounting for the debate in the Storting at this early stage is to 
identify the considerations that the members of parliament themselves considered 
important when Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was passed. The aim is, in particular, to 
avoid that the normative analysis that is about to be performed proves irrelevant to 
political life.   
The debate in the Storting started about ten o’clock in the morning of 6 
December and ended just before one o’clock in the afternoon.15 As mentioned earlier, 
the resolution was passed with dissenting votes. The dissent pinpoints some important 
                                              
15 In addition to the question of Norwegian participation in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations, the issue of ordering of 
Norwegian officers to military operations abroad was extensively debated. 
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ethical considerations. I will therefore make it my point of departure in accounting for 
the debate and in identifying ethically relevant considerations.  
The members constituting the parliament’s minority – and voting against 
participation in out-of-area operations that are not authorised by the Security Council – 
based their position on the argument that it is wrong for Norway to participate in 
military operations where a regional organisation, such as NATO, has neglected the 
Security Council’s resolutions. As will be shown, this argument is based on somewhat 
different assumptions. 
One argument that was put forward by one of the members representing the 
minority is that it is reassuring that the Security Council makes decisions about 
military interventions (Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 1533). This statement must be 
understood in light of the right of veto which all of the Security Council’s five 
permanent members – China, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and 
France – enjoy. It implies that any of the permanent members can block a proposal, for 
example a proposal to allow NATO to intervene beyond its geographical boundaries. 
The system of veto, this minority member believes, ‘provides a fairly efficient safety 
net, which ensures that unreasonable decisions that would affect individual countries 
are not passed’ (Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 1533).  
Another member representing the minority points to the UN Charter as a reason 
for why he considers it wrong that Norway should participate in military operations 
where NATO has ignored the Security Council: He claims that military operations that 
are not mandated by the Security Council are unlawful according to the UN Charter 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 1550). His assumption is, in other words, that 
Norway has an obligation to respect the provisions in the UN Charter and that the 
country breaches this obligation by participating in the mentioned kinds of operations.  
A third minority member acknowledges that it might be tempting to ignore the 
provisions concerning the Security Council’s authority in the UN Charter in some 
situations. What this representative has in mind is probably a situation where the 
Security Council is paralysed because of antagonism between the veto powers. 
Nevertheless, this representative maintains that ‘one exceeds a limit’ by ignoring the 
provisions in the UN Charter (Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 1541). In his opinion it 
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would be better to adhere to the UN Charter’s formal provisions; otherwise the 
consequences may be opposite of the ones desired (Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 
1541). He does not amplify this point, but there is reason to believe that the 
undesirable consequences that he is worried about could come into existence in at least 
two different ways. First, they could result from a military operation getting out of 
control because of the lack of the Security Council’s responsibility. Second, if NATO 
ignores the Security Council’s decisions, the barrier for doing it again – or other actors 
doing it – diminishes. In the end, the Security Council’s authority could be 
undermined.  
In conclusion, the minority advances three reasons for their position: The 
Security Council’s authority, the unlawfulness of non-UN-mandated military 
operations beyond NATO territory and the obligation to respect the UN Charter.16 
The majority, on its part, did not speak of the potential unlawfulness of non-
UN-mandated out-of-area operations.17 Moreover, it proposed few arguments in favour 
of participation. One member representing the minority, however, arose to speak. He 
said that ‘there is reason to emphasise that the use of Norwegian forces abroad must be 
understood as following up NATO’s changed role in a new Europe. I would like to 
refer to the recent decisions taken at NATO’s summit this year, according to which 
support of international peace operations are notoriously defined as one of the most 
important tasks in the time to come. Norway too should undertake its responsibilities 
and obligations in this respect’ (Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 1536).  
This representative thus argues that Norway should participate because 
international peace operations were defined as one of NATO’s most important tasks at 
the Brussels summit 11 months earlier. There is reason to believe that this argument 
relies on the assumption that Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate in out-
                                              
16 These three reasons are interrelated and derive from the same argument: Norway’s obligation to respect rules of 
international law. The UN Charter, which is an important source of international law, contains provisions about the authority 
of the Security Council. 
17 However, Defence Minister Jørgen Kosmo, who was present in the Storting and took part in the debate, was asked about 
the possible security political implications of neglecting the Security Council. He first claimed that such a situation is 
hypothetical (Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 1544). The next time he spoke, however, he acknowledged that a situation in 
which the Security Council is paralysed may arise and that Norway should not demure at participating without a UN mandate 
in such a case: ‘[The second scenario] is that the UN […] actually is paralysed as an organisation due to political 
confrontations, and we should not make ourselves unable […] of coming to our neighbours’ assistance […]’ 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 1544).   
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of-area operations. Since NATO has undertaken new roles after the end of the Cold 
War, one could assume that it is Norway’s duty as a NATO member to contribute in 
order to make it possible for NATO to successfully fill these new roles. However, no 
arguments explaining what the obligation towards NATO consists in were raised 
during the debate.  
The representative’s reference to NATO’s new role in a new Europe and 
Norway’s responsibilities and obligations may also rely on an assumption that 
Norway, through NATO, has an obligation to promote peace beyond NATO’s 
geographical boundaries. An argument raised by Defence Minister Jørgen Kosmo 
supports this interpretation: He pointed to ‘ethnic and regional conflicts’ on the 
European continent and argued that the international community is facing difficult 
tasks in this respect (Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 1543).18 Therefore, Norway 
‘must take its part of the responsibility to maintain international peace and security’ 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 06.12.94: 1543). Norway has an obligation towards the 
international community to promote peace and security, so to speak.  
The Defence Minister also argued in favour of Norwegian participation in non-
UN-mandated out-of-area operations because this would enhance Norway’s own 
security: ‘We cannot reckon that others will come to our rescue if we do not ourselves 
demonstrate our willingness to undertake responsibility […]’ (Stortingsforhandlinger 
06.12.94: 1542). It is, in other words, in Norway’s self-interest to participate in out-of-
area operations for NATO. The argument proposed by the Defence Minister suggests 
that the Storting should vote in favour of participation because it has a duty to promote 
the national interest: The members of parliament can be seen as trustees who should 
always give priority to the interests of the population. 
This account of the arguments and positions in the Storting suggests that the 
dissent resulted from diverging conceptions about Norway’s obligations. The 
minority’s reluctant stance towards participation in non-UN-mandated out-of-area 
operations seems to rely on the premise that Norway breaches its obligation to respect 
rules of international law by participating in such operations that the Security Council 
                                              
18 Note that there was a full-scale war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1994. 
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has not authorised. The reasons for the majority’s vote in favour of participation were 
less explicit, but one representative referred to NATO’s new roles and seem to have 
asserted that Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate. Moreover, the 
Defence Minister argued that the Storting should vote in favour because of the national 
interest and because of a duty towards the international community to promote peace 
and security.19  
 
2.3 The Storting’s ethical considerations 
The main objective of this thesis is to determine whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 
is morally justifiable. As suggested in section 1.2, this must be determined upon 
consideration of the resolution’s premises: The resolution is justified only if the 
premises upon which it rests are valid and if the content of the resolution logically 
follows from the premises.  
When assessing whether a belief is justified, one must consider all arguments 
that are relevant to the belief (Engelstad et al. 1996: 299). If not, one risks basing one’s 
beliefs on incomplete or imperfect premises. This is to say that when determining 
whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 is justified, it is essential to have included all 
relevant considerations. This is what is understood as comprehensiveness. The 
previous section demonstrated that several considerations are relevant to Beslutning S. 
nr. 2, 06.12.94. This may suggest that I should take all considerations into account 
when investigating the resolution’s justifiability. It is impossible, however, to consider 
all considerations within the confines of this thesis. I have therefore chosen to consider 
the arguments that the members were mostly concerned with.  
The Storting’s obligation towards the Norwegian population is a significant 
consideration because the population gives political leaders authority to act on its 
behalf through democratic elections. Hence, political leaders can be seen as trustees 
who have accepted a special responsibility to meet the needs, and promote the 
                                              
19 I have presented the arguments as representative for either the entire majority or the entire minority, but we do not know 
for what reasons each representative voted either in favour of or against the resolution. However, we must assume that the 
members of parliament grounded their votes on those arguments that came up during the debate. Hence, we have reason to 
believe that those who voted against the resolution did it on the grounds of an assumed obligation to respect international law 
and that those who voted against did it on the grounds of assumed obligations towards NATO and the international 
community respectively as well as on the grounds of the national interest.   
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interests, of the population. When it comes to the obligation towards the international 
community to promote peace and security, there is little doubt that a devastating 
humanitarian situation calls for Norway’s action.20 In this case, however, the official 
report of the proceedings in the Storting shows that the representatives’ attention was 
directed towards other considerations: The minority was clearly concerned about the 
unlawfulness of participation in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations while the 
majority’s preoccupation was less explicit. The members of parliament raised one 
argument in favour of participation: The one concerning NATO’s new role and the 
decisions taken at the Brussels summit in January 1994. As suggested in the previous 
section, this argument seems to rely on an assumption that Norway is obligated 
towards NATO to participate in out-of-area operations. Since normative analyses 
should begin where practical deliberation begins to have an impact on political 
decision-making, I have chosen to explore the two considerations with which the 
members of the Storting seemed most preoccupied.  
 
2.4 A proposed method for normative analysis 
The two considerations with which the members of parliament seemed most 
preoccupied are the obligation to adhere to rules of international law and the obligation 
towards NATO to participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations. Hence, 
when passing Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94, the majority must have assumed that  
 
(i) Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 does not represent a violation of the rules 
concerning the resort to military force in international law, or 
(ii) Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 represents a violation of the rules 
concerning the resort to military force in international law, but there 
were adequate reasons for giving priority to the obligation towards 
                                              
20 This moral consideration has enjoyed extensive attention in academic literature. However, existing literature demonstrates, 
for one thing, diverging conclusions as to how this moral obligation is to be met and there is no unanimous prescriptions as to 
the use of military force. Hence, the normative standpoint that Norway should participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area 




NATO to participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations to the 
detriment of the obligation to adhere to rules of international law. 
 
If Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94, is justified, it must rest on one of the two premises. In 
order to determine whether these premises are valid, the first thing I have to do is to 
determine whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 actually complies with the rules 
concerning the resort to military force in international law. I will propose a method for 
assessing the content of rules of international law in chapter 3. If this premise turns out 
to be invalid, I must investigate the other premise: Whether there were adequate 
reasons for having given priority to the obligation towards NATO. In order to 
determine this, I have to know whether such an obligation exists in the first place. In 
practical terms, this means that I should explore whether Norway is obligated towards 
NATO to participate in out-of-area operations that the Security Council has not 
mandated. How should the validity of this normative premise be assessed?  
 
2.4.1 Testing the validity of normative statements  
In assessing whether a normative statement is justified, the crucial task consists in 
determining whether there is reason to accept the statement. A normative statement 
will be justified if anyone has reason to adopt the belief. I will therefore present a 
method for normative analysis dealing with justification and explanation for the 
purpose of determining how one may proceed in order to establish whether normative 
premises or statements – such as the one that Norway is obligated towards NATO to 
participate in out-of-area operations – are justified or not. I will first say something 
about moral intuitions, as they seem to play a role in normative reasoning.  
 
Moral intuitions 
One suggested method for testing the validity of moral ideas is to make appeal to 
moral intuitions. If one appeals to moral intuitions in testing the validity of a 
normative statement, the statement will be valid if it is intuitively appealing. Hence, 
the normative statement that Norway is obligated to participate in non-UN-mandated 
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out-of-area operations will be valid if it is intuitively appealing. There are, however, 
different understandings of what moral intuitions are.  
Most often, intuition is understood as a conviction so strong that one cannot 
think of anything that could make one renounce it (Engelstad et al. 1996: 291). A 
moral intuition is the result of more or less careful reasoning. Moral beliefs derive 
from considering the issue at hand. In testing the normative principle that Norway is 
obligated towards NATO to participate in out-of-area operations, we must make 
appeal to those considered judgments that we have already formed. The assumption is 
that we cannot trust judgments that are formed on impulse.  
However, to trust moral intuitions – even though they are considered judgments 
– can be hazardous. Judgments that are formed upon careful reasoning can be volatile 
and prejudiced: Since the state of mind changes, our intuitions about right and wrong 
cannot be consistent. It was noted above that the task of justifying moral statements 
consists in providing arguments or reasons that makes one accept the statement. To 
appeal to our intuitions – understood as considered judgments – cannot fully meet the 
methodological requirement of explanation: To make our considered judgments the 
test of validity is not to provide arguments why a certain standpoint is acceptable or 
not. This is not to say that intuitions do not play a role at all in normative reasoning, 
and I will return to this issue below. My point is simply that normative statements that 
are tested on the basis of our intuitions should be considered ad hoc responses to moral 
questions until a more careful test is carried through.  
The intuitionist method is increasingly supplemented with two other and more 
reliable ways of testing the validity of moral ideas. These tests deal with explanation 
and justification.  
 
Philosophical explanations 
The validity of a normative principle can be tested by investigating whether it is 
supported by a more general principle: More general principles are invoked as 
philosophical explanations for why a normative standpoint is correct or incorrect. If 
one does not accept the explanations that are stated in defence of the statement, the 
normative standpoint has proven invalid. Contrarily, the normative standpoint gains 
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support if we accept the more general principle. One could attempt to justify the 
normative statement that Norway should participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area 
operations by referring to a more general principle, saying that members of a scheme 
of co-operation have a duty to contribute in achieving the goals of the scheme.  
It is sometimes claimed that efforts at justifying moral beliefs through 
philosophical explanation cannot actually resolve moral disagreement. By making 
reference to more general principles, one takes moral disagreement to a higher level of 
abstraction (Malnes 1992: 124). To appeal to philosophical explanations for the 
premises upon which the parliamentary resolution rests, for example, will reveal 
diverging basic moral outlooks. In any case, it can be valuable to extract more general 
principles from specific moral beliefs. Making general principles explicit will enable 
us to understand why people actually disagree, and it contributes to greater 
transparency in normative thinking (Malnes 1992: 125).  
 
Reflective equilibrium 
Another method for assessing the validity of a normative principle consists in 
investigating possible implications in order to see whether they correspond to our 
considered judgments21 about right solutions (Engelstad et al. 1996: 292–296; Semb 
2000a: 19). This procedure has much in common with empirical hypothesis testing: 
One deduces specific implications of a given principle that one eventually subjects to 
test. If one accepts the deduced implications, it strengthens the validity of the 
normative principle. The more implications of a principle deduced and tested, the 
better it is. Hence, considered judgments have a place in the process of verification, 
but not independently of moral principles.  
What happens if the deduced principles are not accepted? There are, as Semb 
(2000a: 19) demonstrates, several solutions: One solution is to conclude that the 
principle is undermined. But since the test has only shown that the specific 
implications that are deduced are unacceptable, one cannot reject the principle 
                                              
21 According to Rawls (1972: 49), considered judgments are ‘those judgments in which our moral capacities are most likely 
to be displayed without distortion’. Engelstad et al.’s definition of considered judgment, as noted above, is conviction that is 
so strong that one cannot think of anything that could make one renounce it (1996: 291).  
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altogether. Thus the conclusion must be that the principle’s credibility is weakened. 
Another solution consists in saying that the considered judgment must yield. Yet a 
third solution is one proposed by John Rawls. He suggests that normative analysis 
should consist in achieving a so-called reflective equilibrium between normative 
principles and considered judgments (Rawls 1972: 20, 48–49): One should both test 
normative principles against judgments about particular cases and judgments about 
particular cases against normative principles. For example, to assess the validity of the 
statement that Norway should participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations, 
one should hold it to relevant normative principles. One should also hold the 
normative principles to considered judgments. Rawls’ suggestion is that in cases where 
the normative principle runs counter to our judgments, we should ‘go back and forth, 
sometimes altering the [principles], at others [withdraw] our judgments and 
conforming them to [the] principle’ (1972: 20). This operation should be performed 
until there is consistency between the normative principle and the considered 
judgment: ‘[A]t last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is reflective since 
we know to what principles our judgments conform […]’ (1972: 20). Hence, both 
normative principles and judgments about particular cases play a crucial role in 
normative reasoning. Today, this is an acknowledged and widespread method for 
testing the validity of normative statements.  
Norman Daniels (1979) elaborates the complexity in Rawls’ method and argues 
that even though consistency between a normative principles and considered 
judgments22 exists does not imply that the normative principle is justified. Daniels 
maintains that considered judgments are insufficient in assessing the validity of a 
principle: Moral justification consists in seeking a point of equilibrium that involves a 
set of considered moral judgments, normative principles and a set of relevant 
background theories (1979: 258–260). Thus a principle is justified only if a certain 
background theory gives independent support to the proposed principle (Daniels 1979: 
259). The background theory must show that the normative principle is more 
                                              
22 This is according to Daniels (1979: 258) narrow reflective equilibrium. 
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acceptable than an alternative principle. In that case, one has reached a ‘wide reflective 
equilibrium’.  
 
2.4.2 Testing the validity of the Storting’s premises 
I have now presented two ways of testing the validity of moral statements that appear 
more reliable than making appeal to moral intuitions. When I test the validity of the 
normative premises upon which Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 rests, I will primarily 
rely on the methods proposed by Rawls (1972) and Daniels (1979). My aim with 
following this procedure is to separate prejudiced and personal beliefs from justified 
beliefs.  
In determining whether the premise that Norway is obligated to participate in 
non-UN-mandated operations is valid, I am going to propose normative principles to 
investigate whether the premise comply with normative principles in this section. As 
noted above, however, to establish consistency between the premise and a normative 
principle will not be sufficient to conclude that the premise is justified. Even if the 
normative principle seems to comply with the premise, therefore, it is necessary to 
advance philosophical arguments. This will be done in subsequent chapters. In 
attempts at determining whether the normative principle is independently supported by 
such philosophical arguments, I will invoke ethical theories.  
It was explained in section 2.2 that the Storting’s majority did not point out why 
it considers Norway obligated towards NATO to participate in non-UN-mandated out-
of-area operations. Three possible sources of obligation, or normative principles, can 
be suggested, however. The first possible source of obligation is a contractual 
obligation. The North Atlantic Treaty established NATO as an organisation and 
Norway ratified this treaty on 8 July 1949 (Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2002). As noted in the introduction, the mutual defence commitment 
embedded in Article 5 constitutes the Treaty’s cornerstone. Article 3 establishes that 
every member state is obligated to ‘separately and jointly, by means of continuous and 
effective self-help and mutual aid maintain and develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack’. Does the North Atlantic Treaty establish that Norway 
is required to participate in out-of-area operations?  
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According to the terms of Article 3, Norway has consented23 to develop its own 
and the other members’ capacity to resist armed attack. This commitment must be 
understood in light of NATO’s main preoccupation when the North Atlantic Treaty 
was adopted: The defence of NATO territory against the threat of Soviet aggression or 
coercion. Throughout the Cold War, NATO operations beyond its territory was 
unthinkable (Yost 1998: 189). Moreover, Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which 
describes the geographical limits of Article 5, was generally interpreted restrictively to 
exclude military operations out of area (Yost 1998: 189). For these reasons, we can 
reasonable conclude that the North Atlantic Treaty does not require Norway to 
participate in out-of-area operations. Hence, the first proposed normative principle did 
not fit with the premise that Norway must participate in out-of-area operations.  
The North Atlantic Treaty does not necessarily give a full account of Norway’s 
obligations towards NATO, however. As explained in section 1.2.3, NATO is no 
longer an alliance based exclusively on collective defence. Political declarations, 
investments, exercises and military operations after the Cold War demonstrate that the 
alliance also has collective security aspirations. Collective security and the activities 
associated with the concept were not envisaged when the North Atlantic Treaty was 
adopted. These would require an expansion of obligations beyond the mutual defence 
pledge expressed in Article 5. What arguments suggest that NATO members could be 
obligated to enhance collective security? 
The Storting’s Defence Committee proposes another normative principle. In the 
recommendation to the Storting, it alludes to the fair distribution of burdens as a 
source of moral obligation:  
[T]he debate concerning the distribution of burdens within NATO [...] gives reason to 
stress that one must consider ordering Norwegian forces to NATO operations to a 
greater extent than earlier.               (Innst. S. nr. 23 (1994–95): 2) 
The Defence Committee does not explicitly say that Norway should participate in non-
UN-mandated out-of-area operations because it constitutes Norway’s fair share. 
However, a majority of the Defence Committee’s members proposed to the Storting 
that Norway should participate in out-of-area operations even if the Security Council 
                                              
23 I will thoroughly treat the issue of consent and international treaties a source of obligation in sections 3.2 and 5.2.1. 
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has not given a formal authorisation to such operations. This suggests that we may 
reasonably assume that this majority asserted that participation in non-UN-mandated 
operations constitutes part of Norway’s fair share of the burden as a NATO member. 
The principle of fair distribution of burdens seems to give support to the premise that 
Norway should participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations, but it will 
have to be investigated in more detail. To determine whether the premise is justified, I 
will invoke the notion of equality to assess whether the principle of fair distribution of 
burdens actually gives independent support to the proposed principle. I will do this in 
chapter 4.  
A third normative principle suggests that Norway should participate in non-UN-
mandated out-of-area: The principle of reciprocity. This principle requires beneficiar-
ies to make returns for received benefits. In the present case, the principle suggests that 
Norway’s membership in NATO has yielded benefits that generate an obligation to 
participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations because Norway owes NATO 
this kind of contribution. If a reciprocal obligation imposes a duty on Norway towards 
NATO, it must be because its membership has yielded benefits beyond those benefits 
that the North Atlantic Treaty establishes. The reason is that the North Atlantic Treaty 
itself established that the members are obligated to contribute in enhancing the goals 
that the Treaty sets out. To determine whether this principle gives independent support 
to the premise that Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate in out-of-area 
operations, I will explore thoroughly explore the notion of reciprocity as it has been 
expounded in philosophy and sociology in chapter 5.  
There are three possible conclusions to the question of whether the premises on 
which Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 rests are valid: 
(i) The resolution is justified. Both premises of Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94 – that the resolution meets an obligation to participate in 
non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations and does not represent 
a violation of the rules concerning the resort to military force in 
international law – are valid. 
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(ii) The resolution is unjustified. Neither premises of Beslutning S. 
nr. 2, 06.12.94 are valid. 
(iii) There is a situation of a moral dilemma. The premise that the 
resolution meets an obligation to participate in non-UN-mandated 
out-of-area operations is valid, while the premise that it does not 
represent a violation of the rules concerning the resort to military 
force in international law is invalid. 
If (iii) turns out to be the case, I will have to subject the considerations to 
scrutiny again in order to determine whether there were adequate reasons for 
having solved the moral dilemma in favour of the obligation towards NATO to 
the detriment of the obligation to adhere to rules of international law.  
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The main purpose of this chapter is to assess whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 
complies with the rules concerning the resort to military force in international law or 
not. The crucial question is whether international law allows or prohibits an alliance of 
states, such as NATO, to resort to military force outside of its geographical boundaries 
if the Security Council has not authorised such action. International law is an 
international norms system that consists of numerous rules. The modern international 
law system began to take shape in the 17th Century, but some rules of international law 
have roots in the early Middle Ages. Most contemporary rules of international law, 
however, have come to existence after 1945. 
International law makes a fundamental distinction between offensive and 
defensive action. In assessing the lawfulness of Beslutning S. nr.2, 06.12.94, one 
should know whether to characterise the military operations that the Storting 
consented to as offensive or defensive in nature. In section 1.2.4 it was noted that 
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 seems to approve of Norwegian participation in NATO 
operations that are conducted for one of the two following purposes: 
 
(i) Humanitarian: To prevent or stop human rights violations or to secure 
fundamental needs in the case of a humanitarian crisis in countries that are 
not members of NATO. 
(ii) Defensive: To meet the security threat that instability in NATO’s 
geographical rim represents to the alliance.  
 
The purpose of military operations of the first kind is to protect individuals from 
human rights violations or to help off human suffering. As the defence of an innocent 
third party is what is at stake, one can be easily be led to think that these kinds of 
military operations imply defensive action. International law is state-centred, however. 
When defence of an innocent third party presupposes intervention in the internal 
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affairs of a state, it is considered an aggressive action.24 This explains why military 
actions for humanitarian purposes often are referred to as humanitarian interventions, a 
concept that I return to in section 3.6. For this reason, one must assess the lawfulness 
of military operations for humanitarian purposes by invoking rules concerning 
offensive action.  
NATO’s redefinition of security after the end of the Cold War challenges the 
strict distinction between offensive and defensive action in international law. As noted 
in section 1.2.3, NATO perceives instability in its geographical rim as a threat and is 
prepared to carry through military operations to encounter this threat. Thus, one should 
not preclude the possibility that NATO could be the first to transgress an international 
border. This would imply that one should evaluate this kind of military operations in 
light of the rules concerning offensive action. In NATO’s perspective, to understand 
possible military operations of this kind as offensive in nature is to miss the point. 
Rather, they should be understood as a new approach in enhancing security, and thus 
of defensive nature.25 I will take NATO at its word and evaluate such military 
operations in light of the right to self-defence in international law.  
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 establishes that the military operations that 
Norway will participate in must be ‘in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter together with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the 
intentions of the Paris Declaration’. While the Storting considers both the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Paris Declaration relevant to the conduct of out-of-area operations, I 
will not. The Helsinki Final Act, which was adopted in 1975 and established the 
CSCE, is a regional arrangement. So is the Paris Declaration, which was adopted by 
the CSCE in 1990. For reasons that I return to in section 3.4, this implies that these 
documents do not enjoy the same status as the UN Charter as sources of international 
law.  
                                              
24 Note that the UN Charter lacks an explicit principle of non-intervention. However, the UN General Assembly has adopted 
two resolutions that reaffirm the principle of non-intervention (Semb 2000b: 471).  
25 The military operation in Afghanistan is conducted with reference to rules of self-defence. The Norwegian Defence 
Minister Kristin Krohn Devold has explicitly stated this several times, the last time on 12 October 2002: ‛The terror plot 
against the United States exceeded high jacking and terror bombing. The plot amounted to an armed attack which implies that 
the rules of self-defence in international law come to effect’ (Devold 2002).  
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International law is a dynamic norms system; it is continually developing. This 
suggests that I must identify the rules concerning the resort to military force in the year 
1994, when Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was passed. International legal standards are 
rarely crystal clear, however. In sections 3.1 and 3.2 I will point to some reasons that 
throw light on the apparently impalpable nature of international law. In section 3.3 I 
will suggest a method for how one nevertheless may proceed to assess the content of 
rules of international law. In section 3.4 and 3.5 I will account for the rules concerning 
the resort to military force and in section 3.6 I will assess whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94 complies with these rules or not.  
 
3.1 Legal standards and moral principles 
As pointed out above, the purpose of the present chapter is to determine whether 
Beslutning S. nr, 2, 06.12.94 is unlawful according to the rules concerning the resort to 
military force in international law. However, there is a tendency to equal what is 
lawful with what is morally permissible (or obligatory) in international relations. 
During NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, legal rules and moral 
principles were used interchangeably to justify the intervention. The Norwegian 
government justified the bombing by referring to legislation. At least on one occasion, 
Foreign Minister Vollebæk referred to the UN Charter to justify NATO’s bombing 
(Vollebæk 1999). The US government, contrarily, invoked moral principles. President 
Clinton argued that passivity towards the Albanian civilian population would be 
immoral. To him, NATO action was ‘a moral imperative’ (Clinton 1999). The 
academic debate that arose in the wake of the bombing in Kosovo reflects different 
methodological traditions. Some scholars follow a legalist approach, while others 
invoke ethical concepts.26 The recourse to both legal standards and moral principles 
points towards the existence of a normative double standard in international relations: 
An obligation to adhere to rules of international law and an obligation to adhere to 
                                              
26 Simma (1999) and Helgesen (1999) adhere to a legalist approach. Reichberg (2001), on the other hand, argues that it is 
important to move beyond a purely legalist approach. Fixdal & Smith (1998) have earlier shown that most discussion on 
humanitarian intervention is devoid of ethical concepts and suggested the resort to ethical concepts in the Just War tradition.  
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moral principles. Is it unimportant whether one invokes one normative framework 
rather than the other?  
Many – probably most – contemporary rules of international law reflect moral 
principles. Provisions concerning human rights, refugees and asylum, for example, are 
strongly influenced by such principles. So are the rules concerning the resort to 
military force. It is important to note, however, that not all moral principles are, or 
should be, translated into legal injunctions. In order for legislation to be effective when 
it comes to directing the behaviour of both people and states, different pragmatic 
considerations suggest that not every part of morality has a counterpart in law (see 
Malnes 1994: 74–78).27 This implies that a state’s legal obligations under international 
law are not necessarily equivalent to its moral obligations. Hence, an action can be 
unlawful, but morally irreproachable or even praiseworthy. To assess the lawfulness of 
an action, therefore, one must clearly invoke legislation.  
The notion of necessity occurs in both national and international legislation. 
According to this notion, an action that in the ordinary run of things is unlawful can 
nevertheless be lawful (Helgesen 1999: 19). This notion is meant to apply only in very 
special circumstances: in the case of uttermost necessity. The 1980 Drafts Articles on 
State Responsibility by the International Law Commissions, which is considered the 
most thorough and authoritative one on the notion of necessity, concludes that the 
notion of necessity is a relevant source of international law (Helgesen 1999: 20). Is the 
notion of necessity relevant for assessing the lawfulness of Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94? 
As noted in the introduction, the purpose of the Storting’s vote was to lay down 
guidelines for the use of Norwegian forces abroad. There are no indications that 
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was passed because of necessity. This implies that I do 
not have to consider it. Moreover, it seems to me that to invoke this notion in cases 
when a state or several states has carried through actions that in the ordinary run of 
things are unlawful, comes close to a moral justification for the unlawful action. How 
                                              
27 One such pragmatic consideration is the slippery slope argument. There are different versions of this argument, but a 
general structure of it is as follows: (1) If X is permitted, Y will be hard to avoid; (2) Y is morally unacceptable or otherwise 
undesirable; therefore (3) X must not be permitted (Malnes 1994: 77).  
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can one say that the law itself constitute the basis for considering the act permissible? 
When the letter of the law is overridden by very special circumstances, it seems that a 
justification beyond the law itself is invoked. For these reasons, I will rule out the 
notion of necessity in the following account. I will evaluate Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94 in light of the legal framework that international law provides. 
 
3.2 International law and the feature of the international system  
It was mentioned in the previous section that rules of international law are rarely 
crystal clear. In this section, I am going to account for some basic features of the 
international system that shed light on the difficulties related to assessing the rules of 
international law. An important reason why it is difficult to establish the precise 
content of a rule is that some issues, as the resort to military force, are grounded in 
different sources. Sometimes, the sources express different standards.  
This is not only the case for international rules, however: National rules are also 
grounded in various sources. At the national level, however, interpretation and 
application of legislation takes place according to established procedures within a 
hierarchical system of courts. The feature of the international system, however, causes 
special problems of interpretation. At the international level, the task of interpretation 
is shared by institutions of a rather different nature: By national courts, international 
organisations, such as the United Nations, and international institutions, such as the 
International Court of Justice and the European Court for Human Rights. However, 
most international law theory gives the International Court of Justice a prominent 
status when it comes to interpretation.  
The task of the International Court of Justice is to settle those legal disputes that 
states submit to it. Its scope is, nevertheless, limited: It depends on the states’ own 
decisions whether an international dispute is to be taken to the International Court of 
Justice or not. Therefore, the Court only considers a limited number of issues. Both the 
International Court of Justice, the ad-hoc tribunals for war crimes in the former 
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Yugoslavia and in Rwanda and the International Permanent Criminal Court28 are 
indications of a judiciary power at the international level. However, the international 
community lacks a sovereign executive power to compel the Court’s decisions. The 
international system also lacks a sovereign legislative power. The lack of a legislative, 
an executive, and a sovereign judiciary power in the international system is one reason 
why it is often characterised as a system of sovereign states. For present purposes, 
what is important is the following question: How does international law emerge in this 
‘system of sovereign states’?  
According to one position – of which John Austin is one important proponent 
(Malnes 1994: 72; Stumpf 1966: 95) – law can only emerge from sovereign power. 
Since there is no sovereign legislative body at the international level, this is to say that 
there is no such thing as international law. However, the fact that states themselves 
often refer to international law in initiating foreign policy acts certainly implies that 
international law exists. So is the mere existence of the International Court of Justice – 
and its judgements.  
According to the theory of consent, however, international law comes into 
existence independently of a sovereign legislative power: It is the product of the 
consent of states. To consent is to explicitly undertake an obligation.29 International 
law emerges because states consent to behave in particular manners through 
agreements with other states. This means that states – when giving their consent – both 
create law and bind themselves to its provisions. Although consent theory does seem 
to come up with a reliable explanation for how international law emerges, it is not 
immune to critique. The criticism levelled against this theory is that it suffers from two 
shortcomings, a critique that I am going to treat in some detail. I will draw on 
Stumpf’s (1966: 170–171) criticism in the following.  
Firstly, it is maintained that consent cannot be an obligation-generating act. The 
reason for this is that the international system is a system of sovereign states. As the 
notion that one becomes bound by consenting is itself not the product of anybody’s 
                                              
28 The Rome statute on the International Permanent Criminal Court, adopted in 1998, entered into force on 1 July 2002 
(Rome Statute of the International Permanent Criminal Court). It is expected that the court will be operational in the first half 
of 2003 (Amnesty International). 
29 This issue is treated in more detail in section 5.2.1.  
 46
consent, agreements to behave in a special manner cannot actually bind states. Hence, 
self-imposed limitations cannot be true limitations. Is the critique justified? 
When states consent to or approve of international treaties, they declare towards 
other states that they actually will adhere to treaty provisions. When states consent to 
rules of international law, therefore, they promise towards other states to behave in a 
particular manner. Hence, to maintain that states are not bound by consent is to say 
that they enjoy a right to break their promises. This implies that critics of consent 
theory adhere to a special understanding of the concept sovereignty. It is invoked as a 
normative argument saying that the moral principle that promises should be kept does 
not apply to states. Since I have already argued that morality is indeed relevant to the 
political sphere, I shall not dwell with the issue of whether states become obligated by 
consenting to rules of international law. I shall assume that they do. It is a matter of 
fact that states themselves perceive consent as an obligation-generating act: Although 
they do not always adhere to the rules that they have consented to, they do from time 
to time explicitly declare that international law is binding. Furthermore, generations of 
international lawyers have viewed consent as the pre-eminent feature of international 
law and relations (Charney & Danilenko 1995: 23).  
A second criticism levelled against consent theory is that it does not give a 
satisfactory explanation for why new states are bound by international law. It is a 
widespread notion – not least among states themselves – that when new states are 
formed, they are required to adhere to existing international law provisions. As new 
states cannot possibly have given their consent, however, consent theory only partly 
explains why states must adhere to rules of international law. Moreover, consent 
theory does not explain why states are obligated to adhere to customary international 
law, which is not created upon the explicit undertaking of an obligation.30  
The principle of reciprocity and the principle of fair play are two other possible 
sources of obligation. These principles suggest that when states benefit from other 
states adhering to international law, they are required to make returns for the benefits 
by adhering to the same rules. I will thoroughly account for the mentioned principles 
                                              
30 I will account for customary international law in section 3.3.2. 
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in chapter 5. Thus, a full account of what it is that actually obligates states to respect 
rules of international law will therefore have to remain somewhat unresolved 
throughout this chapter.  
I will now turn to the question of how one should proceed to identify the 
content of rules of international law. I will start by accounting for the different sources 
of international law. 
 
3.3 Sources of international law  
Article 38 in the Statute of the International Court of Justice contains important 
principles. It defines the relevant sources of international law:  
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
This article partly supports the view that international law is a product of state consent 
as international conventions (or treaties) are created when states explicitly declare that 
that they consider themselves bound by it. International custom, however, emerges not 
from explicit declarations, but from other forms of state behaviour. A thorough 
account of these two important sources follows in the next two paragraphs. First, 
however, I will briefly account for the two other sources of international law that the 
Statute recognises (letters c and d): General principles of law, judicial decisions and 
juridical literature. These sources do not derive from state behaviour.  
In the previous section I mentioned several institutions that pass judicial 
decisions. It was noted that the International Court of Justice enjoys a prominent status 
among these institutions. Accordingly, there seems to be reason to pay more attention 
to the judgements passed by this institution than to the other institutions’ judgements. 
The wording of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice confers 
judicial decisions and juridical literature subsidiary status as sources, while treaties and 
custom are given primary importance. In spite of that, juridical literature will have a 
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prominent place in my account because this source is more easily accessible than the 
other sources. The literature that I refer to, however, use conventions and custom as its 
primary sources, in conformity with Article 38 in the Statute.31  
Letter c in Article 38 mentions general principles of law as a source of 
international law. There exist several possible interpretations of this source of 
international law. There are, however, serious objections to all of these interpretations. 
The International Court of Justice has never fully examined the general principles of 
law as a source. Neither has it expressly found that a particular norm has been derived 
from general principles (Charney & Danilenko 1995: 45). Anthony Arend (2000: 49–
53), however, argues that this source of international law has been underestimated in 
international law theory. He suggests that general principles of law are essential for the 
very existence of international law: He sees the general principles of law as principles 
about the nature of international law. They are ‘philosophically prior to custom and 
treaties’ (Arend 2000: 52). One general principle of law, he argues, is that international 
law is created by states: ‘For all the other sources to make sense, it must first be 
accepted that states are the constitutive agents’ (Arend 2000: 52).  
A reasonable interpretation of Arend’s assertions is that he uses the general 
principles of law to make up for the difficulties with explaining why states actually are 
obligated to respect rules of international law. It seems, however, that Arend gives the 
general principles of law too much significance. As noted above, the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice reckons general principles of law as one of several 
sources of rules of international law. Since there is no unanimous interpretation of this 
source of international law, I will not consider it when I later ascertain the rules 
concerning the resort to military force. 
 
3.3.1 International treaties 
An international treaty (or a convention) is a written agreement between at least two 
states or other subjects of international law. A treaty is most often the product of a 
                                              
31 As will be demonstrated in section 3.4, contemporary international law theory diverges on the confidence it places in 
conventions and custom and for this reason there is a tendency to weight the two sources differently. I shall be explicit about 
my own position.  
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long negotiation process. Treaties become rules of international law when a 
sufficiently number of states – usually specified by the treaty itself – explicitly has 
approved of the treaty. An explicit approval can take many forms: as signature, accept-
ance, accession or ratification (The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 
11). When approving of a treaty, states become bound by the convention’s provisions. 
An important question in international law theory is whether a non-contracting state 
can become bound by an international convention.  
Generally, the answer is no. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties establishes that ‘a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
party without its consent’. This is in accordance with the previous account of consent 
theory. The International Court of Justice has also stressed that treaties cannot bind a 
state without its consent (Charney & Danilenko 1995: 38). The underlying assumption 
of this position is that states are free until they voluntarily agree to be bound by 
treaties.  
Nevertheless, it is sometimes asserted that treaties can bind third states in 
special cases and that the UN Charter is a treaty of this kind. One argument set forth is 
that the Charter has acquired status as international custom and that consequently, all 
states are bound by the custom. Another argument the rules in the Charter have 
become peremptory norms (Charney & Danilenko 1995: 40). Since Norway has 
ratified the Charter and thus bound by it, I will not dwell with this issue in more detail.  
 
3.3.2 International custom 
While there is generally little doubt whether an international treaty exists, the case is 
somewhat different when it comes to international custom. International custom is a 
source of international law that is not expressed in written form. International custom – 
and treaties also – exist both at the regional and at the international level. How does 
one determine whether an international custom has emerged? Article 38 in the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice does not suggest how international custom comes 
into existence. It simply notes that international custom is ‘an evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law’ (Article 38). In international law theory, this point is 
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amplified as two criteria (Charney & Danilenko 1995: 34). For an international custom 
to exist,  
 
(i) there must be a general practice, and 
(ii) the states must perceive the general practice to be law (opinio juris). 
 
The first criterion implies that states do not have to declare themselves bound by a 
legal standard as long as their behaviour actually comply with the standard. The 
second criterion implies that states must adhere to a practice because they presume that 
a legal obligation require that they behave in that specific manner. Hence, a policy 
pursued for the sake of the national interest of states will not give rise to customary 
international law. If a state wants to create a new rule or modify the content of an 
already existing rule, it should invite a negotiation process for the purpose of adopting 
a new treaty. 
A crucial question is how common state behaviour must be to qualify as an 
international custom. It is generally assumed that a custom emerges if a majority of the 
states in the international community adhere to a practice. A qualifying majority 
should be decided upon consideration of a specific case. It is also assumed that states 
that do not adhere to practice also become bound to the custom. This follows from the 
assumption that silence gives consent. However, states may protest against a practice. 
What are the implications if a state refuses to acknowledge a custom? A dissent at the 
regional level may be fatal to the establishment of a norm. At the international level, 
however, it is not likely that one or a few dissenting states can prevent an over-
whelming majority’s practice from becoming a rule of international law, and thus 
binding also upon the protesting states themselves (Charney & Danilenko 1995: 34).  
 
3.4 Assessing the content of rules of international law 
It was noted above that the Statute of the International Court of Justice establishes 
treaties and international custom as primary sources of international law. However, the 
relationship between the two sources is complex: On the one hand, a treaty can replace 
an international custom. During the 20th century, international custom with uncertain 
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legal status has been codified in the form of written agreements. On the other hand, 
international custom may replace a treaty. State behaviour that differs from 
convention-based rules can give rise to new legal considerations. When one wants to 
ascertain the content of an international legal rule, therefore, one must seek for 
evidence in state behaviour. Have states consented to a legal rule by approving of an 
international treaty? Does a certain practice qualify as international custom?  
Scholarly writings, however, offer different methodological traditions for deter-
mining the content of a rule of international law. Although the traditions recognise 
both treaties and custom as sources, they diverge with regard to the interpretation of 
state behaviour and the weighting of sources. One tradition – by its critics called legal 
positivism (Arend 1999: 70) – considers international treaties as primary sources as 
they express state consent. In this perspective, substantial evidence – a widespread 
practice and opinio juris – is required to say that an international custom with a 
different legal standard than the one expressed in a treaty has emerged. This is the 
traditional and the predominant view.  
Another approach, of which Anthony Arend and Robert Beck (Arend & Beck 
1993; Arend 1999) are important proponents, sees greater difficulties with using 
treaties as sources. Arend & Beck (1993: 9–10) set up what they call an authority-
control test in order to determine the content of a rule of international law. To 
determine whether a putative norm is genuinely law, one must establish whether it is 
‘authoritative’ and ‘controlling’. Any norm of international law – either expressed in a 
text or established through custom – must be both authoritative and controlling. I shall 
devote some space to an account and discussion of the authority-control test. 
According to Arend & Beck (1999: 9), a rule is controlling if it is reflected in 
the actual practice of states. 100 percent compliance is not necessary. This is in 
accordance with the previous account of what it takes for treaties and custom to be 
binding on states. The case is different when it comes to the other criterion. Arend & 
Beck (1999: 9) defines a norm as authoritative if states, in general, ‘regard the norm as 
legitimate; they must perceive it to be “law”. In the traditional language of 
international law, the norm must have opinio juris’ (Arend & Beck 1993: 9). 
According to Arend & Beck, this criterion applies for treaties as well as for customary 
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international law. It is worth considering the implications of the authority criterion for 
treaties.  
As states must perceive treaties as law for it to be genuinely law, the criterion 
implies that it is not enough that states actually have approved of a treaty. Although 
Arend & Beck’s comments on what it actually takes for states to ‘regard a norm as 
legitimate’ are rather sparse, the few remarks gives one reason to believe that they 
assert that states must adhere to a treaty to perceive it as law: If states do not actually 
comply with a treaty that they have approved of, it is no longer controlling of their 
behaviour, which is the basic criterion. The underlying assumption of this view must 
be that if states do not adhere to an established treaty, this is evidence that they have 
withdrawn their consent. This understanding of what it means that states ‘regard’ a 
norm as legitimate implies that if a considerable number of states breach a treaty’s 
provisions, for the sake of their own national interest for instance, it should no longer 
be regarded as valid law.  
In section 3.3.2 it was noted that it takes more to say that a treaty no longer 
represents valid law: Only a new custom – a widespread practice among states and 
opinio juris – can nullify a treaty. This is the predominant view. In making these basic 
assertions, this approach proposes a normative barrier against policies that are pursued 
for the sake of the national interest. It precludes any foreign policy from becoming 
normative unless it is carried out based on a belief that it is legally required. Hence, it 
guarantees that states simply can ignore their promises by pursuing a new practice.32  
In the following account, I will adhere to the method for assessing the content 
of international law that the traditional and predominant method offers. While Arend 
& Beck’s (1999) account implies that states easily can form new practices, the basic 
assertions embedded in the traditional approach are in accordance with the basic 
assumptions about the feature of the international system and state sovereignty set 
forth in section 3.2: That states, although existing in a system that lack sovereign 
legislative and executive power, are morally required to keep their promises.  
 
                                              
32 As noted above, this does not imply that it is impossible to achieve a legitimate breakthrough for new practices: Any state 
can initiate a negotiating process for the purpose of adopting a new treaty expressing a different legal standard. 
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3.5 Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 and the United Nations Charter  
The purpose of this section is to determine whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 
complies with the rules concerning the resort to military force in the UN Charter. I will 
first account for the rules in the Charter (section 3.5.1) and then evaluate Beslutning S. 
nr. 2, 06.12.94 in light of the rules. 
 
3.5.1 The rules concerning the resort to military force in the United Nations Charter  
The United Nations Charter was adopted at the San Francisco Conference on 26 June 
1945. The United Nations came into official existence on 24 October 1945 when 
China, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and a major-
ity of the other signatories had ratified the Charter. Norway ratified the UN Charter on 
27 November 1945 (Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002). Today, 
the UN consists of 191 member states (United Nations Home Page).  
The primary rule about the resort to military force – Article 2 (4) – is a general 
prohibition on the resort to military force:  
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.  
This article forbids offensive war and states that threat of use of force is illegal.  
An overwhelming majority of international law experts consider Article 2 (4) to 
be part of jus cogens. This means that it is accepted and recognised by the international 
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
(Simma 1999: 3). Accordingly, any agreement or decision that contradicts Article 2 (4) 
is unlawful. For example, a regional agreement that runs contrary to the article will be 
unlawful. Rules that enjoy the status of jus cogens can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same peremptory character 
(Simma 1999: 3).  
The UN Charter contains two exceptions to the general prohibition of the resort 
to military force. According to Article 51, the member states are entitled to protect 
themselves individually or collectively in the case of an ‘armed attack’ directed from 
another state. This right to self-defence only applies ‘until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’ (Article 51). 
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This means that until the Security Council has established that there is a breach of the 
peace and has taken the necessary measures, an attacked state enjoy a right to self-
defence.  
There is also another exception to Article 2 (4). Article 24 gives the Security 
Council a superior responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. 
Chapter 7 in the UN Charter contains several articles that describe the way in which 
the Security Council may exercise this responsibility. According to Article 39, the 
Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression. If the Council concludes that a particular situation qualifies 
as such, it decides what measures that shall be taken to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. The Security Council’s competence is exclusive in 
this respect. Articles 41 and 42 describe the kinds of measures that the Security 
Council can take.  
Article 42 contains the most severe measures: The Security Council ‘may take 
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security’. However, the United Nations has never had military 
forces of its own. When the Security Council has mandated military operations under 
the provisions of Chapter 7, it has always delegated the military responsibility for 
carrying through the military operations to the member states.33  
After the Cold War, the Security Council has authorised several military 
interventions: In Somalia in 1992 (Resolution 794), in Bosnia in 1993 (Resolution 
836), in Rwanda in 1994 (Resolution 929) and in Haiti in 1994 (Resolution 940). The 
military intervention in Northern Iraq in 1991 was conducted with reference to 
Resolution 688, but there is some dispute about the legal status of this intervention 
(Semb 2000b: 473). The mentioned resolutions were passed because the Security 
Council considered the conditions within these countries as a threat to ‘international 
                                              
33 Note that according to the Charter, the Security Council undertakes those measures that it considers necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Hence by giving the member states a military responsibility, the Security Council makes use 
of the member states’ military forces in exercising the responsibility for international peace and security. UN-mandated 
operations are therefore the Security Council’s responsibility according to the UN Charter. More and more often, however, 
one tends to think in opposite terms: That UN-mandated military operations are carried through with the authorisation of the 
Security Council. It should also be noted that if the Security Council is blocked and does not exercise its primary 
responsibility for collective security, the United Nations might recourse to the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure. The General 
Assembly can, with a 2/3 vote, recommend military measures, and has done so once, during the Korean War (see Helgesen 
1999: 17–18; White 2000: 38–41).  
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peace and security’. There was no risk that the mentioned states would attack other 
states, however. Hence, the adopted resolutions demonstrate that the Security Council 
has stretched the concepts ‘threat to the peace’, ‘breach of the peace’ or ‘act of 
aggression’.  
 
3.5.2 Is Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 lawful according to the UN Charter? 
I will now turn to Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94. Does it comply with the rules 
embedded in the UN Charter or not? The previous account has shown that the primary 
rule concerning the resort to military force in the UN Charter is a general prohibition 
on the resort to military force. The resolution therefore, if it is lawful, must come 
under one of the two exceptions to this rule.  
In the introduction to this chapter I said that possible military operations for 
humanitarian purposes, in the state-centric perspective of international law, are 
considered offensive in nature. As the UN Charter prohibits offensive use of force 
unless the Security Council has authorised such action, Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 is 
clearly unlawful as it establishes that Norwegian participation in operations for 
humanitarian purposes beyond the territory of NATO might take place in cases when 
the Security Council has given no authorisation to such operations.  
What is there to say of out-of-area operations for purposes of self-defence? Are 
such operations in accordance with the other exception to Article 2 (4) – article 51 –
concerning the right to individual or collective self-defence? It was noted in the 
introduction to this chapter that it is reasonable to suppose that NATO could be the 
first to transgress an international border even though a military operation is conducted 
with reference to self-defence. This means that military actions can take place before 
an armed attack has occurred towards any of the NATO members. This raises the 
question of whether Article 51 prohibits anticipatory self-defence or not.  
According to Article 51, the right to collective or individual self-defence is 
triggered ‘if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations’ (italics 
added). The wording of this article implies that the use of force that falls short of an 
armed attack – for example isolated border incidents – does not warrant military self-
defence. However, there was no definition of the phrase ‘armed attack’ in the records 
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of the San Francisco Conference, probably because the term was regarded as 
sufficiently clear and self-evident (Alexandrov 1996: 96). Some scholars maintain that 
Article 51 does not bar anticipatory self-defence. One reason they give is that Article 
51 was not meant to restrict the customary right to self-defence before the UN Charter 
was adopted, which accepted anticipatory self-defence. Other scholars have argued 
that Article 51 actually was meant to restrict the customary right of self-defence 
(Alexandrov 1996: 100). Since Article 51 does not itself establish how an ‘armed 
attack’ is to be understood, we must assess how this rule has been interpreted. Stanimir 
Alexandrov (1996: 213) demonstrates that states have interpreted Article 51 
restrictively. There has been a strong resistance among states to broaden the scope of 
self-defence to permit force except where there has been an armed attack or threat of 
an imminent attack. The International Court of Justice has affirmed this interpretation 
of Article 51. In its judgment on Nicaragua vs. USA, the Court found that the exercise 
of the right of individual or collective self-defence ‘is subject to the State concerned 
having been the victim of an armed attack’ (quoted in Müllerson & Scheffer 1995: 
105, italics added). This suggests that there is no right to anticipatory self-defence and 
I may reasonably conclude, therefore, that out-of-area operations, even if conducted 
for purposes of self-defence, are unlawful according to the UN Charter.  
 
3.6 Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 and customary international law  
As noted in section 3.4, international custom can replace international conventions. In 
assessing the lawfulness of Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94, this calls for an inquiry of 
customary international law. In order to give a definite answer as to whether 
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 is unlawful or not, I am now going to investigate whether 
an international custom expressing a different legal standard than the UN Charter had 
emerged in 1994. Is there evidence of an international customary rule that permits 
states to intervene in other countries irrespective of the Security Council’s decisions, 
for either of the following purposes?  
 
(i) To stop governmental oppression of a country’s citizens or to secure 
fundamental needs in the case of a humanitarian crisis, or  
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(ii) To prevent instability in other countries from spreading to own territory. 
 
I will adhere to state practise that is documented and interpreted by international law 
scholars in this section.  
Often, a customary international rule concerning the resort to military force for 
the protection of human rights is referred to as the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. This doctrine has its roots in the Just War tradition, which emerged with 
St. Augustin in the 4th century. Today, it has several appearances. In a generic form, 
however, it says that a state or a coalition of states can intervene in another country’s 
internal affairs if an overwhelming majority of the state’s citizens are subjected to 
grave, systematic and widespread oppression. Moreover, the intervening state must not 
have political or economical interests that motivate it to undertake the intervention 
(Helgesen 1999: 24). A number of unilateral interventions with reference to human 
rights took place during the Cold War, in Congo (1964), in East Pakistan (1971), in 
Zaire (1978), in Cambodia (1978–79) and in Uganda (1979). These interventions were 
not recognised as humanitarian interventions by the international community: Both 
UN member states, the Security Council and the General Assembly have taken a 
reluctant stand towards these interventions (Helgesen 1999: 28–30). This suggests that 
none of the interventions constitute precedence for humanitarian intervention.  
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention experienced a revival after the Cold 
War. In particular, the oppression of the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq in 1991 
triggered a new debate about the doctrine. Today, there is a widespread consensus that 
human rights are not only a matter for the internal affairs of states; they concern the 
international community as a whole. As demonstrated in section 3.5.1, international 
law has developed in recent years as the Security Council acknowledges that human 
rights and humanitarian disasters are concerns of international peace and security. Is 
there, however, evidence that humanitarian intervention is established as customary 
international law?  
Two interventions with clear humanitarian purposes – and lacking explicit UN 
mandate – were conducted before Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was passed: 
ECOWAS’ peacekeeping operation in Liberia from 1990 and the intervention in 
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Northern Iraq in 1991. It has been argued that Operation Restore Hope in Northern 
Iraq, which was conducted to protect the Kurdish minority in the country, was a ‘pure’ 
humanitarian intervention. The British professor Christopher Greenwood maintains 
that this intervention established that humanitarian intervention has become customary 
international law.34 In 1994, he wrote that the intervention had enjoyed ‘widespread 
(though by no means universal) acceptance’ (quoted in Helgesen 1999: 36) and this 
implies a changed state of the law. Do these single events constitute precedence? Are 
they sufficient to conclude that humanitarian intervention is established as an 
international custom? As noted in section 3.5.1, most international law scholars assert 
that Article 2 (4) is part of jus cogens. Although this does not prevent a new 
international custom from coming into existence, the evidence of a new customary rule 
must be substantial. Hence, isolated instances cannot be sufficient to say that a custom 
has emerged. In other words, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the UN 
Charter has been replaced by an international custom of humanitarian intervention. 
Although there has been an increasing concern for humanitarian considerations in 
international community, the international community has not recognised a right to 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. Since there is no international legal right to 
humanitarian intervention, Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 must be found unlawful.  
Is there evidence of a custom concerning interventions to secure fundamental 
needs in the case of a humanitarian crisis? This issue has enjoyed significantly less 
attention than the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The evidence of a right to 
intervene irrespective of the Security Council is even poorer than in the case of 
governmental oppression: Only one such operation has been conducted, namely 
Operation Restore hope in Somalia in 1992. As noted in section 3.5, this operation was 
conducted under the Security Council’s auspices. Since the evidence of a new custom 
is even poorer here than in the case of intervention to prevent governmental 
oppression, the conclusion must be that a new custom has not emerged. 
I will now turn to the last issue, whether there is a right to prevent violent 
conflicts in other countries from spreading to own territory. This concerns anticipatory 
                                              
34 Other scholars have also argued in favour of a customary right to humanitarian intervention.  
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self-defence. Arend & Beck (1993) belong to a minority of international law scholars 
who assert that international custom has replaced the provisions concerning the resort 
to military force in the UN Charter (Arend & Beck 1993). They maintain that states 
through customary practice have withdrawn their consent from Article 2 (4) and 
assume an extended right to self-defence. They see anticipatory self-defence, which I 
found unlawful according to the UN Charter, as a clearly established custom (1993: 
79). They explain that  
[e]ven though there may not be an established consensus in support of the 
permissibility anticipatory self-defense, there is certainly not a consensus opposed to 
it. In consequence, it would seem to be impossible to prove the existence of an 
authoritative and controlling norm prohibiting the use of force for pre-emptive self-
defense.  
For reasons that I accounted for in section 3.4, one should not take the 
authority-control test for granted. To say that it is impossible to prove the existence of 
an authoritative and controlling norm prohibiting anticipatory self-defence is not 
sufficient to establish it being an established custom. For customary international law 
to emerge, states must perceive it as their legal obligation to behave in the specific 
manner.  
Most international law scholars have argued that the rules concerning the resort 
to military force in the UN Charter express valid law. It is maintained that neither the 
general prohibition of the resort to military force in Article 2 (4) nor the exception in 
Article 51 have been replaced by international customary law. In the comprehensive 
book Self-Defense Against the Use of Force in International Law, Stanimir 
Alexandrov (1996) thoroughly examines state practice on the right to self-defence. He 
concludes (1996: 297) that the arguments that favour a right of self-defence expanded 
beyond the UN Charter are of doubtful validity. I will conclude that Beslutning S. nr. 
2, 06.12.94 is not in accordance with the international right to self-defence.35  
 
                                              
35 NATO’s bombing in Afghanistan is conducted with reference to the right to collective self-defence. It is disputed, 
however, whether this military action is lawful. The disputed issues are the endurance of the operation, whether the terrorist 




In this chapter I have argued that it is important to distinguish between moral 
principles and legislation in assessing what obligations that apply to states. I have also 
pointed at some basic arguments that suggest how states actually become obligated to 
adhere to rules of international law. Having explained why it is difficult to assess the 
content of rules of international law, I proposed a method for ascertaining the content 
of such rules. I then accounted for the rules concerning the resort to military force in 
international law. I concluded that Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 clearly falls outside of 
the scope of the UN Charter, and must be found unlawful according to the Charter’s 
provisions. I also concluded that there is poor evidence that customary international 
law has replaced the Charter provisions. Since there is no legal basis for the resort to 
military force for humanitarian purposes or for purposes of self-defence beyond the 
UN Charter, Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 breaches the rules concerning the resort to 
military force in international law.  
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I concluded in the previous chapter that Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 represents a 
violation of the provisions concerning the resort to military force in international law. 
In determining whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 is justified, therefore, I am now 
going to investigate the premise that Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate 
in out-of-area operations that the Security Council has not mandated. As pointed out in 
sections 1.2 and 2.4, Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 can only be justified if such an 
obligation exists and if there were adequate reasons for having given priority to the 
obligation towards NATO.  
I explained in section 2.4 that there is reason to believe that Storting’s majority 
asserted that Norway should participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations 
because it constitutes part of Norway’s fair share of the burden as a NATO member. 
This implies that to determine whether participation actually constitutes Norway’s fair 
share of the burden or not becomes a crucial task in investigating the justifiability of 
the resolution passed by the Norwegian parliament. A plausible reasoning behind this 
assertion is as follows: ‘NATO is an international organisation that undertakes various 
tasks, and undertaking these tasks involves costs. These costs must in some way or 
other be distributed among the member states. One prerequisite for the distribution of 
burdens among the NATO members in 1994 to be fair is that Norway participates in 
out-of-area operations, also in cases when the Security Council has not authorised such 
operations.’  
My principal task in this chapter will be to determine whether the premise that 
participation in out-of-area operations that lack Security Council approval constitutes 
Norway’s fair share of the burden is valid. In practical terms, this task requires that I 
identify normative principles for fair burden sharing. Do normative burden-sharing 
principles suggest that Norway should participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area 
operations? 
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The task of identifying normative principles for the fair distribution of burdens 
– just as identifying normative principles for the fair distribution of goods – raises the 
question of what fairness is. The International Encyclopaedia of Ethics (1995) defines 
fairness as a moral principle used to judge procedures for distributing benefits and 
burdens among parties. But what kind of moral principle should one apply?  
Most contemporary literature focuses on the principle of equality in discussing 
what it is that makes a distribution system fair or unfair. More precisely, a distribution 
system is fair if its objective is to achieve or maintain equality among those who are 
subjected to the distribution. But equality has been, and is still, a disputed notion. 
What should there be equality of? Should a society distribute its goods and burdens 
with the aim of achieving equality of for example income, wealth, happiness, liberties 
or opportunities? Despite disagreement about what there should be equality of, the 
principle of equality will prove a fruitful approach in determining what it is that makes 
a distribution system fair or unfair: When applied on specific cases, this principle 
makes it possible to determine whether individuals should be subjected to different or 
the same treatment. One may assess whether there are justifiable reasons, for example, 
for distributing burdens differently between members of NATO.  
I will account for and discuss different approaches to the principle of equality in 
the first section of this chapter (section 4.1). In this account, I will explain how 
equality may be used as a moral principle for distributing burdens. I will then (section 
4.2) briefly show how equality may be achieved. Having accounted for the principle of 
equality and how it may be achieved, I will suggest two normative burden-sharing 
principles that will be thoroughly accounted for in the two subsequent in sections (4.3 
and 4.4). The main objective of these sections is to test the validity of the principles 
and determine whether they are justified within the context of NATO burden sharing. 
In the last part of this chapter (section 4.5), I will on the basis of the burden-sharing 
principles assess whether participation in non-UN-mandated NATO operations 
constitutes Norway’s fair share of the burdens as a NATO member. 
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4.1 The principle of equality 
Bernard Williams (1962/1997: 110) has explained that the idea of equality is 
sometimes used as statements of fact, or what purport to be statements of fact – that 
men are equal – and at other times as statements of political principles or aims – that 
men should be equal. What does it mean that men are equal? One common answer to 
this question is that we are all equal in one respect: we are equal in being human 
beings (Lucas 1965/1997: 297; Williams 1962/1997: 110). Our common humanity 
constitutes our equality. The possession of certain (human) features, such as 
rationality, makes for our humanity and thus our equality. To be equal as human 
beings implies that we are entitled to or worth the same treatment: ‘Because we are 
men, we ought not to be killed, tortured, exploited and humiliated’ (Lucas 1965/1997: 
297). The second idea, that human beings should be equal, implies that we at present 
are unequal or different. But since our common humanity makes us equal qua human 
beings, we must be unequal or different in other respects. I will soon return to this 
assertion.  
Aristotle first formulated the idea that human beings can be both equal and 
unequal. This notion, as will soon be shown, constitutes the cornerstone in his 
approach to equality. To Aristotle, justice was the greatest moral virtue. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains that justice is a sort of equality: When he 
comes to grips with distributive justice (which is the assignment of a fair share of a 
good to individuals) in Book V, one of his first remarks is that ‘justice is equality, as 
all men believe it to be, quite apart from any argument’.36  
In approaching the question of what equality is, Aristotle starts by defining a 
fair share: ‘And since what is equal (ison) [and fair] is intermediate, what is just is 
some sort of intermediate’ (1131a 15–17). A fair share is thus the intermediate; 
something between a share that is too large and too small. The intermediate is 
                                              
36 Quoted in Vlastos (1962/1997: 121). I have tried to verify this quotation, but was unable to find it in Book V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Vlastos (1962/1997: 121) notes that Greeks in particular ought to agree with Aristotle on this point. The 
reason is that the ordinary word for equality, to ison or isotes, comes closer to being the right word for ‘justice’ than does the 
word dikaiosyne, which is usually translated to ‘justice’. Thus when someone speaks Greek he or she will be likely to say 
‘equality’ (ison or isotes) and mean justice.  
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established by considering both the persons who are entitled to a share and the good 
that is subject to distribution:  
And since what is equal involves at least two things [equal to each other], it follows 
that what is just must be intermediate and equal, and related to some people. In so far 
as it is intermediate, it must be between too much and too little; in so far as it is equal, 
it involves two things; and in so far as it is just, it is just for some people. Hence what 
is just requires four things at least; the people for whom it is just are two, and the 
[equal] things that are involved are two.             (Book V, 1131a 17–20) 
Aristotle says that justice consists in finding the intermediate share by considering the 
actors and the good. How, exactly, does one determine the share that a person is 
entitled to? According to Aristotle, the equality of the persons implies equality in the 
shares. This means that two equal persons are entitled to equal shares. There will be an 
unjust distribution ‘whenever either equals receive unequal shares, or unequals equal 
shares’ (1131a 24–25). In saying this, Aristotle established the equality formula: 
Equals are to be treated equally and unequals are to be treated unequally. Since 
equality may require differentiated treatment, the assumption must be that requiring 
the same treatment for all can be unfair.  
When Aristotle tells us to treat equal cases alike and different cases differently, 
he tells us to act consistently and not capriciously. His equality formula, therefore, is 
simply the principle of consistency. This definition of equality may be called formal 
equality (Pojman & Westmoreland 1997: 2–3). In achieving equality, however, it is 
not enough to act consistently, as consistent policies can be unjustified. Consider the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. This regime consistently treated whites differently 
from blacks on an assumption that people with white skin colour have more worth than 
people with black skin colour. A person’s skin colour determined which political 
rights he or she enjoyed, what kind of work he or she might undertake and which 
places to live. The colour of the skin does make people different from one another, just 
as many other qualities – for example gender, nationality and degree of education – 
make us different. In fact, people are different in most respects. To confer people 
different rights on the basis of their skin colour, however, does not constitute an 
ethically relevant reason for this kind of differentiated treatment. Apartheid was 
unjustified because whites and blacks in South Africa were subjected to differentiated 
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treatment whereas they, in an ethical perspective, should have been subjected to the 
same treatment.  
The opposite case – consistently treating unequals as equals – is not any better. 
Child work was institutionalised with the emergence of the industrial revolution. In 
requiring both children and adults to work, the industrialists subjected these two highly 
different groups to the same treatment. From the beginning of the 19th century, 
however, legal provisions restricting, controlling and eventually forbidding child work 
were passed. Western governments realised that children and adults, being unequals, 
no longer could be subjected to the same treatment. Amartya Sen (1992: 1) emphasises 
the importance of considering those traits that make people unequal:  
The assessment of the claims of equality has to come to terms with the existence of 
pervasive human diversity. The powerful rhetoric of ‘equality of man’ often tends to 
deflect attention from these differences. […] [T]he effect of ignoring the interpersonal 
variations can, in fact, be deeply inegalitarian, in hiding the fact that equal considerat-
ion for all may demand very unequal treatment in favour of the disadvantaged.  
Since it is not enough to act consistently in achieving equality, we must fill the 
equality formula with content. This means that we must establish what differences it is 
that in an ethical perspective qualify to differentiated treatment. Because human 
beings are equal qua human beings, we have to provide a normatively justifiable 
reason or principle for any difference in the way people are treated. If such a reason or 
principle cannot be given, people have to be subjected to the same treatment.  
What constitute ethically relevant reasons for differentiated treatment? Aristotle 
argues that merit or worth determines whether people should be treated as equals or 
unequals:  ‘For everyone agrees that what is just in distributions must fit some sort of 
worth37 [...]’ (Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, 1131a 25–26). Aristotle’s conception of 
human worth differs from ours: He does not believe that human beings are equal qua 
human beings. Hence his notion can easily be misunderstood and even misused. But 
he does recognise that there are competing standards of what makes for different merit 
or worth:  
[B]ut what they call worth is not the same; supporters of democracy say it is free 
citizenship, some supporters of oligarchy say it is wealth, others good birth, while 
supporters of aristocracy say it is virtue.    (Nicomachean Ethics 1131a 26–30) 
                                              
37 The Greek word is axia. This word is translated both into ‘worth’ (Terrence Irwin in Michael L. Morgan’s volume) and 
‘merit’ (David Ross in the Oxford World’s Classics).  
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Aristotle’s notes, in other words, that although we all agree that goods should be 
distributed according to worth or merit, we do not all share a common understanding 
of these concepts (Yack 1993: 164–165).  
Disagreement about what constitutes relevant reasons for differentiated 
treatment in Aristotle’s time – free citizenship, wealth, good birth or virtue – continues 
today. The disagreement about what are qualifying reasons for differentiated treatment 
reflects disagreement about what there should be equality of. Those who argue in 
favour of differentiated income tax, for example, see equality as income levelling. In 
sections 4.3 and 4.4 I will demonstrate how this applies to burden sharing. It is 
important to note that demanding equality in one respect often leads to inequality in 
other respects. As Amartya Sen (1992: x) explains:  
[A] libertarian demanding equal rights over a class of entitlements cannot, 
consistently with that, also insist on equality of incomes. […] Wanting equality in 
what is taken to be ‘central’ social exercise goes with accepting inequality in the 
remoter ‘peripheries’.  
This suggests that one important challenge in assessing the fairness of a distribution 
system is to determine whether one form of equality is more justifiable than another. It 
will be demonstrated in subsequent sections how different forms of equality collide.   
As mentioned in section 4.1, the purpose of the following sections is to 
establish normative burden-sharing principles for the purpose of determining whether 
participation in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations constitute Norway’s fair 
share of the burdens as a NATO member. The previous account suggests that to 
identify burden-sharing principles means to ask: What differences, if any, constitute 
justified reasons for differentiated burden sharing? What, if anything, qualifies to 
differentiated treatment when burdens are to be distributed between members of a co-
operative scheme? I will suggest two variables:  
(i) The ability to pay 
 Within a burden-sharing context, I will call this the ability-to-pay principle 
(ii) The individual need 
 Within a burden-sharing context, I will call this the principle of equality of 
satisfaction of needs 
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I will thoroughly account for the two principles and investigate their justification in 
sections 4.3 and 4.4. John Stuart Mill discussed the principles in Principles of Political 
Economy (1849) and I will partly draw on Mill’s writings in the following two 
sections. Adam Smith spoke of the principles earlier, in The Wealth of Nations38 
(1776). Neither Mill nor Smith accounted for these principles in detail, however. 
Moreover, both recent and older literature on NATO burden sharing tends to take the 
normative issues of burden sharing for granted, moving directly to discussing de facto 
burden sharing (see Hartley & Sandler (1999); Kennedy (1979); Lunn (1983)). For 
these reasons, I will to some extent proceed by way of independent reasoning. 
 
4.2 How to achieve equality 
Before I explore the two suggested burden-sharing principles, I would like to briefly 
account for three ways in which equality can be achieved (Pojman & Westmoreland 
1997: 5), as the distinction will prove useful in the normative discussions to come. 
Firstly, we can bring the worst off and everyone in between to the level of the best off 
(up-scaling). Secondly, we can bring the worse off up and the better off down so that 
they meet somewhere in between. Thirdly, we can bring the best off and everyone in 
between to the level of the worst off (down-scaling).  
The first solution is intuitively appealing. Often, however, resources are limited. 
This is, in the language of economics and political science, a null-sum situation: As 
there is a limited amount of resources to be distributed, one person’s gain means 
another’s loss. This, it seems, is what applies to most co-operative schemes: A certain 
amount of goods – the total sum of the members’ contributions – is subject to 
distribution. Thus to improve the situation of the worse off presupposes that the better 
off renounce something.  
 
4.3 The ability-to-pay principle  
In section 4.1 I concluded that equality does not necessarily mean that everybody 
should be treated alike. Any difference in the way people are treated, however, must 
                                              
38 Book V, Chapter II, Part II Of Taxes.  
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be justified on the basis of a reason or a principle. In this section, I am going to discuss 
one candidate for differentiated treatment in the context of burden sharing: The ability-
to-pay principle. Instead of treating members of a co-operative scheme alike, which in 
practical terms means to require the same contribution from each of them, one might 
gear contributions to each participant’s ability to pay or to contribute. More 
specifically, the suggested principle has for its object that each participant of a co-
operative scheme is to carry a share of the burden in proportion to the ability to pay.  
This section starts (section 4.3.1) with an account of the concept ‘ability to pay’ 
and demonstrates that the ability to pay varies from one context to another. On this 
background, I will show what it is that determines the NATO members’ ability to pay 
to the organisation. I will then (section 4.3.2) give a philosophical explanation for the 
ability-to-pay principle in order to test its validity. As will be shown, the ability-to-pay 
principle conflicts with other considerations. For this reason, I will also test the 
validity of the principle by investigating its implications. In doing this, it will be 
established whether NATO burdens should be distributed in proportion to the 
members’ respective ability to pay. 
 
4.3.1 The concept ability to pay 
It was noted in the previous section what primarily characterises people is their 
differences and not their likenesses. People are different in most respects, and 
differences in their qualities imply differences both in how much and what they can 
produce. At the international level, the case is the same. States, just as persons, are 
different in many respects. Because of their differences, their ability to make 
contributions to those international organisations of which they are members will vary.  
This is not to say that any difference between states (or people) implies 
differences in the ability to pay. For example, the difference in Canada and 
Guatemala’s geographical area does not make the two countries’ ability to pay to the 
United Nations different. However, the differences in wealth do: Since the United 
Nations requires economic contributions from its members, Canada’s ability to pay 
will be greater than Guatemala’s. Within other contexts, however, wealth is less 
important. The Kyoto regime requires that the participants reduce their green house 
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gas emissions. This means that the participating countries’ ability to pay is given by 
conditions such as their coal, oil and gas dependency. In conclusion, the ability to pay 
is given by what the undertaking at hand requires from its members and thus varies 
from one undertaking to another.  
NATO was founded for the objective of enhancing peace in the North Atlantic 
region, and the security of its existing 19 member states remains its main objective. In 
order to achieve this goal, the organisation requires its members to make both 
economic and military contributions: The members contribute to NATO both in the 
form of cash payments for NATO’s common budgets and payments-in-kind through 
the allocation of national forces to NATO command (Hartley & Sandler 1999: 668). 
This implies that each member state’s ability to pay will be given by its wealth, size of 
the population and military capabilities. In section 4.5 I will more thoroughly discuss 
the concept of ability to pay within NATO. 
 
4.3.2 Testing the validity of the ability-to-pay principle 
Is the ability to pay a justified burden-sharing principle? As will now be demonstrated, 
the ability-to-pay principle relies on a more general principle. Consider the United 
States and Turkey as NATO members. While the United States comes off best with 
respect to the three variables that were mentioned above (wealth, size of the population 
and military capabilities), Turkey is both a smaller, militarily weaker and less wealthy 
country. To treat these countries alike – to require identical contributions from them – 
would be to require very different efforts. In terms of both economic contributions and 
military capabilities, Turkey would have had to make much greater efforts than the 
United States if the two countries were to carry the same shares of the burden. This 
suggests that one should subject members of co-operative schemes to different 
treatment with the aim of requiring the same effort from each of them.  
John Stuart Mill argued that burdens ought to be distributed in proportion to 
people’s ability to pay. He justified the ability-to-pay principle in the following way 
(1849/52: 366, italics added): 
[I]n a case of voluntary subscription for a purpose in which all are interested, all are 
thought to have done their part fairly when each has contributed according to his 
means, that is, has made an equal sacrifice for the common object […]. 
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Differentiated treatment on the basis of the ability to pay leads to equal sacrifice. 
According to Mill, the ability-to-pay principle is justified because everyone should 
make an equal sacrifice. By distributing burdens in proportion to each individual’s 
means, everyone will ‘feel the same pain’. It appears more reasonable if participants of 
the same undertaking make equal efforts or sacrifices than if some suffer more than 
others. Since the consideration of equal sacrifice supports the ability-to-pay principle, 
the principle is strengthened. 
One objection could be raised against the ability-to-pay principle, however: It is 
unfair if more advantaged members of an undertaking are to make an equal sacrifice as 
the less advantaged just because they happen to be advantaged. This argument, as will 
be demonstrated in the following, is particularly relevant to undertakings of NATO’s 
kind.  
NATO is what we may call a targeted undertaking: Its specific purpose is to 
enhance the members’ security. Most undertakings are targeted; they are founded for a 
specific purpose and are, accordingly, limited in scope. Athletic organisations, 
environmental organisations and political parties are all targeted organisations, limited 
in purpose to physical display, the protection of the environment and political activity 
respectively. Of importance in this context is that membership in a targeted organisat-
ion will only affect a certain part of the members’ existence.  
There is also membership in what we may call all-encompassing undertakings. 
Citizenship of a country and perhaps membership in a religious sect are two such 
memberships. To be a member of an all-encompassing organisation affects the 
individual’s existence in (more or less) every respect: Our citizenship, for instance, 
determines what rights to health, education, welfare, work, protection, cultural and 
religious display etc. we have.  
To hold all-encompassing undertakings responsible for our abilities seems more 
reasonable than to hold targeted undertakings responsible for it. All-encompassing 
undertakings have a greater impact on our abilities than targeted organisations because 
they concern so many aspects of life. When it comes to NATO, differences in the 
ability to pay between the members are not caused by the membership itself but by 
conditions beyond the membership. The fact that for example the United States as a 
 71
NATO member is more advantaged – and thus more capable of contributing to the 
alliance – than Turkey, is not conditioned by the two country’s membership in the 
alliance; it has quite different explanations. In this perspective, it appears unfair that 
the United States should carry a greater burden than Turkey. 
Robert Nozick (1974/91) emphasises the individual’s right to choose where to 
transfer his or her own holdings when he discusses the legitimacy of distributional 
arrangements to achieve greater equality. According to Nozick (1974/91), it is 
insufficient to look at the distributional profile. The acid test of whether a given 
distributional arrangement is legitimate or not is the way in which the distribution 
came about; whether it results from people’s own choice or not. What Nozick actually 
argues in favour of, then, is that the right to choose where to channel one’s assets must 
take precedence over equality of material condition. This libertarian argument, it 
seems, is particularly relevant to the case of burden sharing in NATO, as the allies’ 
holdings are not acquired through the organisation, but independently of it.  
These remarks point towards the conclusion that we are facing incompatible 
considerations: On the one hand, there is the consideration not to impose a greater 
burden on someone just because this individual happens to be advantaged. On the 
other hand, there is the consideration of equality of sacrifice. What is to be preferred? 
In order to answer this question, I will attempt in the following to test the validity of 
the ability-to-pay principle by investigating implications of the principle and the 
principle’s opposite.  
What implications follow if burdens are distributed regardless of abilities? I will 
take NATO as my point of departure and proceed from the previous example of 
Turkey and the United States. Being less populous, less wealthy and militarily weaker, 
Turkey’s ability to contribute to NATO is smaller than that of the United States, and 
hence Turkey would have had to make enormous efforts compared to the United States 
if the two countries were to contribute identical shares to the alliance.  
Because of its greater efforts, Turkey would to a lesser extent than the United 
States be able to allocate its resources to other international or national tasks. The 
United States, however, would obtain a proportionally greater pot to undertake other 
tasks. Hence a burden-sharing system that distributes burdens regardless of the 
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participants’ ability to pay would strengthen the more advantaged participants to the 
detriment of the less advantaged. The burden-sharing system, in other words, would 
reinforce differences in the participants’ abilities. In this case, it is the combination of 
the more advantaged becoming even more advantaged with the disadvantaged 
becoming even more disadvantaged which, from a moral point of view, is difficult to 
accept. A burden-sharing system that does not worsen the situation of the less 
advantaged, however, appears more acceptable.  
To subject members of co-operative schemes to different treatment on the basis 
of their ability to pay, however, would not lead to greater discrepancies in the ability to 
pay: Equal sacrifices preserves the initial ability to pay. Thus the ability-to-pay 
principle, one might argue, relies on another general principle as well, namely to avoid 
worsening the situation of the worse off. This, it seems, also strengthens its validity.  
Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that the ability-to-pay principle entails a 
loss for the more advantaged in that it imposes a greater burden on them. To determine 
which principle is more justifiable, it should be considered for whom the loss is 
hardest to bear. John Stuart Mill justified the ability-to-pay principle by maintaining 
that the loss is hardest to bear for the least advantaged (1849/52: 368):    
If any one bears less than his fair share of the burthen, some other person must suffer 
more than his share, and the alleviation to the one is not, caeteris paribus, so great a 
good to him, as the increased pressure upon the other is an evil. Equality of taxation, 
therefore, as a maxim of politics, means equality of sacrifice.  
In other words, the loss that relates to becoming more disadvantaged is greater than the 
loss of paying a greater burden. Here, I believe, we find ourselves at a normative 
endpoint. I do not see any intuitive objections against Mills’ assertion, which means 
that my conclusion is that the ability-to-pay principle is justified, also for organisations 
of NATO’s kind. The conclusion is thus that for NATO burden sharing to be fair, 
burdens should be distributed in proportion to the members’ respective means, defined 
as military capabilities, wealth and size of the population.  
 
4.4 The principle of equality of satisfaction of needs  
In this section, I will test the validity of the principle of equality of satisfaction of 
needs, which is the second of the two proposed principles. This principle prescribes 
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that each participant of an undertaking is to receive benefits that meet the individual 
need. Thus according to this principle, I will receive a greater share of the benefits of a 
scheme of co-operation than someone’s whose needs are smaller than mine. The 
reason why this principle should be investigated is that satisfying my needs 
presupposes that someone actually carries a burden – makes a contribution – that 
covers my needs. The crucial question is who should pay to cover my needs. Is it 
myself or my fellow participants?  
I will first account for two basic features of the principle of equality of 
satisfaction of needs and show that this principle leads to inequality in another respect 
(section 4.4.1). I will then (section 4.4.2) test the validity of this principle for the 
purpose of determining whether burdens should be distributed for the aim of achieving 
equality of satisfaction of needs within NATO.  
 
4.4.1 The principle of equality of satisfaction of needs 
The principle of equality of satisfaction of needs prescribes that each participant of an 
undertaking is to receive benefits that meet the individual need.39 Generally, a 
distribution system will equally meet the participants’ respective needs if two criteria 
are fulfilled.  
Firstly, unequal degrees of need are to be unequally met. The benefits are to be 
distributed in proportion to the participants’ respective needs. Ideally, there should be 
a 100% needs satisfaction for all. Suppose two sisters are going to the same university, 
A living at five kilometres’ distance and B at fifty kilometres’ distance from the 
university. The difference in distance gives rise to different degrees of need: While A’s 
daily need of going to the university can be met by giving her a bike, B needs a car, 
which is more expensive. If their parents can afford both a bike and a car, but nothing 
more, A should be given a bike and B a car according to the principle of equal 
satisfaction of needs.  
In cases where there are not enough resources to fully meet everybody’s needs, 
however, things become a lot more complicated. How are everyone’s needs to be 
                                              
39 A more thorough account of the concept of need follows in the next section. 
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‘equally met’ in such cases? One possibility consists in distributing benefits 
proportionally to the needs. For example, A could get running shoes and B a bike, 
which means that they would both get something, although not enough to fully meet 
their respective needs. Another possibility consists in distributing benefits 
disproportionally to the need. B could get a car and A nothing, as it would take B 
several hours to get to the university by bike, while A could get there within an hour. 
This issue will be thoroughly discussed in the next section.  
Secondly, different kinds of needs must be differently met. For there to be 
equality of satisfaction of needs, it is crucial to take into account what the participants’ 
needs are. If A, who is allergic to apples, is twice as hungry as B, one does not equally 
meet their needs by giving two apples to A and one apple to B.  
The previous account demonstrates that to achieve equality of satisfaction of 
needs presupposes that one carefully considers how to distribute the benefits. Within a 
scheme of co-operation, it will sometimes be imperative to consider how to distribute 
the burdens as well. Suppose burdens are distributed in proportion to the received 
benefit. In that case, one will impose a greater burden on those whose needs are 
greater than on those whose needs are less. Such a burden-sharing arrangement is ‘to 
supply with one hand while confiscating with the other’. No surplus is left over for 
those whose needs are greatest, and hence differences in the satisfaction of needs 
might prevail.40  
Suppose, contrarily, burdens and benefits are distributed regardless of the 
received benefit: Those whose needs are greater, and who receive more, carry either a 
smaller or an identical share of the burden than those whose needs are greater. This 
will lead to a surplus which will be beneficial for those whose needs are greater. For 
this reason, this distribution principle will promote equality of satisfaction of needs. 
This principle, however, also has the implication that those whose needs are lesser will 
bear a loss.  
                                              
40 This will depend on the nature of the need and the nature of contribution. If my need can be met by receiving a warm 
jacket while I can pay in proportion by giving one of my many expensive hats, to require a proportionate contribution will not 
necessarily contradict equality of satisfaction of needs. If I have no possessing, however, my need will not be met by giving 
me a warm jacket and requiring me to pay in proportion to the received. I will presuppose that a surplus is necessary meet the 
individual need in the following.  
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When distributing burdens in proportion to the received benefit, it will be 
advantageous for those whose needs are lesser. When distributing burdens regardless 
of the received benefit, however, it will be advantageous for those whose needs are 
greater. What must be determined is whether one should favour those with the greater 
needs or those with the lesser needs.  
 
4.4.2 Testing the validity of the principle of equal satisfaction of needs 
One possible justification for equality in general and for equality of satisfaction of 
needs in particular is that equality is a goal per se. In this perspective, equality is what 
we may call an intrinsic or an immanent value. It was noted in section 4.2 that there 
are three ways in which we can achieve equality. If we accept the justification that 
equality is a goal per se, we must accept all three ways of achieving equality. It would 
be inconsistent to say that up-scaling and meeting in between is justifiable, while 
down-scaling is not, for the purpose of achieving equality itself.  
The French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville was amazed at the preoccupation 
of Americans for equality during his visit to the United States in the 1830s, but also 
warned against its dangers:  
There is indeed a manly and legitimate passion for equality which rouses in all men a 
desire to be strong and respected. This passion tends to elevate the little man to the 
rank of the great. But the human heart also nourishes a debased taste for quality, 
which leads the weak to want to drag the strong down to their level […] (quoted in 
Pojman & Westmoreland 1997: 5, italics added). 
According to de Tocqueville, to want equality can turn out both productively and 
destructively. One of the dangers de Tocqueville sees in ‘the passion for equality’ is 
down-scaling. Thus by accepting equality as a goal per se, we must be ready to ‘dumb 
down the brilliant, infuse the healthy with disease and blind the sighted’ (Pojman & 
Westmoreland 1997: 5). When it comes to equality of satisfaction of needs, we must, 
for example, be ready to make the satiated starve for the sake of equality of 
satisfaction of needs itself. Needless to say, these implications are intolerable. Down-
scaling as a means to achieve equality should thus be rejected. Since, as noted, down-
scaling must be accepted just as the two other forms of achieving equality for equality 
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itself, this suggests that a possible justification for the principle of equality of 
satisfaction of needs must be sought in other normative considerations.   
As noted in section 4.2, resources are often limited and up-scaling is not 
possible. Accordingly, we are left with the second method for achieving equality that 
was mentioned above: To bring the worse off up and the better off down so that they 
meet somewhere in between. The crucial normative question thus becomes: Why 
should someone renounce a benefit for the sake of others’ welfare? What normative 
reasons suggest that we should require a person to give up a benefit for another person 
in order to have equality of satisfaction of needs?  
The justification for equality need not necessarily be sought in equality having 
an intrinsic value. Equality can also have an instrumental value: Equality can be 
justified because it is a means to achieve other goals that we value. In coming to grips 
with a justification for the principle of equal satisfaction of needs, I am now going to 
investigate what goals that might justify that someone will have to give up a benefit.  
Kai Nielsen maintains that people should receive equal welfare because 
‘morality requires that we attempt to distribute happiness as evenly as possible’ 
(quoted in Pojman & Westmoreland 1997: 5, italics added). In demanding equal 
welfare for the purpose of equal happiness, Nielsen makes himself a proponent of the 
principle of equal satisfaction of needs: Equality of satisfaction of needs, to him, 
consists in preference satisfaction: If happiness is to be distributed as evenly as 
possible, we must make sure that people get their preferences satisfied. Thus ‘needs’ is 
understood as whatever preferences we have. This implies that if my preferences 
require a new wardrobe every week to make me happy, I have an equal right to this as 
the one who is happy with getting a new shirt every five years has a right to that.  
This standpoint, however, is only partly helpful. How are we to distribute 
resources when everybody’s preferences cannot be fully met? To have an equal degree 
of happiness, should my expensive preferences be met at the expense of other people’s 
preferences, or even basic needs? Are all preferences to count as equal?  
It becomes necessary to distinguish between different kinds of needs. Charles 
Larmore makes this distinction in explaining that there are four different sorts of 
things that are good to people (1987: 139):   
 77
1. The avoidance of physical pain 
2. The satisfaction of needs 
3. Whatever satisfies short-term preferences, and 
4. Whatever fulfils long-term preferences (projects and commitments) 
By needs (2), Larmore understands desires that we have not because we have adopted 
them, but in virtue of ‘our being the sort of being we are’ (Larmore 1987: 139). Thus 
desires for food and sleep would be needs. What Larmore calls needs could be 
understood in the context of basic conditions for living, and thus called basic needs. 
Preferences, by contrast, are desires we have because we have adopted them. These are 
distributed between (3) and (4).41  
(1) and (2) have the properties of unanimity and objectivity because we 
generally agree on what it means to avoid physical pain and have our (basic) needs 
met. There is, however, far less unanimity as to the two latter sorts of good. People 
largely differ about what is good with regard to short-term and long-term preferences. 
Moreover, and most importantly, (1) and (2) have an urgency that the other forms of 
good do not have. They have an objective urgency because they are distinct from any 
subjective feeling of urgency that a person may have. Preferences can be held so 
strongly as a need, and yet not be as urgent. Larmore (1997: 140–142) maintains that 
since the avoidance of physical pain and satisfaction of needs have an objective 
urgency, we should pursue their fulfilment:   
[I]f I agree with Y that he has a certain need, then I and everyone else have a reason to 
pursue its satisfaction. […] When the greater good overall consists in the avoidance of 
pain or the satisfaction of needs, […] we cannot so easily pass over its claims upon us. 
If we have it in our power to satisfy the needs of others or to prevent their having 
physical pain, and if the good thereby effected is sufficiently great, we may well feel 
obligated to set aside temporarily the pursuit of our own projects.  
This points towards the conclusion that we are required to renounce a benefit in the 
particular case that someone is in pain or does not have his or her (basic) needs met. 
The requirement is not equally strong if the purpose is to renounce a benefit for the 
sake of someone’s preference, because preferences are not as urgent as needs. In other 
                                              
41 Larmore (1987: 140) admits that the boundary between needs and preferences is not always a sharp one. Physical activity 
is perhaps one example of it: Enjoying it implies that it is a preference, but some maintain that physical activity is necessary 
to avoid mental or physical diseases, which implies that it is a need.  
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words, there is not necessarily something wrong with a gap in preference satisfaction. 
At least we can tolerate it. A deficit in needs satisfaction, however, is intolerable. This 
is not to say that there might not be good reasons for redistribution for less urgent 
needs as well. One such reason could be to prevent envy or even conflict, but I am not 
going in details with it here.  
The previous discussion gives us the following two interpretations of the 
principle of equal satisfaction of needs, each with its respective area of validity:  
(i) In a context where urgent needs are at stake, redistribution is justified. This 
means that someone who is well off – or at least better off than someone who has not 
his or her basics needs met – will have to renounce something for the sake of the other 
person’s welfare. Equal satisfaction of needs means that everyone should have their 
basic needs met. In a burden-sharing context, this implies that burdens should be 
distributed regardless of the received benefit. 
(ii) In a context where preferences are at stake, the claim that the better off 
should renounce something for the less well off is not equally strong because 
preferences do not have the same urgency as needs. Equal satisfaction of needs, in 
such cases, would generally mean to distribute benefits in proportion to everyone’s 
preferences. In a burden-sharing context, this implies that burdens should be 
distributed in proportion to the received benefit. 
We have now come to the issue of determining whether NATO burdens should 
be distributed regardless of or in proportion to the received benefit. Given the previous 
discussion, this answer must depend on the urgency of the members’ needs. If urgent 
needs are at stake, burdens should be distributed regardless of the received benefit so 
that these needs can be met. By distributing burdens regardless of the received benefit, 
one avoids a deficit in the satisfaction of needs. If less urgent needs, or preferences, are 
at stake, burdens might be distributed in proportion to the received benefit as there will 
not be a deficit in satisfaction of needs, only a gap in the satisfaction of preferences.  
It is a general assumption that among a population’s many needs, security is 
essential. An armed attack from a foreign power might lead to many casualties and in 
general damage the population’s conduct of life. Security, thus, must be characterised 
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as a need according to Larmore’s (1987: 139) typology. This points towards the 
conclusion that burdens should be distributed regardless of the received benefit.  
John Stuart Mill (1849/52: 368) argued that if the beneficiaries of protection of 
government were to pay in proportion to their benefits, there would be an unjust result. 
The reason is that it is a so-called wrong of nature if people are not able to help or 
defend themselves:  
If there were any justice, therefore, in the theory of justice now under consideration, 
those who are least capable of helping or defending themselves, being those to whom 
protection of government is the most indispensable, ought to pay the greatest share of 
its price: the reverse of the true idea of distributive justice, which consists not in 
imitating but redressing the inequalities and wrongs of nature (1849/52: 368).  
This assertion seems applicable to the case of a defence alliance as well: In the case of 
protection, what X must suffer by not having his security needs met is worse than what 
Y must suffer not to enjoy full benefits of the co-operation. Again, we find ourselves 
at a normative endpoint. As I neither here see any intuitive objections against Mill’s 
assertion, and since I consider security to be among a country’s basic need, my 
conclusion is that it is morally justifiable that those NATO countries enjoying a 
security surplus should renounce this for the sake of another ally’s security. Thus 
NATO burdens should be distributed regardless of the received benefit.  
 
4.5 Establishing Norway’s fair share 
In the two previous sections I have concluded that for NATO burden sharing to be fair, 
each member’s share of the burden should be determined upon consideration of its 
ability to pay and regardless of the received share of the total sum of benefits. What 
constitutes Norway’s fair share of the NATO burden?  
It was noted in section 4.3 that the ability to pay is a multi-dimensional concept 
and that the ability to pay within NATO is given by the member states’ wealth, size of 
the population and military capabilities. In order to more precisely estimate the ability 
to pay, we must now give these concepts an operational meaning.42 Different measures 
have been suggested to estimate the ability to pay (Hartley & Sandler 1999; Kennedy 
                                              
42 The meaning of ‘the size of the population’ is self-explaining.  
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1979; Lunn 1983). Hartley & Sandler (1999) suggest the six following ability-to-pay 
measures:  
(i) Gross domestic product (GDP) 
(ii) GDP per capita 
(iii) Defence spending 
(iv) Per capita defence spending 
(v) Defence as a share of GDP 
(vi) Armed forces personnel 
These indicators measure different aspects of an ally’s ability to pay: While (vi) is a 
purely military indicator, the others are economic indicators, (iii), (iv) and (v) 
measuring defence spending. Can we use these indicators to determine how burdens 
should be distributed in proportion to the ability to pay? I shall first consider the 
indicators’ operational validity.  
The GDP (i) is a useful indicator of the ability to pay because it measures the 
size of the allies’ economy. This indicator prescribes that countries with a large 
economy should contribute more than countries with a smaller economy, which 
appears reasonable. However, the GDP does not measure the allies’ wealth. A 
country’s wealth is an important aspect of the ability to pay as richer countries more 
easily can allocate resources to NATO than less rich countries. Hence, this should be 
considered in distributing burdens. We may assess the allies’ wealth by dividing GDP 
by the population. Hence (ii), GDP per capita, measures the allies’ wealth. It suggests 
that the greater a country’s GDP per capita, the greater the share of the burden it must 
carry. 
Although the GDP (i) and GDP per capita (ii) measure important aspects of an 
ally’s ability to pay, these indicators do not take into account military capability. Since 
NATO is a defence alliance, the member states’ ability to pay will also be given by 
their military capabilities. This suggests that indicators measuring military capabilities 
should be used as well.  
Defence spending (iii), per capita defence spending (iv) and defence as a share 
of GDP (v) are different indicators of military capabilities, in assuming that military 
strength grows proportionally with defence spending. Per capita defence spending (v) 
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and defence as share of GDP (vi) measures the degree to which defence is given 
priority compared to other tasks for a given country. These indicators, however, are 
not entirely reliable as measures of the ability to pay, as there will be differences in the 
efficiency with which the member states convert defence expenditures into combat-
effective armed forces. Some allies might have inefficient forces, which would not be 
evident from these indicators. Moreover, the member states can differ in their 
definitions of defence spending and some countries rely on conscript forces so that 
their different defence budgets underestimate their defence burdens (Hartley & Sandler 
1999: 669).  
The armed forces personnel indicator (vi) is also intended to measures the 
allies’ military capabilities. We can reasonable assume that a country’s military 
strength increases proportionally with the number of armed forces personnel. Being a 
numerically based indicator, however, it fails to measure differences in the national 
forces’ effectiveness and cleverness. It also fails to measure possible differences in the 
quality of the military equipment. Hence, important aspects of military strength are left 
out.  
This brief account demonstrates that every suggested measure suffers from 
validity weaknesses, and several other problems of validity could also have been 
mentioned.43 This implies that it is not impossible to assess the exact shares that each 
ally should bear on the basis of their ability to pay.  
Suppose, nevertheless, that we were willing to accept this inaccuracy and that a 
burden-sharing formula was established on the basis of one or several of the 
mentioned indicators. What would this formula suggest in terms of participation in 
non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations? Suppose armed forces personnel were used 
as an indicator of Norway’s ability to pay. In that case, Norway’s fair share of the 
burden would be estimated on the basis of its share of NATO’s overall military 
personnel. In 1995, Norway’s armed forces personnel (38 000) constituted 0.8% of 
NATO’s total armed personnel (4 700 000) (Sandler and Hartley 1999: 672). This 
implies that Norwegian armed forces personnel should constitute 0.8% of the total 
                                              
43 For a more throughout account of this, see Hartley & Sandler 1999; Kennedy 1979: 59–83; Lunn 1983: 54–55.  
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number of armed forces personnel in NATO military operations. Other indicators 
suggest other contributions: The GDP indicator, for example, suggests that Norway’s 
economic contributions to NATO should be 8.13% of the total costs, as Norway’s 
GDP constituted 8.13% of the total NATO GDP in 1995 (Sandler & Hartley 1999: 
672).  
These numbers suggest what Norway’s fair share of the NATO burdens consists 
in. However, the trouble with giving the ability-to-pay principle an operational 
meaning by employing these, and the other, measures is that they do not establish in 
what form the fair share must be given. To say that Norway’s fair share consists in 
paying 8.13% of the total NATO budget does not establish that this amount of money 
must be spent on non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations. Moreover, Norway’s 
armed forces could just as well be deployed to peacekeeping operations as to non-UN-
mandated out-of-area operations; Norway would still be said to carry its fair share of 
the burden.  
Any indicator may be used to prescribe a mathematically precise share, but 
neither of them establishes that Norway ought to participate in out-of-area operations 
that the Security Council has not mandated. In conclusion, burden-sharing principles 
do give normative prescriptions about the share that Norway should bear: They give 
prescriptions as to the extent of Norway’s contribution. But the principles, it now 
seems clear, do not establish what specific tasks that Norway should undertake.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
I started this chapter by arguing that one should invoke the principle of equality when 
determining what Norway’s fair share of the NATO burdens consists in because the 
principle of equality allows for an assessment of whether individuals should be 
subjected to the same or to differentiated treatment. I then investigated the validity of 
two normative principles that prescribe differentiated treatment within the context of 
burden sharing: The ability-to-pay principle and the principle of equality of 
satisfaction of needs. A thorough account of these principles demonstrated that they 
are justified and apply to burden sharing within NATO. I then asked what Norway’s 
fair share of the NATO burdens is. The following account showed that while burden-
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sharing principles do give prescriptions about the extent of Norway’s fair share of the 
burden, they do not establish what specific tasks that Norway should carry out. Hence, 
assessing what Norway’s fair share of the burden consists in proved inappropriate for 
determining whether Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate in non-UN-
mandated out-of-area operations. This means that the normative premise that Norway 
should participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations has so far not proved 
valid.  
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5 THE MORAL REQUIREMENT TO RECIPROCATE  
 
 
In the previous chapter I concluded that burden-sharing principles do not establish 
whether Norway should participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations or not. 
There is nevertheless reason to pursue the question of whether Norway should make 
this contribution to NATO. Although the Storting passed Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 
on invalid moral assumptions, it might well be that other moral arguments suggest that 
Norway is obligated to undertake this kind of task. Accordingly, other possible 
normative reasons than burden-sharing principles should be explored.  
One argument suggesting that Norway should participate in out-of-area 
operations that lack Security Council mandate is that Norway owes NATO this kind of 
contribution. This argument is the principle of reciprocity, which requires beneficiaries 
to make returns for good received. The principle of reciprocity as a source of moral 
obligation has so far enjoyed modest attention in international normative theory. In 
this chapter and the following one, I am going to assess this principle’s relevance for 
Norway’s membership in NATO. In particular, I will be concerned with determining 
whether Norway’s membership in NATO has yielded benefits that generate an 
obligation to make returns. If an obligation of reciprocity exists, does it require that 
Norway to participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations? 
I will thoroughly account for and discuss the moral requirement to reciprocate 
in this chapter. I will explain what reciprocity is and account for the moral requirement 
to reciprocate as it has been spelled out in philosophy and sociology (section 5.1.1). I 
will then (section 5.1.2) explore possible justifications for the requirement. Having 
established what the moral requirement to reciprocate actually requires, and suggested 
different justifications for it as well, I will ask what we must make returns for (section 
5.1.3). I will then test the validity of the principle of reciprocity by investigating its 
implications (section 5.1.4). This test will demonstrate that the requirement, as it has 
been formulated, has problematical implications. I will therefore attempt at 
reformulating the requirement in section 5.2. In the next chapter, I will discuss the 
moral requirement to reciprocate with the particular aim of determining whether 
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Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate in military operations beyond the 
territory of NATO that lack a UN mandate.  
 
5.1 The moral requirement to reciprocate     
The concept of reciprocity connotes both normative and empirical aspects. First and 
foremost, though, reciprocity is a word that refers to the latter, to a state of affairs, to 
be precise. Reciprocity is the outcome of a two-way process. Reciprocity is what 
comes into existence because something is returned. Reciprocal affection, for 
example, is found when two persons’ affection towards one another is mutually 
returned. A’s affection towards B and B’s affection towards A give rise to reciprocal 
affection because A’s feelings towards B are returned by B and B’s feelings towards A 
are returned by A.  
Reciprocity, or a reciprocal relationship, may also arise from people’s actions. 
In this respect, reciprocity is the outcome of two parties’ mutual exchanges. However, 
reciprocity does not arise from mere exchange. Reciprocity comes about because one 
party (B) makes a return to its counterpart (A) for a received benefit. Thus reciprocity 
presupposes that the mutual exchanges are contingent upon one another: B’s return to 
A is a response to A’s prior contribution to B. This point is crucial. If the mutual 
exchanges are not contingent upon one another, the mutual relationship is not 
reciprocal. When an act is returned, the recipient (or beneficiary) becomes a benefactor 
and the initial benefactor becomes a recipient.  
The fact that reciprocity is the result of something being returned suggests that 
reciprocal relationships cannot involve more than two parties: A return must be 
directed towards the initial benefactor to be a return. The possibility that reciprocal 
relationships involve more than two individuals should not be ruled out, however. If 
the recipient (B) is unable to make a return, a third actor (C) may enter the relationship 
and make a return to the benefactor (A) on behalf of B. A recipient (B) might also 
direct a return towards another actor (C) than the benefactor (A) if C acts on behalf of 
A. I will now turn from this brief account of the phenomenon of reciprocity to the 
normative aspects of the concept.  
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5.1.1 The norm of reciprocity and the moral requirement to reciprocate 
It is argued that there exists a universal norm of reciprocity. The sociologist Alvin 
Gouldner (1960: 171) asserts that the norm of reciprocity is to be found in all ‘value 
systems’. Lawrence Becker, in his philosophical account of reciprocity, claims that ‘in 
all societies of record, there is apparently a norm of reciprocity’ (1986: 81). The 
assertion that there exists a universal norm of reciprocity, seems to connote two rather 
different assumptions.  
The first assumption concerns people’s moral sense and practice. In general, 
people have a moral sense of repaying benefits: ‘Ethnographers, social 
anthropologists, historians and sociologists report in unison that people everywhere do 
“feel” [an obligation to repay]’ (Becker 1986: 73). Apparently, people’s sense of 
obligation actually affects their behaviour: According to Becker (1986: 80), the 
empirical evidence of a norm of reciprocity is overwhelming. However, people’s 
‘reciprocal behaviour’ differs from one society or culture to another (Becker 1986: 81; 
Gouldner 1960: 171). People have different ways of reciprocating and their sense of 
obligation varies.  
The other assumption – and of importance in this context – concerns the 
existence of a moral duty. Linked to the norm of reciprocity is a demand that we 
should repay benefits. Being universal, this moral requirement applies to everyone.44 
Becker (1986: 89) formulates the moral requirement to reciprocate as follows: ‘Good 
received should be returned with good’.45 This demand connotes several difficult 
moral questions, and I will raise the questions one by one in the following sections.  
In the following, the moral requirement to reciprocate should be understood in 
light of what John Simmons (1979) calls natural moral bonds (or natural duties). 
Natural duties are moral bonds that apply to everybody irrespective of status or of acts 
performed and they are owed by all persons to all others (Simmons 1979: 13–14). It is 
common to make a distinction between natural moral bonds and specific moral bonds. 
                                              
44 Neither Becker nor Gouldner explicitly say that there is a moral requirement linked to the norm of reciprocity. However, 
they do assert that such a requirement exists: They say that the norm of reciprocity is universal in a generic form (Becker 
1986: 81; Gouldner 1960: 171). That is, although the norm of reciprocity is put to practise differently in different societies, 
there exists a (generic) norm that applies to everyone.  
45 The moral requirement to reciprocate appears in other formulations as well, and I return to one of them below. Alvin 
Gouldner’s (1960: 171) formulation of the moral requirement to reciprocate is different than Becker’s. However, he does not 
explore its justification. For this reason I will adhere to Becker’s formulation and account.  
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The latter are moral requirements that are generated by the performance of some 
voluntary act or omission (Simmons 1979: 14), and I will say more about such moral 
bonds in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.  
The assumption that the norm of reciprocity connotes a moral imperative, and 
that it is not only a proof of an attitude and a practice, is important: No matter how 
substantial the empirical evidence of people’s sense of obligation to reciprocate and of 
their actual reciprocal behaviour might be, it does not justify the moral requirement 
itself. It might be that people’s tendency to make return of benefits is but evidence of 
their politeness. Likewise, their sense of moral obligation might be grounded in false 
beliefs about moral bonds. For these reasons, I will in the following sections dwell 
with the assumption that we are morally required to return good for good received. I 
will therefore explore possible justifications for the moral requirement to reciprocate 
and determine to which extent – if at all – one must make returns for the good that we 
receive.  
 
5.1.2 Possible justifications for the moral requirement to reciprocate 
What makes an individual morally required to return good for good received? In this 
section, I am going to explore three possible justifications for the moral requirement to 
reciprocate. Reciprocity is justified on the grounds of having both instrumental and 
immanent value. 
One justification for the duty to return good for good received is that reciprocity 
is an instrumental necessity in our lives (Becker 1986: 90–91). In becoming what we 
want to be, we need other people’s help. Every day, from birth to death, we live on and 
advance because other people are thoughtful, support and help us. We are dependent 
on other persons to a great extent, and we cannot develop – perhaps not even survive – 
without the benefits that other people bestow us. We are much more likely to receive 
the necessary help from others if we make returns for the things we receive. There is 
reason to repay the help or good received, then, because reciprocation reinforces 
helping behaviour.  
That it is beneficial to repay benefits does not necessarily justify it being a 
moral obligation, however. To reciprocate because it contributes to other people’s 
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helping behaviour, implies that other people become means in one’s own goal seeking. 
Moral duties, however, appear more properly moral when they do not entirely rely on 
self-fulfilling strategies. Can reciprocity be justified on the grounds of other people’s 
welfare? 
The moral requirement to return good for good could be justified because it 
promotes equilibrium. Reciprocity brings about social equilibrium in two ways: First, 
because two parties – and not just one – make an effort or a sacrifice. Second, because 
both parties benefit from each others’ efforts. This argument appears self-evident, but 
that does not deprive it from being important. In the extreme, the lack of equilibrium 
between two parties can threaten one party’s existence. Hence, social equilibrium 
protects against abusive behaviour and exploitation. In short, equilibrium fosters sound 
relationships between human beings.  
Becker (1986: 82, 132) explains that the moral requirement to reciprocate is 
justified because equilibrium is a so-called primary good. That is, we acquire this 
particular primary good by reciprocating. Primary goods are vital because they are ‘a 
state or object or disposition that is necessary (logically, physically, or 
psychologically) to the conduct of rational agents as such – that is, to deliberation and 
choice, or to goal satisfaction per se […]’ (Becker 1986: 81). To put it in simpler 
words, primary goods are necessary for the conduct of human life.  
In this perspective, to reciprocate appears once again as an instrumental 
necessity: Equilibrium is necessary to achieve and maintain sound social relationships, 
and we achieve equilibrium by reciprocating. Arguments about sound social 
relationships, as opposed to the above-mentioned argument, are not (only) grounded 
on notions of self-fulfilment, however. Equilibrium is necessary to ensure other 
people’s well-being as well as our own. Hence, the equilibrium explanation appears 
better founded.  
A third justification for the duty to return good for good received could be that 
of doing good per se. We should repay the good that we receive not because it 
promotes our own welfare, neither because it promotes social equilibrium, but simply 
because we should return other people’s good deeds. This justification is intuitively 
appealing: There is something morally attractive about returning good simply for the 
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sake of doing good. The justification, however, is also difficult to rationalise. What 
follows now is an attempt.  
In order to identify the grounds for this moral justification, I would like to start 
with some brief remarks about virtue ethics, which I find central to the picture. In 
virtue ethics, the source of morality is not ‘external’ moral bonds (that we often tend to 
think in terms of), but rather the inner life and the character of the individual. Virtue 
ethics does not see moral life as a matter of relating properly to rules but is rather 
concerned with the virtuous (moral) individual and ‘inner traits, dispositions and 
motives that qualify the person as being virtuous’ (Slote 1997: 177). Virtue ethics is 
generally said to be agent-focused rather than action-focused: Of importance is who 
the person should be to be a moral person rather than what a moral person should do to 
act morally. However, being and acting is of course connected: I am not a moral 
person if I do not behave as one.   
In a virtue ethical perspective, we should reciprocate because it is virtuous to 
reciprocate. In the terminology of virtue ethics, then, one should be disposed to return 
good for good (Becker 1986: 90–92, 125, 172).46 To succeed as moral agents, we must 
take a certain attitude towards the receipt of benefits: We must be inclined to 
reciprocate. Why should we be disposed for reciprocation? According to Becker 
(1986: 80), reciprocity is justified because it is an ideal. But in the same breath, he 
says that reciprocity is an ideal because it entails helping behaviour and equilibrium. 
In referring to these reasons for reciprocity being an ideal, it seems that Becker looses 
sight of the ideal itself: It seems he argues in favour of reciprocity being an 
instrumental value, and not a goal per se.  
What does it mean that reciprocity is an ideal? In what sense is it virtuous to 
reciprocate? Among the forms of virtue ethics that are least radical, the virtuous 
individual is someone who, without relying on rules, is sensitive and intelligent 
enough to perceive the noble as it varies from circumstance to circumstance (Slote 
1997: 178), and act accordingly. In this perspective, to return good for good is noble 
because the action itself is noble. To reciprocate bears evidence of a sensitive 
                                              
46 This is the other formulation of the moral requirement to reciprocate that I referred to above.  
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character, but the grounds for one’s actions are subordinate. What counts is the noble 
action itself.  
More radical forms of virtue ethics, however, would say that the ethical 
character of actions is not so independent of how and why the actions are done. 
Rather, the evaluation of actions is derivative from and dependent on what we have to 
say ethically about the inner life of the agents who perform these actions (Slote 1997: 
178). Accordingly, it is noble, good and admirable to return good for good if the 
actor’s motives are noble. A noble motive could be that one wishes other people well. 
In certain circumstances, it seems right that the excellence of a return depends 
upon the motives that gave rise to it: Certain motives can be so ethically problematic 
that they infect that action itself. Nevertheless, I incline to say that as long as someone 
makes a return for a received benefit because he or she perceives such an act as 
something that ought to be carried through, the act is noble and admirable. There is 
also something noble about having the perceptiveness to know when it is appropriate 
to reciprocate. This takes me to the conclusion that reciprocity can be justified because 
the nobleness of returning good for good per se – whether it is because our motives are 
noble or because the action itself is noble – implies that we should be disposed for 
reciprocation.  
This section has explored three justifications for the moral requirement to 
reciprocate. Upon examination, the latter one – that we should reciprocate because it is 
an ideal – appears the best founded.  
 
5.1.3 Returning good for good received 
As already mentioned, the principle of reciprocity requires that one returns good for 
good received: One must make returns for the good that one receives, and what one 
returns must be good. What does this actually mean? Webster’s Dictionary (1989) 
gives 49 different definitions of the word ‘good’. Good can be used both as an 
adjective and as a noun. Here, the word ‘good’ will be used in both senses: As a noun, 
meaning for example excellence or kindness, as in ‘to do good’, and as an adjective, 
meaning for example kind, beneficent or friendly, as ‘to do a good dead’ or healthful 
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or beneficial, as in ‘fresh fruit is good for you’. I will deal with receiving good in this 
section; i.e. what we must make returns for.  
Good is most often thought of as something that is valued or appreciated. The 
valued or appreciated is thus good because it means something to us: It contributes to 
our welfare or enriches our lives. However, whether something is valued or not will 
depend upon the recipient: It is given by the recipient’s needs and interests. 
Accordingly, something of great value to me may be valueless to someone else, and 
vice versa. Sunny, calm weather, for example, has great value for those who take 
Easter holiday and leave for the mountains, but it can be valueless (and even painful) 
for those who have to work long days. What I perceive as good, then, is not 
necessarily good for someone else. This is the subjective side of the concept good, but 
there seems to be an objective side to the concept as well: Fresh fruit, doctors claim, is 
indeed good to anyone. Hence, no matter whether one likes fruit or not, it is ‘good’. 
This seems to imply that one should make returns for benefits that, objectively, are 
good even though the benefit is not really appreciated.   
Alvin Gouldner asserts that the value of the received is constitutive for the 
existence of a moral requirement to reciprocate. He explains that the moral require-
ment to reciprocate 
imposes obligations only contingently, that is, in response to the benefits conferred by 
others. Moreover, such obligations of repayment are contingent upon the imputed 
value of the benefit received. The benefit and hence the debt is in proportion to and 
varies with – among other things – the intensity of the recipients’ need at the time the 
benefit was bestowed […] (1960: 171).  
The greater the recipient’s need, the greater the value of the benefit will be. If the 
received has value to the person who receives it, the moral requirement to reciprocate 
arises. The antithetical facet to Gouldner’s point is the following: If the received is not 
valuable to the recipient, he or she will not be required to reciprocate. Is Gouldner 
right in assuming that a person is not required to reciprocate if the received is not 
valuable? I believe that there is more to the question of what good is.  
Consider the following example: An acquaintance of my family calls me and 
invites me for dinner. Although I am very tired, I accept the invitation for the sake of 
politeness. If I return home in a good mood after a nice meal and pleasant company, it 
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means that I appreciated visiting my acquaintance. Hence, it represents a good 
according to the definition above (and I am morally required to reciprocate). What if I 
return home hungry and angry? What if the food I was offered, as well as the 
company, was off-putting? In that case, there is no doubt that going there was 
valueless to me. Accordingly, I am not morally required to reciprocate according to the 
definition above. The logic, it seems, is that there is nothing to make returns for.  
Let us assume that my acquaintance actually did everything she could to please 
me, but was unfortunate while cooking. Failing in the kitchen put her in a terrible 
mood. She could not help it as she takes pride in cooking. However, I was invited with 
her best intentions. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that to me, the visit ended rather 
unpleasantly. In this case, my being morally required to reciprocate or not seems to 
depend upon my acquaintance’s success in the kitchen.  
There might be reason to let people’s intentions have a say, however. As 
mentioned in the previous section, virtue ethics is concerned with character and the 
dispositions and motives that qualify someone to be virtuous. Whether the recipient 
chooses to respond or not, in a situation as the one sketched above, tells us something 
about his or her character: Not making a return would be ignoring the other person’s 
good intentions, which bears evidence of an insensitive character. A moral or a 
virtuous person, however, might in a given situation observe that reciprocation is right 
because not reciprocating could make the other person feel worse. Consequently, in 
defining the kinds of things that we should make returns for, there might be reason to 
include people’s good intentions, although the actual outcomes of their intentions – 
their actions – are not valuable to us. 
 
5.1.4 Implications of the moral requirement to return good for good 
The moral requirement to reciprocate demands, as previously mentioned, that 
we should return good for good received or that we should be disposed to reciprocate. 
I would now like to test the validity of the moral requirement to reciprocate by 
examining its implications. To what extent must we return good for good received?  
I will take the latter formulation of the moral requirement to reciprocate – that 
we should be disposed to reciprocate – as my starting point. This formulation of the 
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requirement expresses that we should reciprocate for the sake of doing good itself, 
which upon examination in section 5.1.2 proved the best justification. As noted above, 
being disposed to reciprocate is a demand to take a certain attitude towards the receipt 
of benefits. To succeed as moral agents, we must perceive repayment of benefits as a 
moral commitment, no matter how the benefit came about.  
To be disposed for reciprocation means that the moral agent, in principle, must 
make returns for whatever good he or she receives. All situations will be equal in a 
moral sense because such a disposition implies that the moral agent cannot different-
iate between situations in which he or she receives benefits. Accordingly, what the 
received is, from whom we received it or why it was given to us is insignificant in a 
moral sense since every good received should be returned. Moreover, own role in 
receiving a benefit is also unimportant: To be disposed to reciprocate implies that we 
should make returns for good received, ‘not only for the good we solicit and not only 
for the good we explicitly accept’47 (Becker 1986: 124). Among the mentioned 
implications, I believe that the last one – that our own role in receiving benefits is 
unimportant – gives rise to the most controversial and difficult moral questions. For 
this reason, I will now carefully investigate the significance of one’s own role in 
receiving benefits for the duty to reciprocate.  
Consider the following example of mere receipt of benefits: My friend and I 
have decided to ascend Visbretind, one of Jotunheimen’s highest and most spectacular 
peaks. Half way to the peak, we decide to make a pause. We take off our rucksacks 
and sit down. While I am enjoying my sandwiches and the view, my friend takes all 
the things I am carrying and puts them in his rucksack, on his own initiative. He starts 
to walk before I realise what is going on, and it is too late to stop him. I have no 
possibility to catch up with him, and he reaches the peak before I reach him. Reaching 
the peak myself, I am very happy that I was released from my heavy rucksack. Thus, 
what my friend did was valuable to me. I was given a benefit. 
In this situation, I was entirely passive: I was given the benefit only because my 
friend decided to carry my things. I might have wished for the benefit (and I might 
                                              
47 I will treat the issue of accepting benefits in more detail in section 5.2.3.  
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not), but it is clear that I did not do anything to get the benefit. It should be noted, 
however, that not only was I passive in this situation. Receiving the benefit was also 
out of my control. That is, not only did I do nothing to receive it: As it was, I could not 
avoid getting it.  
There is no doubt that it would be nice if I in some way or other made a return 
for the received benefit. It would make my friend happy, and it would make me feel 
better. According to the requirement to reciprocate as formulated above, however, I 
am actually morally required to make a return in this situation. The mere receipt of a 
benefit makes me required to reciprocate because not reciprocating in some way or 
other would be contrary of pursuing the ideal.  
Likewise, I should in principle repay the post card that I recently received from 
my friends on holiday in the Seychelles since receiving their news made me happy. 
The same goes for the long-wanted book that my mother suddenly decided to give me. 
I should also repay the street lightning in Oslo since I am scared of the dark. When 
thinking about it, the list of benefits that one receives from others becomes over-
whelming. We receive benefits every day, and many of the benefits that we receive 
cannot be avoided. Since we generally should repay every benefit received, we will be 
constantly and ceaselessly indebted. There seems to be overwhelming burdens 
associated with the moral requirement to reciprocate.  
Lawrence Becker acknowledges that  
resources are scarce, and time and energy are limited. Reciprocating for every good 
received may well be impossible […]. It might be self-defeating, in the sense that it 
would compromise the very efforts at further social intercourse that reciprocity is 
supposed to promote (1986: 91).  
When, then, should we actually reciprocate, and when may we let it be? What other 
pressing demands may override the requirement to return good for good received? 
Becker has no confidence in a precise general answer (1986: 91). Whether one should 
make a return for a benefit received or not will have to be worked out case by case. To 
reciprocate, hence, is a prima facie duty.  
I would like to consider another important implication of the moral requirement 
to reciprocate as well. As opposed to the mentioned implication, which is linked to the 
overwhelming burdens that follow from the moral requirement, this implication is 
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rationally, rather than practically, problematic. As noted above, we should make 
returns for whatever good we receive, also for benefits that we have not asked for or 
even wanted. This implies that our moral bonds will depend upon what other people 
happen to do to us. Should someone thrust a benefit upon us we should, in principle, 
make a return. We become required to make returns, then, because of other people’s 
whims and benefactions. No matter how well founded the virtue ethical justification 
for reciprocity appears, there is something disturbing about the fact that we must 
reciprocate just because someone happens to be good to us.  
I have now unearthed some disturbing consequences of a strict moral duty to 
reciprocate. What is actually disturbing about them? I believe that the answer is linked 
to the important notion of autonomy. We are in no way responsible for receiving all 
benefits, and being required to reciprocate for benefits that cannot be avoided threatens 
our autonomy. In this sense, the moral requirement to reciprocate makes us vulnerable. 
To be sure, we do not enjoy entire freedom as a moral agents. Moral requirements do 
indeed restrict our freedom. Anyhow, we have to accept the vulnerability that moral 
requirements represent. But the moral requirement to reciprocate makes us vulnerable 
towards people who happen to bestow us benefits; a vulnerability that cannot so easily 
be accepted.  
The purpose of the next section is to consolidate the justification for reciprocity 
being an ideal, for which I concluded there is a strong case, and the important notion 
of autonomy. 
 
5.2 The moral requirement to reciprocate reformulated 
In dealing with the problematic implications of the moral requirement to reciprocate, 
as it was formulated in the previous section, the aim must be to narrow the 
requirement’s scope so that it does not challenge the notion of autonomy. I will 
attempt at reformulating the moral requirement to reciprocate by starting to account for 
a moral tradition which sees moral requirements not as duties that apply to us 
independently of our actions, but as obligations that apply to us in virtue of our 
actions: The consent tradition.  
 
 96
5.2.1 The consent tradition: moral bonds as voluntary and deliberate undertakings 
According to the consent tradition, our moral bonds (obligations) come into existence 
because we voluntarily undertake them. While nature duties are owed by all persons to 
all others, obligations are owed by a specific person (the obligor) to a specific person 
or persons (the obligee(s)). Promises, written contracts and authorisations of the 
actions of others are generally held to be acts of consent. They are acts of consent 
because they are both voluntary and explicit statements. Hence, to undertake an 
obligation requires the performance of a deliberate act: An individual cannot become 
obligated unless he or she intentionally performs an obligation-generating act with a 
clear understanding of its significance (Simmons 1979: 64). This assertion relies on 
the notion that man is naturally free, and that man gives up his natural freedom (and is 
bound by moral obligation) only by voluntarily giving a ‘clear sign’ that he desires to 
do so (Simmons 1979: 62–65). Since consent is explicitly stated, the content of an 
obligation is determined by determining what the obligor actually has promised or 
agreed to.  
Why does consent generate an obligation? The answer must be that the obligor, 
by consenting, gives the obligee reason to believe that he or she can expect a certain 
performance from the obligor. In promising my father that I will take care of my 13-
year-old sister when she arrives at the airport, I give him reason to expect that I will 
actually do so. As a source of moral obligation, consent protects the obligee’s 
expectations: I will be held morally responsible for not fulfilling my promise towards 
my father. There is reason to hold an obligor responsible for obligation-generating acts 
because such acts are voluntary. Hence, the obligee’s expectations are to count for 
more than the obligator’s unwillingness to fulfil what is agreed or promised to.  
In a consent perspective, one is not required to make returns for benefits unless 
one deliberately and explicitly has stated to do so. An act’s being morally acceptable 
or even praiseworthy cannot make the act obligatory. Accordingly, a person in only 
required to reciprocate if he or she has undertaken such an obligation. This implies that 
the consent tradition does not, as opposed to the moral requirement to reciprocate, 
threaten the notion of autonomy. On the contrary, the approach seems to go too far in 
protecting the individual’s autonomy and it therefore fails to account for those 
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requirements that apply to us as moral agents48. This will be demonstrated by way of 
example. 
Suppose the United States decides to share an intelligence novelty with its 
NATO allies. As the new technology is economical to produce, all members of the 
alliance decide to make use of the invention to upgrade their intelligence systems. 
Each country develops and makes use of the know-how provided by the United States. 
A few weeks later, France decides to share a logistics system novelty. This invention 
also proves useful to the other NATO members. They all benefit by reorganising their 
logistical systems. One by one, the ally members decide to share new valuable know-
how with the other members. This goes on until Norway is the only country that has 
not contributed. While the other NATO members willingly have shared military 
inventions with the others, the Norwegian government decides not to, on the grounds 
that Norway has never consented to share new technology with its allies. Quite so, the 
North Atlantic Treaty does not establish that military inventions must be shared among 
the member states. In other words, none of the allies have explicitly stated their 
support of sharing new technology with the others. In a consent perspective, therefore, 
Norway is not obligated to share its own technological devices with the other 
members. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that if Norway chooses not to make some 
kind of return for received benefits, we will consider Norway’s action morally 
unacceptable. For what reasons should Norway be required to make returns for 
received benefits?  
The sharing of military technology could be understood as a practice or a 
custom that has gradually developed, making all states required to contribute. It could 
be argued that the practice represents an additional set of rules, existing beside the 
formal agreements already signed by the member states. It appears that the more 
countries that share technological novelties, the more the custom is set. Being the only 
country that has not contributed, therefore, one could argue that Norway should 
assume responsibility by contributing.  
                                              
48 The same observation was made in section 3.2 when I accounted for international law and consent theory.  
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In this case, however, the number of countries adhering to the new practice is 
not morally significant. If we presume that Norway is required to share one of its 
inventions just because all its allies have decided to do so, Norway’s autonomy will be 
threatened. This was raised as a significant objection against the moral requirement to 
reciprocate in section 5.1.4.  
It could also be argued that Norway’s obligation to contribute rests on the 
expectations of Norway’s allies. By benefiting from the other members’ efforts, 
Norway might lead its allies to expect certain future performances from Norway. 
However, simply benefiting from the other members’ inventions does not give the 
other allies the same reason to expect something from Norway as consent would as, 
Norway has not explicitly stated that it will share its military know-how. On this view, 
there is not a strong case for the expectations that Norway’s allies might have. This 
conclusion and the previous one suggest that neither the expectations nor the actions 
of Norway’s allies can impose a duty on Norway to make returns for received benefits. 
Instead, the grounds for Norway’s obligation to carry its fair share should be sought in 
Norway’s own actions. The principle of fair play, which I will account for in the 
following section, suggests that Norway is obligated to make returns for benefits 
because it is fair that Norway does so.  
 
5.2.2 The principle of fair play 
In this section I will account for the principle of fair play as H. L. A. Hart (1955), John 
Rawls (1964/99) and John Simmons (1979) has expounded it in order to assess 
whether this approach can be used to consolidate the moral requirement to reciprocate 
and the notion of autonomy. H. L. A Hart accounts for the principle of fair play in the 
following way:   
[W]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus 
restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required 
have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their 
submission. […] [T]he moral obligation to obey the rules in such circumstances is due 
to the cooperating members of the society, and they have the correlative right to 
obedience.           (1955: 185) 
In the case of mutual restrictions we are in fact saying that this claim to interfere with 
another’s freedom is justified because it is fair.           (1955: 190–191) 
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Hart’s assertion is that a beneficiary (B) of co-operation has an obligation to do his or 
her fair share by submitting to the restrictions of a scheme because the others (X, Y, Z) 
have a right to B’s co-operation. Because X, Y and Z have previously submitted to the 
scheme’s restrictions, it is fair that B does so as well. The reason for this – a reason 
that Hart does not explicitly mention – must be that B has benefited from X, Y and Z 
submitting to the scheme’s restrictions. Not co-operating is to deprive X, Y and Z from 
benefits that B has already enjoyed. Hence, not submitting to the scheme’s restrictions 
would be to take unfair advantage of the others. Since the principle of fair play 
establishes that B must co-operate, the principle of fair play actually requires B, a 
beneficiary, to make returns for received benefits. We can see, therefore, that the 
principle of fair play makes the same kind of demand as the principle of reciprocity: 
To make returns for received benefits.49 The justification for this must be that one by 
making returns, or doing one’s fair share, does not take unfair advantage of the others. 
An individual becomes obligated by the principle of fair play not by explicitly 
demonstrating that he or she is aware of the moral significance receiving the benefits. 
Thus, obligations of fair play, as opposed to consent as a source of moral obligation, 
need not be deliberately incurred.50  
It is important to note that Hart (1955) asserts that the principle of fair play 
applies to ‘joint enterprises’ governed by ‘rules’. This implies that the scope of the 
principle of fair play is more limited than that of the moral requirement to reciprocate. 
In the following, I am going to investigate the scope of the principle of fair play in 
some more detail. Does an obligation of fair play arise simply by entering a scheme of 
co-operation? That is, is it enough to be a member of a scheme to be required to make 
returns for the benefits that the scheme yields?  
                                              
49 An important difference between the two principles lies in the context within which they are discussed: While Hart (1955) 
and Rawls (1964/99) discuss the principle of fair play in the context of schemes of co-operation, Becker (1986) and Gouldner 
(1960) discuss the principle of reciprocity in the context of mutual relations. 
50 When I discussed the justification for states’ obligation to adhere to rules of international law in section 3.2, I concluded 
that consent theory does not give a full account of this obligation since it is assumed that new states become bound by 
existing rules of international law. The principle of reciprocity and the principle of fair play, however, are possible 
justifications: If new states benefit from other states’ adherence to rules of international law, they should make returns in the 
form of adherence to the same rules. As will be demonstrated in the next section, however, only participants of a scheme of 
co-operations should be required to make returns. This raises the question of whether new states can be said to be 
participants. I will not attempt at answering this question here and will rest satisfied with the justification presented in chapter 
3. Since the UN Charter has not been replaced by a customary international rule and Norway has ratified this charter, consent 
theory gives a full account of Norway’s obligation to respect the Charter provisions.  
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For the purpose of more precisely assessing how and to what extent the 
principle of fair play yields an account of obligation, I shall start by asking why Hart 
considers a set of rules governing the co-operative scheme as significant for an 
obligation of fair play to exist. Does Hart mean to say that the principle of fair play 
does not apply to non-rule-governed undertakings? Recall the previous example of the 
sharing of military devices. Why would the North Atlantic Treaty be necessary for 
Norway to be morally required to make returns for received benefits? Would Norway 
be any less required to make returns to its allies if the co-operation was not established 
by a treaty? As John Simmons (1979: 105) observes, there does not seem to be any 
reason why rules governing an enterprise are necessary for the principle of fair play to 
apply. Not making returns would be equally unfair whether there are rules governing 
the enterprise or not. Each participant ought to do ‘his part’ in the scheme, even if that 
‘part’ is not clearly defined by rules (Simmons 1979: 105). This is to say that even if 
the co-operation is not governed by rules, the participants should make returns for 
received benefits. We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that the principle of fair 
play applies to both rule-governed and non-rule-governed undertakings.51  
We must suppose that Hart, by saying that the principle of fair play applies to 
joint enterprises conducted ‘according to rules’, meant to limit the principle’s scope to 
veritable undertakings: The principle is only to apply to individuals who participate in 
a scheme of co-operation. This is a crucial point. If the principle of fair play were to 
obligate anyone who simply benefits from a scheme, it would threaten the autonomy 
of non-participants. Employees who have chosen not to be organised in a trade union 
because they disagree with its chosen issues, for example, should not have to 
reciprocate even if they get the advantages that the work of the trade union gives.  
Hence, it is necessary to distinguish non-participants (or outsiders) from 
participants (or insiders). How, exactly, must an individual be involved in a scheme to 
be characterised as a participant, and thus bound by the principle of fair play? Is it 
enough to be a member of an identifiable group? The question of what kind of 
                                              
51 Note that there can be at least two kinds of ‘rules’: (i) Rules governing (or establishing) the enterprise itself and (ii) rules 
amplifying what the members must contribute. Neither the first nor the second kinds of rules are necessary for an obligation 
of fair play to arise.  
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relationship there must be between an individual and a co-operative scheme for 
someone to be said to be a participant, and thus bound by the principle of fair play, is 
tricky. Simmons (1979: 123) notes that one would normally say that an individual is 
involved in a scheme if he or she has  
(i) pledged his or her support to the scheme, or tacitly agreed52 to be 
governed by the scheme’s rules, or 
(ii) played some active role in the scheme after its institution. 
(i) implies that membership itself imposes an obligation of fair play. (ii) implies that 
an individual also can become obligated by the principle of fair play by playing an 
active role in the scheme. I will most likely be considered a participant of a reading 
circle if I start turning up at its meetings and take part in the discussions, even if I have 
not explicitly declared that I intend to be a member of the group. Thus according to the 
general view, to fulfil one of the two criteria is sufficient: I do not have to pledge my 
support to a scheme in addition to playing an active role in it, and vice versa, to be 
considered a participant. 
If it is enough to be regarded as a participant by pledging one’s support to the 
scheme, it could be argued that the principle of fair play is superfluous (Simmons 
1979: 124): If the principle of fair play only binds participants, it will bind only those 
individuals who are already obligated to do their part in the scheme because they have 
consented to it. The principle of fair play does enjoy an individual justification, 
however: As noted above, the principle obliges a member of a scheme to make returns 
to avoid taking unfair advantage of the other members. It requires that a member to 
make returns because it has benefited as a member. However, a member does not take 
unfair advantage of the others if it does not make returns for benefits that have not 
been received. Hence, an individual is not required to make returns for benefits that 
have not actually been received. This implies that it is not sufficient to pledge one’s 
support to a scheme to be bound by the principle of fair play.  
                                              
52 The issue of tacit consent raises difficult questions. In brief, tacit consent means that consent is given by remaining silent or 
inactive; it is expressed by the failure of doing certain things (Simmons 1979: 80). As I have not been concerned with this 
issue previously and as I will not return to it later, I will not dwell with it here.  
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This section has demonstrated that an individual who simply benefits from a 
scheme of co-operation, without being a member, does not become obligated under the 
principle of fair play. It has also been demonstrated that membership in a co-operative 
scheme is not sufficient to generate an obligation of fair play, as membership does not 
necessarily yield benefits. The principle applies, however, when membership in a 
scheme of co-operation is beneficial. These conclusions suggest that the tricky 
implications of the moral requirement to reciprocate and the unsatisfactory account of 
consent theory have been compromised: The principle of fair play complies with the 
important notion of autonomy without presupposing that the beneficiary must have 
given a clear sign of his or her willingness to make returns for received benefits.  
Although these conclusions have been reached, it remains to more precisely 
assess the scope of the principle of fair play. What is the significance of the way in 
which the benefits are received within the scheme of co-operation? Does a member 
become obligated to make returns for benefits that cannot be avoided? I will explore 
these questions in the next, and last, section of this chapter.  
 
5.2.3 Receiving benefits within a scheme of co-operation 
Membership in a co-operative scheme, I concluded in the previous section, does not 
itself generate an obligation of reciprocity. However, such an obligation can arise if 
the membership is beneficial. Are members of co-operative schemes obligated to make 
returns for all benefits, no matter how they are received? Or must the benefits be 
received in certain ways? If we assume that a beneficial membership is enough to 
generate an obligation to make returns, this implies that the way in which the benefits 
are received is normatively insignificant. One reason why the moral requirement to 
reciprocate was rejected in section 5.1.4, was that a requirement to make returns for 
benefits that are merely received or unavoidable threaten the beneficiary’s autonomy. 
This raises the question of benefits that are merely received or unavoidable within a 
scheme of co-operation generate an obligation to make returns. While one cannot hold 
the beneficiary responsible for receiving the benefit per se, one can certainly hold the 
beneficiary responsible for being a member of the scheme. This suggests that the 
beneficiary is indirectly responsible for receiving the benefit.  
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John Rawls (1964/99), as H. L. A. Hart (1955), asserts that the principle of fair 
play only applies to veritable undertakings. As opposed to Hart, however, Rawls 
(1964/99: 122) does not consider membership as a sufficient condition for one’s being 
obligated to make returns for received benefits: 
The principle of fair play may be defined as follows. Suppose there is a mutually 
beneficial and just scheme of cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can only 
be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone cooperates. Suppose further that cooperat-
ion requires a certain sacrifice from each person, or at least involves a certain restrict-
ion of his liberty. Suppose finally that the benefits produced by cooperation are, up to 
a certain point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation is unstable in the sense that if 
any one person knows that all (or nearly all) of the others will still be able to share a 
gain from the scheme even if he does not do his part. Under these conditions a person 
who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair play to do his 
part and not to take advantage of the free benefit by not cooperating.   (1964/99: 122, 
italics added).  
                                             
What Rawls suggests, is that only those members who have accepted the benefits of a 
scheme are bound by the principle of fair play. Rawls, in other words, does not see 
mere benefaction within a co-operative scheme as sufficient to generate an obligation 
of fair play. What does Rawls mean when he says that members have to have accepted 
benefits to be required to make returns? Does acceptance presuppose an action or a 
statement, or is it possible to accept benefits that are merely received? Although Rawls 
insists on acceptance, he does not explain what it means to accept benefits. It is 
reasonable to assume, however, that a person who has tried to avoid getting a benefit 
cannot be said to have accepted it (Simmons 1979: 129). This suggests that members 
of co-operative schemes who have tried to avoid getting the benefits of co-operation, 
but nevertheless received them, cannot be required to make returns for them. 
John Simmons (1979: 129), in elaborating the notion of accepting benefits, 
suggests that an individual, to have accepted a benefit, must either  
(i) have tried to get (and succeed in getting)53 the benefit or 
(ii) have taken the benefit willingly and knowingly. 
Thus according to Simmons, to determine whether a person has accepted a benefit, one 
should consider both the beneficiary’s actions and attitude towards the benefits. (i) 
refers to the actions; to cases when the benefits are only available to the members, and 
they have to do something to get the benefits. As demonstrated above, when a 
 
53 As established above, we are not required to make returns for benefits that we have not received.  
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beneficiary is himself or herself responsible for receiving a benefit in this way, it 
would be unfair not to co-operate by doing one’s share. In the example of the sharing 
of technological devices within NATO, it was shown that Norway actually had to 
develop the know-how developed by the other NATO members and that Norway thus 
was responsible for having received these benefits. In this case, Norway’s own actions 
have generated an obligation to make returns.  
(ii) refers to the attitude. In cases when a benefit is merely received, and the 
beneficiary himself or herself is not responsible for receiving the benefit, there can be 
little doubt that he or she may take the benefit willingly and knowingly. That is, the 
beneficiary can both want the benefit and be aware of the fact that he or she receives it, 
although he or she does not have to do something to get the benefit. Hence, acceptance 
does not presuppose an action or a statement.  
For what reasons does Simmons consider the beneficiary receiving the benefits 
willingly and knowingly as morally significant? Fair play considerations, as 
demonstrated in section 5.2.2, are justified because we ought not to take unfair 
advantage of others. While a beneficiary who is not aware of receiving benefits (or 
who has not wanted the benefits at all) can hardly be said to take unfair advantage of 
the others by not making returns, a beneficiary who willingly and knowingly benefits 
from other people’s efforts without repaying can certainly be said to do so. This 
implies that to merely receive benefits within a scheme of co-operation does not 
necessarily imply that the beneficiary is morally required to make returns. Of 
importance is the beneficiary’s knowledge of and attitude towards the benefits.  
In establishing that a beneficiary is required to make returns not only for 
benefits that the beneficiary in some way or other is responsible for receiving, but also 
for benefits that are willingly and knowingly received, the moral requirement to 
reciprocate as now reformulated does not seem to threaten the beneficiary’s autonomy, 





This chapter started by exploring the principle of reciprocity as it has been spelled out 
in philosophy and in sociology and investigating possible justifications for the 
principle. Among these justifications, the one saying that one should reciprocate for 
the sake of doing good itself appeared the best founded. Having demonstrated that the 
implications of the natural duty to reciprocate conflict with the important notion of 
autonomy, I attempted to reformulate the principle. The account of the consent 
tradition demonstrated that while this tradition is highly attentive to autonomy 
considerations, it does not fully account for the obligations that actually apply to moral 
agents. I then explored the principle of fair play and demonstrated that this principle 
makes the same kind of demand as the principle of reciprocity. However, its scope is 
narrower: The principle only applies to participants in veritable undertakings. 
Moreover, the participants are only required to make returns for benefits that they have 
had to do something to get hold of, or if the benefits are merely received, only if the 
benefits are received willingly and knowingly. The justification for this formulation of 
the principle of fair play – which is the principle of reciprocity reformulated –, it was 
demonstrated, is the consideration of not taking unfair advantage of others. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether Norway is bound by moral obligation 
to participate in NATO out-of-area operations that lack Security Council authorisation. 
While chapter 4 concluded that burden-sharing principles do not establish whether 
Norway is obligated towards NATO to participate in this kind of military operations, 
the previous chapter implies that Norway can be bound by a moral obligation of 
reciprocity towards NATO to participate. If such an obligation exists, it seems to be 
because the benefits that Norway has received as a NATO member has generated an 
obligation to make returns in the form of participation in the mentioned kind of 
operations.  
The North Atlantic Treaty, as explained in section 1.2.3, was grounded for the 
purpose of collective defence. The Treaty entails benefits but also imposes obligations 
on NATO’s member states. While collective defence remains one of NATO’s 
purposes, NATO has undertaken new roles beyond the collective defence to enhance 
the member states’ security in the post-Cold War era. As noted in section 2.4.2, 
political declarations, investments, exercises and military operations after the Cold 
War demonstrate that the alliance has collective security aspirations. In determining 
whether Norway is obligated to make returns to NATO for received benefits, I will 
direct my attention to benefits that derive from NATO’s post-Cold War approach to 
security and call these benefits ‘benefits of collective security’. The reason why I focus 
on the benefits of collective security is that they lack a contractual basis54, while the 
benefits of collective defence are established in the North Atlantic Treaty55. I will first 
examine whether Norway’s membership in NATO has yielded benefits that generate 
an obligation to make returns. If so, how is an obligation of reciprocity fulfilled?  
                                              
54 They are expressed in both political declarations and the strategic concepts, but the member states have not ratified any 
written document establishing an obligation to make contributions to achieve these benefits.  
55 As noted in section 2.4.2, Article 3 in the North Atlantic Treaty obliges every member state to ‘to maintain and develop 
their individual and collective capacity to resist an armed attack’. Given their contractual basis, the principle of fair play will 
superfluous for these benefits.  
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 6.1 Is Norway obligated to make returns for received benefits?  
Membership in a co-operative scheme, I concluded in section 5.2.2, does not 
itself generate an obligation of reciprocity. However, such an obligation can arise if 
the membership is beneficial. I explained that the justification for this is that not to 
make a return would be to take unfair advantage of the other members. These 
conclusions suggest that Norway is required to make returns to NATO only if the 
membership is beneficial. It is generally held that Norway’s membership in NATO is 
beneficial because NATO guarantees Norway’s security. Does this mean that Norway 
is bound by an obligation of reciprocity to make returns to NATO for received 
benefits? Is the fact that Norway receives benefits from NATO a sufficient reason to 
say that Norway is obligated to reciprocate? 
The discussion of the principles of reciprocity and of fair play in the previous 
chapter suggests that Norway’s actions and attitudes towards NATO benefits are 
decisive. If Norway has to take steps to receive the benefits of co-operation, Norway 
can be held responsible for receiving the benefits and will thus be obligated by the 
principle of fair play to make returns. If, however, the benefits are merely received, 
Norway cannot be held responsible for receiving the benefits per se. In that case, 
Norway’s attitude towards the benefits will be decisive.  
In economic theory, a distinction is made between public and private goods. 
This distinction will prove relevant to determining whether the principle of reciprocity 
imposes a duty on Norway. Military alliances have been characterised as sharing 
public goods. Defence is purely public if the benefits associated with defence are non-
rival and non-excludable (Sandler & Hartley 1995: 29).56 It is assumed that NATO’s 
nuclear defence posture from 1949 to 1966 – the deterrence strategy of mutual assured 
destruction (MAD) – yielded non-excludable and non-rival benefits to members of the 
alliance (Sandler & Hartley 1999: 37–38). According to MAD, any Soviet territorial 
expansion affecting NATO territory would be met with a devastating nuclear attack. 
                                              
56 A good is non-excludable if it is available to all once the good is provided and non-rival (or indivisible) if a member can 
consume a unit of the good without detracting from the consumption opportunities still available to the others (Sandler & 
Hartley 1995: 4). 
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Hence deterrence was non-rival as the ability to deter enemy aggression was 
independent of the number of allies on whose behalf the retaliatory threat was made. 
Moreover, the retaliatory threat was credible because Soviet nuclear forces were 
vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike until the mid-1960s, so that US nuclear forces could 
attack with impunity (Sandler & Hartely 1999: 38). Deterrence was also non-
excludable because the US threat to retaliate on behalf of its European allies was 
credible and more or less automatic as the United States had little to fear from 
unleashing a pre-emptive strike (Sandler & Hartely 1999: 38). Important to the present 
discussion is the fact that public goods cannot easily be avoided. Security in the form 
of strategic deterrence is obtained upon membership itself. If the benefits of MAD 
were to be avoided, an ally would have to avoid NATO altogether.  
In 1967, NATO adopted the doctrine of flexible response, which permitted 
NATO to respond in alternative ways to a Warsaw Pact challenge (Sandler & Hartley 
1999: 38). This document and several other documents, adopted both during and after 
the Cold War, significantly reduced NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons. To fulfil 
the new strategic doctrines, NATO has strengthened its conventional forces. The 
reliance on conventional weapons means that a greater share of NATO’s defence 
benefits is private57 (or impurely public) (Sandler & Hartley 1999: 38). This means 
that the benefits are subject to consumption rivalry to a greater extent: The deployment 
of conventional forces for military operations in the Balkans, for example, implies less 
means to resist a potential Russian attack in Finnmark. Being subjected to 
consumption rivalry, one would assume that the members have to negotiate to obtain 
the benefits. There is an important conclusion to be drawn from this observation: If the 
benefits of NATO co-operation actually have to be obtained, there is reason to say that 
the allies are responsible for receiving the post-Cold War benefits themselves. This 
implies that the allies are morally required to make returns for these benefits.  
Although the benefits of co-operation after the Cold War to a greater extent 
than earlier have the character of privateness, not all security benefits must be gained. 
                                              
57 A pure private (or ally-specific) good possesses benefits that are excludable and rival. An excludable benefit is one that can 
be withheld costlessly by the provider, while a rival benefit is one that cannot be consumed without restricting the 
consumption opportunities available to the others (Sandler and Hartley 1995: 4).   
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Recall that NATO assumes that instabilities in its geographical rim represents a 
security threat to the alliance as a whole. Even though forces are deployed to an 
instable region, one must assume that – given NATO’s perception of threat – this is 
beneficial to the alliance as a whole. Hence, the possibility that membership in NATO 
still automatically yields the member states certain benefits should not be ruled out. 
This raises the question of whether Norway can be obligated to make returns for 
benefits that the country merely receives from NATO? Although Norway cannot be 
held responsible for receiving such benefits, the country might have accepted the 
benefits by willingly and knowingly receiving them. How can we know whether a 
benefit that is merely received is received willingly and knowingly? What kind of 
evidence is required to conclude that Norway has accepted benefits and thus is morally 
required to making returns?  
It was noted in section 5.2.3 that a member who has tried to avoid getting a 
benefit cannot be said to have accepted it. Is it, however, necessary to have tried to 
avoid getting a benefit not to have accepted it? Although a member of scheme of co-
operation has not tried to avoid getting a benefit, one cannot conclude that the member 
has taken the benefit willingly. NATO’s history demonstrates, however, how certain 
members have actively made exemption from benefits that the membership yields. 
France, for example, has never benefited from the co-operation in NATO’s Nuclear 
Planning Group, as the country has never participated in it (Yost 1999: 35). During the 
early and mid-1960s, Denmark attached several paragraphs to NATO communiqués 
dealing with intermediate-range nuclear forces (Yost 1998: 117). Although Denmark 
presumably enjoyed the benefits that these nuclear forces yielded, there is no doubt 
that the country opposed the benefits.  
When it comes to Norway, there is no indication that the country has tried to 
avoid the benefits of NATO co-operation after the Cold War. The country has never 
questioned nor opposed the benefits that the co-operation yields. There is no reason to 
believe that Norway has not wanted the benefits of collective security; rather, 
Norway’s foreign policy tends to show that Norway consider these benefits valuable. 
This suggests that Norway takes the benefits of co-operation willingly and knowingly. 
By walking along with the alliance’s development in the post-Cold War era without 
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questioning any of the alliance benefits, Norway accepts the benefits that derive from 
the co-operation. As everything tends to show that Norway has taken the benefits of 
collective security willingly and knowingly, not to make returns for these benefits 
would be to take unfair advantage of the other ally members. For this reason, I will 
conclude that the moral principle of reciprocity imposes a duty on Norway to make 
returns for received benefits.  
 
6.2 Fulfilling the obligation of reciprocity 
How is an obligation of reciprocity fulfilled? While some moral principles give 
specific action guidance, others do not. The moral  principles ‘keep your promises’ and 
‘do not lie’ are examples of moral requirements that give specific action guidance. A 
moral agent, to fulfil the first obligation, needs to know what he or she has promised to 
do. The second obligation requires that he or she knows what is true. A moral principle 
of this kind establishes by itself the claim it has on someone’s actions. It takes the form 
of a precise command or prohibition, and thus only allows for what Charles Larmore 
calls ‘little leeway for individual moral judgement’ (1987: 5).58 
The duty of reciprocity is a moral principle that does not give specific action 
guidance. The moral principle establishes, as demonstrated above, that Norway should 
make returns to NATO. However, the principle does not establish what actions 
Norway must carry out to fulfil the duty. This does not imply, however, that any given 
Norwegian response will fulfil the obligation. Since the principle’s justification is that 
a beneficiary should not take unfair advantage of others, some actions will certainly 
better satisfy the obligation than other actions. To know how to best fulfil the 
obligation – to know what the return in this specific case must be like – one must 
exercise moral judgment.59 One must, as Larmore (1987: 6) explains, figure out which 
available course of action that best satisfies the obligation.  
 
                                              
58 I discussed a moral principle of this kind in chapter 3, namely the moral principle that states are obligated to adhere to rules 
of international law. This principle itself establishes the claim it has on Norway’s actions: Norway must not resort to military 
force unless the country or one of its allies is subjected to an armed attack or if the Security Council has given authorisation 
to military operations. 
59 I will more to say of moral judgment in the next chapter.  
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6.2.1 Making fitting and proportional returns 
I explained in section 5.1.1 that reciprocity comes into existence when something is 
returned. What kinds of actions qualify as returns from a moral point of view? The 
justification for the reformulated principle of reciprocity is that a beneficiary should 
not take unfair advantage of the benefactor(s). This justification will be considered 
when I account for how the duty of reciprocity is to be fulfilled.60   
In the literature about reciprocity, one comes upon the assumption that actions, 
to be reciprocal, must be ‘correspondent’, ‘equivalent’ (Homans and Simmel 
expounded in Larson 1998: 129) or ‘commensurate’ (Becker 1986: 106). Strictly 
speaking, these words are not synonyms, but in speaking of reciprocity, they do refer 
to the same idea: An action, to qualify as a return in the moral sense of the word, must 
meet the received benefit. If the beneficary makes a return that meets the received 
benefit, the beneficiary avoids to take unfair advantage of the others. In Becker’s 
account (1986: 105–106), an action must fulfil two criteria to be commensurate: It 
must be both fitting and proportional. I shall elaborate on these two criteria in some 
detail in this section, in order to evaluate Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 as a reciprocal 
action below. I will start with Becker’s assumption that a return must be fitting, which 
concerns the return’s appropriateness as to type.  
What kind of return must a beneficiary make in order to fulfil an obligation of 
reciprocity? What is a fitting return? I have previously explained that the concept of 
good is crucial in Becker’s conception of reciprocity: The moral requirement to 
reciprocate is defined as returning good for good received. Becker asserts that a fitting 
return is one that the initial benefactor perceives as a good, and thus rules out the 
possibility of making returns that are objectively good: ‘In general, anything that 
contributes to the welfare of the recipient will qualify as fitting, provided it can be 
perceived as such by the recipient [...]’ (1986: 108, italics added). The reason he gives 
for this is that if the return is not actually a good, it necessarily fails to be a return of 
good for good (1986: 107). To fulfil an obligation of reciprocity, therefore, the 
recipient must make a return that the initial benefactor perceives as valuable. Meeting 
                                              
60 I will draw on Becker’s (1996) account in the following. Although Becker’s justification for the principle of reciprocity is 
different than the justification I adhere to, this does not cause problems.  
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the recipient’s need will generally contribute to the recipient’s welfare, and also be 
perceived as such.  
It was noted in section 5.1.3 that the concept of ‘good’ is commonly understood 
as something that is valued or appreciated, just as Becker defines the concept. I 
concluded, however, that there seems to be more to this issue. Although a recipient 
does not perceive the received as beneficial, it can be beneficial in an objective sense. 
Is a recipient required to make returns that will be perceived as good upon receiving 
benefits that were not perceived as such? Even if a return is not perceived as good, it 
may nevertheless touch the initial benefactor’s feeling of gratitude and happiness. It 
should not be ruled out, therefore, that returns that are not perceived by the initial 
benefactor as contributing to his or her welfare qualify as reciprocal acts, although the 
individual perception of what is good appears important.  
While the fittingness principle concerns the return’s appropriateness as to type, 
the proportionality criterion concerns a return’s appropriateness as to quantity. What 
constitutes enough for a return to qualify as a reciprocal act? If the beneficary is to 
make a return in order not to take unfair advantage of the benefactor(s), it seems that 
the purpose of the return must be to create a balanced relationship between the 
beneficiary and the initial benefactor(s). This means that the return must equal the 
good received (Becker 1986: 111).  
Two considerations, in particular, make it difficult to assess whether a return 
equals the benefit received. I have already discussed these considerations when 
accounting for the ability-to-pay principle in section 4.3: Efforts and abilities. On the 
one hand, the beneficiary can put great efforts into something that barely has value to 
the initial benefactor. On the other hand, small efforts may result in benefits of 
ultimate importance. Often, this is a question of available resources and abilities. In 
fulfilling an obligation to reciprocate, should the beneficiary equal the benefactor’s 
efforts or the value of the received benefit?  
Becker seems inclined to consider the benefit, not the effort, determining: 
‘Balanced benefits [...] must be the leading concern’ (1986: 112). To avoid taking 
unfair advantage of others, it seems reasonable that the return should equal the 
received. By focusing exclusively on the actual contribution, and not the ability, 
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however, there is a risk that the discrepancy in efforts can become great. The duty of 
reciprocity requires a beneficary not to take unfair advantage of others. However, this 
does not necessarily imly that it would be right to require enormous efforts to equal the 
received. These brief remarks seem to imply that in cases where equalling a received 
benefit would mean to make significantly larger efforts in return, the level of effort 
should be considered.  
 
6.2.2 Does Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 qualify as a return for received benefits?  
I will now evaluate the Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 in light of the moral requirement 
to reciprocate as reformulated in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. Does Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94 qualify as a fitting and proportional return to NATO? It was noted in the 
previous section that while one commonly assumes that the recipient’s (or initial 
benefactor’s) perception of the received is crucial, the possibility that returns of 
objective value qualify as returns was not ruled out. Thus, as the concept of ‘good’ 
was defined, we should start by asking whether NATO actually perceives Beslutning 
S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 as promoting its welfare and interests.  
There can be little doubt that NATO cannot perceive the Norwegian 
parliamentary resolution to participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations 
either as valuable or invaluable in the common understanding of what it means to 
perceive. However, this does not imply that an assessment of Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94 is impossible. In 1994, NATO consisted of 16 members. Any security 
political decision taken by one ally will be favourable or unfavourable to the other 
allies. This implies that in determining whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 qualifies 
as a return for received benefits, one should assess whether the resolution is favourable 
or not to the other member states.  
It was noted in section 1.1 that NATO – or NATO’s member states –  was 
concerned about the importance of the United Nations’ role in conferring the alliance 
legitimacy in the conduct of international operations at the time Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94 was passed. At the Brussels summit in January 1994, NATO reaffirmed its 
offer to the UN to support peacekeeping and other operations under the United 
Nations’ auspices (The Brussels Summit Declaration, Paragraph 7). This might 
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suggest that the parliamentary resolution does not meet a need that the other allies 
have, which would imply that it does not qualify as a return for received benefits. I 
shall argue that Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94, in light of NATO’s post-Cold War 
approach to security, is valuable to Norway’s allies nevertheless, in three different 
respects at least: In terms of freedom of action, in terms of predictability and in terms 
of coherence. Recall that NATO has collective security aspirations: To promote a 
peaceful order in the entire Euro-Atlantic area. 
Chapter 7 in the United Nations Charter gives the Security Council an exclusive 
competence in – and superior responsibility for – matters of international peace and 
security: Only the Security Council can authorise non-defensive military operations 
(sections 3.5 and 3.6). According to the UN Charter, therefore, any NATO out-of-area 
action is dependent on a Security Council resolution. Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94, 
however, says that it does not consider a UN mandate to be necessary for non-
defensive NATO operations. By saying that Norway will participate in out-of-area 
operations for NATO independently of the Security Council, Norway lifts a restraint 
imposed on NATO by the UN Charter and whatever decisions the Security Council 
may take or not take. Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 seems valuable to its allies, then, 
because Norway means to give NATO freedom of action. When holding Beslutning S. 
nr. 2, 06.12.94 to NATO’s post-Cold War perception of threat, there can be little doubt 
about its value in terms of freedom of action: As the risks to NATO’s security are 
multi-directional and multi-faceted in nature and also difficult to predict and assess, 
the more freely NATO members can operate, the better it is.  
By saying that Norway does not consider NATO operations dependent on a UN 
mandate, Norway allows the decisions taken by the NATO governents to count for 
more than the Security Council’s decisions. Hence Norway’s loyalty, in questions of 
military operations, is stronger towards NATO than towards the UN. Norway’s loyalty 
is indeed important to the other member states because it contributes to predictability. 
Should the alliance as awhole decide to take action without a UN mandate – no matter 
how likely or unlikely it seemed in December 1994 – it can count on Norwegian 
participation.  
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The explicit declaration to participate in NATO humanitarian operations, rescue 
operations and peace operations made by the Norwegian parliament is also evidence of 
a strong commitment to the other allies. Norway could solely have declared its 
political support of such operations, or only its commitment not to dissent to them. 
Norway’s promise to actually take part in the mentioned kinds of operations is 
valuable to the other member states because deployment of troops is necessary for the 
accomplishment of military operations.  
The commitment to participate is not only important in terms of predictability, 
however: For NATO governments, any decision to resort to military force – whatever 
the reason might be – connotes a heavy moral responsibility. The best conditions for 
carrying such a moral responsibility exist if NATO acts coherently. Cohesion, 
therefore, is valuable to NATO’s members, and would be even more valuable should a 
military operation become subject to international condemnation.  
It was noted in the previous section that an obligation of reciprocity requires the 
beneficiary to make returns that are appropriate not only as to type, but also as to 
quantity. This means that Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94, to qualify as a return, also 
must equal the new kinds of security benefits that Norway receives as a NATO 
member. It is, however, somewhat imprecise to say that this one resolution must equal 
the received benefit. The benefits that Norway is obligated to make returns for have 
come through a persistent relationship with NATO and not from an occasional receipt 
of benefits. This one resolution, in other words, cannot be evaluated as to make up for 
all benefits of collective security. I must therefore investigate whether the decision to 
participate in non-UN-mandated operations somehow meet the received benefits 
although it cannot equal all the benefits Norway has received.  
I have previously explained that security is of vital importance to a country and 
that it is generally assumed that Norway’s membership in NATO ensures the country’s 
security. Membership in NATO, in other words, is very valuable to Norway. Norway 
has, in particular, significantly benefited from NATO’s transformation and efforts to 
promote security in the post-Cold War era. Because the alliance has proved able to 
adapt to the new security challenges, Norway’s security has been enhanced also after 
the end of the Cold War. Norway has benefited from NATO’s ability to adapt to a 
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changed security environment, where the risks are vague and unpredictable. Therefore, 
there can be little doubt that predictability and cohesion is essential to Norway’s allies. 
Moreover, freedom of action appears particularly valuable given the alliance’s 
unstable security environment. To more precisely assess the degree of value that 
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 actually represents to NATO would require a further 
security political analysis, which I do not intend to accomplish here. Since the 
parliamentary resolution appears as a substantial return to NATO, I shall terminate on 
this rough estimation and conclude that there is no particular reason to believe that the 
return made to NATO does not meet the received benefit. On the contrary, the return 
appears appropriate given NATO’s perception of threat. Thus, by having declared that 
Norway will participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations, the country 
fulfils its obligation of reciprocity towards NATO.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed that Norway is obligated to make returns for benefits that 
derive from NATO’s post-Cold War approach to security, i.e. benefits beyond the 
collective defence. The chapter has demonstrated that by participating in non-UN-
mandated out-of-area operations, Norway fulfils this obligation. Since there is no 
contractual basis for an obligation to enhance NATO’s post-Cold War approach to 
security, we now clearly see the importance of the obligation of reciprocity for NATO: 
The obligation of reciprocity is the moral glue, keeping the alliance together by 
requiring the alliance members to make returns for received benefits.  
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7 THE REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
VERSUS THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
I have previously argued (sections 1.2 and 2.4) that the research question in this thesis 
– whether the Storting passed a morally justifiable resolution when it decided that 
Norway would participate in NATO out-of-area operations that are undertaken without 
a Security Council mandate – must be answered by investigating its premises. In 
chapter 3 I investigated the premise that Norway does not breach the rules concerning 
the resort to military force in international law by participating in non-UN-mandated 
out-of-area operations. A thorough account of the these rules demonstrated that this 
premise is invalid: Participation in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations is 
unlawful according to the UN Charter and no customary rule of international law has 
replaced the Charter’s provisions. 
In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I explored the premise that Norway is obligated towards 
NATO to participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations. While chapter 4 
demonstrated that burden-sharing principles do not establish whether Norway is 
obligated to participate in such operations or not, chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that 
the premise is valid: The moral requirement to reciprocate imposes a duty on Norway 
to make returns to NATO for received benefits, and Norway fulfils this duty by 
participating in out-of-area operations that the Security Council has not mandated.  
These conclusions imply that the Storting faced a situation where two 
requirements pointed the Storting in opposing directions. Participating in non-UN-
mandated out-of-area, which the duty towards NATO requires, is in conflict with 
fulfilling the obligation to adhere to rules of international law. Likewise, fulfilling the 
duty to adhere to rules of international law will dissatisfy the duty to make returns for 
received benefits. Hence, the Storting could not fully meet both duties. This situation 
may be characterised as a tragic dilemma, which means that  
in some sense, whatever one does, one does a wrong; this is to be contrasted with 
ordinary choice between equally good alternatives, where whichever one chooses one 
is not doing a wrong.            (Dancy 1993: 125) 
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Since the requirements pointed Norway in opposing directions it is not, at this 
stage, possible to conclude as to whether the Storting passed a morally justifiable 
resolution. As suggested at the end of section 2.4, I must subject the moral 
requirements to scrutiny again in order to determine whether Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94 is morally justifiable or not. In addressing this question, it is important to 
consider whether the Storting had adequate reasons for giving priority to the 
obligation towards NATO to the detriment of the obligation towards the international 
community and to consider whether the Storting should have acted differently.  
The investigation of the premises upon which Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 rests 
has demonstrated that two obligations apply to Norway: An obligation not to breach 
rules of international law and an obligation not to take unfair advantage of others. As I 
will soon demonstrate, these requirements have the character of deontological claims: 
They issue absolute prohibitions and require Norway to act on a principle. This raises 
the question of whether conflicts between deontological requirements can be solved. Is 
it possible to settle conflicts between conflicting deontological requirements?   
 
7.1 Can deontology solve the moral dilemma? 
The core idea of deontology is that what makes an action morally right is that it 
complies with a correct moral rule or principle. This means that in a deontological 
perspective, what is morally right can be specified by rules (Larmore 1987: 4). 
Deontology, however, does not give guidance about how to act until one knows what 
to count as a correct moral rule or principle. What are correct deontological rules or 
principles? Central to deontologists is that there are certain things that we must never 
do towards others. We must respect others as ends in themselves, never simply as 
means.61 Since we are to treat other people as ends in themselves, a correct moral rule 
must be one prescribing actions that imply treating every individual as having an 
ultimate source of value. In requiring people to act on principles or rules, 
                                              
61 This is Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. To Kant, a 
correct moral principle must also be universalisable: ‘Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law’ (Kant 1785/1994: 274). It implies that correct moral principles only prescribe 
actions that can be made moral rules of general application. In this account, however, I shall focus on the deontological 
notion of treating others as ends in themselves. It is common to interpret that notion as applying only to persons. However, 
Kant’s moral theory allows for an extension of the individual morality, and hence the duty to treat other individuals as ends in 
themselves can be said to have direct application to states as well (Donaldson 1992: 141).  
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deontological claims issue absolute prohibitions: ‘Do not lie’, ‘do not break promises, 
but also commands: ‘Tell the truth’, ‘keep your promises’.  
In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant distinguishes between so-called perfect and 
imperfect duties. Perfect duties either prohibit or command specific acts; they leave 
little leeway as to how to discharge them (Baron 1997: 16). The deontological claims 
‘do not lie’ and ‘do not break promises’ are examples of perfect duties. Imperfect 
duties, on the other hand, do not specify what specific actions that are required. They 
are duties to promote certain ends: The happiness of others and the perfection of 
oneself (Baron 1997: 18). According to Kant, however, the rule associated with 
imperfect duties cannot completely specify what actions should be done to satisfy the 
duty (Larmore 1987: 13). The moral duty of benevolence, for example, is a duty 
whose rule appears too schematic to settle by itself how it is correctly carried out 
(Larmore 1987: 5–6).  
The obligations to respect international law and to make returns for received 
benefits are deontological claims: They require Norway to treat members of the 
international community and members of NATO respectively as ends in themselves. I 
explained in chapter 3 that states are obligated to adhere to rules of international law 
because they promise other states to behave in a certain manner when they make 
agreements with them. When Norway ratified the UN Charter, it promised other states 
not to resort to military force unless the country itself or one of its allies is subjected to 
an armed attack or unless the Security Council has mandated military operations under 
the provisions of Chapter 7. To treat the international community as an end in itself, 
Norway must keep this promise. Hence, the obligation to adhere to rules of 
international law may be specified as the following deontological rule: ‘Do not break a 
promise’.62 This duty itself specifies the claim it has on Norway’s actions: Norway 
must not breach the Charter provisions. Accordingly, the duty towards the 
international community is a perfect duty. 
                                              
62 It was noted in section 5.2.2 that the principle of reciprocity and the principle of fair play are other possible justifications 
for the obligation to adhere to rules of international law. I will not rule out the possibility that the duty of reciprocity also 
imposes an obligation on Norway to adhere to rules of international law. Since Norway has ratified the UN Charter and since 
the Charter expresses valid law, however, the grounds for Norway’s obligation towards the international community is 
clearly consent.  
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In chapter 6 it was demonstrated that the justification for the principle that one 
should make returns for received benefits is not to take unfair advantage of others. 
Having received benefits as a NATO member, Norway must make returns to NATO to 
treat its allies as ends in themselves. Hence, also the obligation to make returns for 
received benefits may be specified as a deontological rule: ‘Do not take unfair 
advantage of others’. This requirement has the character of an imperfect duty because 
it does not itself specify how it is to be fulfilled. I explained in chapter 6, however, that 
Norway, to meet the received benefit, should participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-
area operations. In this case, the Storting has placed itself in a moral dilemma: It has 
incurred two duties that conflict with each other. If the promise towards the 
international community were to be kept, it ought not have accepted NATO benefits 
on the behalf of the Norwegian population generating a duty to participate in out-of-
area operations.  
In requiring individuals to always act on rules or principles, deontology gives 
more or less precise action guidance, depending on whether a perfect or an imperfect 
duty is at stake. But what action guidance does this ethical theory give when a moral 
agent faces a moral dilemma? How are moral conflicts to be solved? Can deontology 
solve Norway’s moral dilemma?  
The Kantian moral theory does not admit the existence of moral conflicts at all. 
The reason is that deontological claims are assumed to always be in harmony with 
each other. According to Kant, ‘a collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable’ 
(1797/1991, 224). In the case at hand, however, Norway does in fact face a moral 
dilemma: The Storting cannot emerge from the situation without breaching the 
instruction to treat others as ends in themselves. It must either break a promise made 
towards the international community or take unfair advantage of its allies.  
While Kant denied the possibility of conflicting duties, other deontological 
positions recognise that what seems to be moral dilemmas may actually arise. A 
central feature of this position is the belief that moral dilemmas are only apparent or 
prima facie: For any given dilemma, there will be one, correct decision to be made 
(Hursthouse 1999: 44–45, 52; Larmore 1987: 10). In order to determine whether the 
Storting made ‘the one correct decision’, one should identify a higher-order rule 
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establishing how a conflict between the first-order rules ‘do not break a promise 
(towards the international community)’ and ‘do not take unfair advantage (of your 
allies)’ is to be solved. The insistence on such an explicit decision-procedure should be 
understood as a reaction to what the deontologists perceived as the intolerable 
vagueness of Aristotle’s approach to phronesis63 or moral wisdom and the 
unsatisfactory notions of intuition, insight and perception (Larmore 1987: 4–5, 
Hursthouse 1999: 53). The assumption is that normative ethics should be stated in such 
terms that any person could identify the correct solution to any dilemma only by 
adhering to the identified rules.  
Some deontologists have argued in favour of ordering moral duties by 
considering their decisiveness, the assumption being that some deontological claims 
are more important than others. W. D. Ross is one proponent of this position, and he 
gives the following example of a situation in which one deontological duty is more 
decisive than another:  
If I have promised to meet a friend at a particular time for some trivial purpose, I 
should certainly think myself justified in breaking my engagement if by doing so I 
could prevent a serious accident or bring relief to the victims of one. […] When I 
think it right to do the latter at the cost of not doing the former, it is […] because I 
think it the duty which in the circumstances is more of a duty’ (1930/1994: 334, italics 
added). 
This example suggests that the Storting made a morally right decision if the duty not to 
take unfair advantage of others is ‘more of’ a duty than the duty to keep promises 
towards the international community. How does one determine whether one 
deontological duty is ‘more of’ a duty than another? 
To Ross, what seems important is that the premises on which the promise was 
made have changed.64 He can justifiably break the promise because the duty to prevent 
a serious accident or bring relief to the victims of one,65 which is more of a duty, 
arises. Hence, Ross can give priority to the duty of benevolence.  
What makes the duty of benevolence a more decisive duty? Ross does not 
justify his choice by referring to a deontological rule. When Ross concludes that one 
                                              
63 Phronesis is the Greek word for wisdom and a crucial concept in Aristotle’s philosophy.   
64 Ross rejects that the second duty is more of a duty on utilitarian grounds; that it leads to better consequences overall 
(1930/1994: 334). 
65 This is a deontological duty of benevolence. 
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duty is ‘more of’ a duty than the other, it seems reasonable to assume that he has 
considered the particularity of the situation: ‘How important is the promise that I have 
made?’ ‘What does benevolence actually require from me in this particular situation?’ 
These questions imply that because morality is complex, the duties cannot be ordered 
in a hierarchical system on general grounds. It thus seems as if an absolute ranking of 
the two deontological duties is implausible. Likewise, there is reason to question 
whether an absolute ranking of the duty to keep promises and the duty not to take 
unfair advantage of others is possible.  
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999: 40) explains that there is an increasing sense in 
philosophy that the enterprise of coming up with a set of rules or principles for solving 
moral dilemmas has failed.66 When facing conflicting deontological claims, therefore, 
it seems like one has to renounce a procedure preoccupied with general principles and 
rules. Rather, when facing a conflict situation, to apply certain rules rather than others 
and to weight and balance competing considerations correctly requires that the moral 
agent exercise moral judgment to find the best solution to the situation at hand 
(Hursthouse 1999, Larmore 1987).  
 
7.2 Can exercising moral judgment solve the moral dilemma? 
Moral judgment offers a way to resolve moral dilemmas ‘by arguments, by appeal to 
reasons’ (Larmore 1987: 14). Moral judgment is both an ability to and a method for 
making considered or well-founded decisions: To elaborate and appraise different 
courses of action in order to learn what in a particular situation is indeed the morally 
best thing to do (Larmore 1987: 12). Appealing appropriately to reasons, however, 
presupposes that an individual makes use of certain personal abilities: ‘Moral 
sensitivity, perception and imagination’ (Scheffler quoted in Hursthouse 1999: 54).  
The most common critique levelled against the recourse to moral judgement in 
moral deliberation is its apparent vagueness. How, precisely, does one ‘appeal to 
reasons’? Why should one place confidence in decisions that are not based on specific 
                                              
66 Note that although an absolute ranking of the duties appears implausible within deontology, utilitarianism insists on 
solving moral dilemmas by applying the higher-order principle of utility, in requiring the moral agent to always pursue the 
course of action leading to the best consequences overall.  
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criteria such as rules or principles, but simply on ‘reasons’? The advantage of 
exercising moral judgment is that it allows one to capture the particularity of a given 
situation. To exercise moral judgment permits the thinker to consider all relevant 
considerations and to invent creative solutions to moral problems. I shall proceed on 
the assumption that normative ethics is more fruitful and more apt to produce valid 
conclusions not by adhering to a specific decision procedure, but by relying on moral 
judgment, wisdom or phronesis.   
Individuals who recourse to moral judgment to know what is the morally right 
thing to do in a particular situation and who employs the faculties of moral sensitivity, 
perception and imagination are often said to act virtuously or to be virtuous: These 
individuals find what is appropriate to do in a given situation. Sometimes the 
particularity of a situation requires honesty, sometimes respect. For this reason, the 
virtues, such as honesty and respectfulness, could be said to express what a virtuous 
agent person characteristically would do in a given situation (Hursthouse 1999: 28–
29), having considered the relevant reasons.  
An individual who exercises moral judgment will generally keep promises 
because, having made promises, will find that it is disrespectful, unfaithful and 
irresponsible not to keep them. While disrespectfulness, unfaithfulness and 
irresponsibility are vices, respectfulness, faithfulness and responsibility are virtues. 
Moreover, an individual who benefits from membership in an organisation will, when 
exercising moral judgment, generally find that it is right to make returns. Having 
accepted benefits, not to make returns would be to take unfair advantage of others. 
Unfairness and abuse are vices, while fairness and praise are virtues.  
As noted in section 7.1, Norway has made a promise and then incurred a duty to 
make returns that conflict with the promise. The country has thus placed itself in a 
situation where being both respectful and fair is impossible: The different virtues – just 
like the deontological requirements – point Norway in opposing directions. This raises 
the question of whether the Storting acted virtuously when choosing fairness towards 
NATO to the detriment of respectfulness towards the international community. What 
reasons suggest that to avoid taking unfair of Norway’s allies, all things considered, 
was better than keeping the promise? Were there adequate reasons for giving priority 
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to the obligation towards NATO? In addressing this question, I will return to the 
parliamentary debate and examine the reasons that the members of the Storting 
themselves considered when considered before passing Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94.  
 
7.2.1 The majority’s failure to recognise conflicting duties 
When accounting for the parliamentary debate that preceded Beslutning S. nr. 2, 
06.12.94 in section 2.2, I explained that the Storting’s majority passed its resolution on 
an assumption that Norway’s membership in NATO requires that Norway participates 
in out-of-area operations, even if the Security Council has not mandated such 
operations. The moral requirement to reciprocate imposes a duty on Norway to make 
returns for received benefits, and Norway fulfils this duty by participating in non-UN-
mandated out-of-area operations. Hence, the Storting’s majority was right in assuming 
that Norway has a duty to participate in such operations. While the obligation towards 
NATO was considered, the official report of the proceedings in the Storting shows that 
the majority did not direct its attention to the potential unlawfulness of non-UN-
mandated out-of-area operations. The requirement towards NATO, therefore, was the 
only argument that the majority considered before passing the vote. This is more 
problematic than it may at first seem.  
The Storting, being Norway’s principal decision-making body, should be 
informed about the country’s obligations towards other states. In this case, the 
members representing the majority acted as if they were not informed about Norway’s 
obligation to adhere to the rules of the UN Charter since they did not mention the 
possibility that Norway, by passing the resolution, would render itself guilty of 
violation of these rules. The members constituting the majority must have been aware 
that the decision they were about to take could bring the duty to adhere to rules of 
international law into disfavour, however: On several occasions during the debate, the 
minority opposed the resolution by referring to its unlawfulness.  
The possibility exists that the majority questioned the validity of the minority’s 
arguments and assumed that the resolution was lawful. If that was the case, the crucial 
notions of moral sensitivity, perception and imagination suggest that the members 
representing the majority should have investigated the issue of lawfulness to the full 
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instead of ignoring it. A person who applies the mentioned faculties will understand 
that it is important to take other persons’ arguments seriously. When reasoning from 
moral sensitivity and perception, one will open one’s mind to different kinds of 
considerations and will acknowledge that there can be several answers to a given 
question. In other words, one will realise that one’s own beliefs can be incorrect.  
When ignoring the arguments put forward by the minority members, the 
majority members deliberately disregarded an important consideration. To deliberately 
leave out a counter-argument is particularly problematic when it is done by the very 
persons who have been elected to exercise a primary responsibility for the nation. 
These persons’ daily work consists in taking decisions to direct society in the right 
direction. Moreover, the seriousness of the issue under consideration – the resort to 
military force – also suggests that it was imperative to take into account every relevant 
consideration. The failure not to do so came about because the majority’s members did 
not exercise moral judgment.  
When disregarding the arguments put forward by the minority’s members, the 
majority’s members did not only show disrespectfulness. They also showed 
carelessness towards the issue in question and precluded themselves from observing 
all relevant considerations, and passed Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 on incomplete 
reasons. This means that the members representing the Storting’s majority ‘opted for’ 
one course of action rather than ‘exercised choice’.67  
 
7.2.2 A better solution to the dilemma? 
The Storting had to choose between breaking a promise made towards the international 
community and taking unfair advantage of the other NATO members. In the situation 
that the Storting had placed itself, it would do a wrong no matter how it acted. This is 
not to say, however, that the given courses of action were equally wrong. In 
determining whether the Storting had adequate reasons for giving priority to the 
obligation towards NATO, it seems crucial to determine whether it did the least harm 
possible: If it was possible to escape the moral dilemma by doing less harm, the 
                                              
67 I borrow these expressions from Hursthouse (1999: 71). 
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Storting should not have passed Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 in the adopted form. 
Since the Storting passed the resolution based on incomplete considerations, an 
examination of all relevant considerations might reveal that the Storting was lucky 
enough to have opted for the best course of action, but it might also reveal that there 
was reason to choose a different course of action.  
The promise towards the international community consists in refraining from 
the resort to military force. This constitutes the perhaps most important promise that a 
state can make towards other states because it is a guarantee not to cause them human 
suffering and material damages. The UN Charter was adopted as the Second World 
War was coming to end to prevent similar cruelties from happening again. Moreover, 
the promise is a perfect duty and can only be fulfilled by following the provisions in 
the UN Charter. Norway, to keep the important promise towards the international 
community, must not resort to military force unless the country or one of its allies has 
been subjected to an armed attack or if the Security Council has authorised it. 
Fulfilling the obligation towards NATO to participate in out-of-area operations that the 
Security Council has not authorised clearly contradicts the instructions that the 
international legal obligation gives.  
The duty not to take unfair advantage of others, however, is an imperfect duty 
and does not itself specify what actions must be undertaken in order to fulfil it. This 
means that it might be possible to fulfil the duty in different ways. Could the Storting 
have chosen to pursue a different course of action and thereby have caused less harm? 
Is adhering to rules of international law possible without dissatisfying the obligation 
towards NATO altogether?   
NATO exists with the one aim of enhancing the member states’ security. To 
achieve security, NATO makes use a variety of different measures. Some measures 
relate to the collective defence. Crisis management and peace operations beyond 
NATO territory, however, are among NATO’s most significant new measures in 
promoting a peaceful order in the Euro-Atlantic area, and were established to meet the 
changed security threats in the 1990s. Norway has benefited from NATO’s efforts at 
enhancing security in an unpredictable security environment. These were the reasons 
given for Norway to participate in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations.  
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NATO’s reliance on crisis management and out-of-area operations in enhancing 
the new security challenges does not necessarily imply that participation in non-UN-
mandated out-of-area operations is the only way in which Norway could make returns 
for received benefits, however. Other tasks are also important to the alliance. Norway 
could, for instance, participate in out-of-area operations that have been mandated by 
the Security Council. Other possible lawful returns would be to participate in 
peacekeeping operations, make economic contributions to the alliance, promote a 
fruitful dialogue with NATO’s adversaries and promote NATO’s policy of support for 
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. These measures also play a major 
role in the achievement of the alliance’s security objectives. As these contributions are 
lawful, they could have been made without dissatisfying the obligation to adhere to 
rules of international law. Hence, by making these contributions to the alliance, 
Norway would not cause harm towards the international community.  
Although the mentioned contributions would be valuable to the other NATO 
members, they might not fully meet the obligation of reciprocity. Making contribut-
ions to NATO’s budgets, co-operation with adversaries, peacekeeping operations and 
arms control would not give NATO an equal degree of operational flexibility as 
participation in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations would. Since Norway has 
benefited from NATO’s ability to adapt to a changed security environment, where the 
risks are vague and unpredictable, it seems that operational flexibility is what Norway 
should give in return. This implies that although there were other ways of fulfilling the 
moral requirement, these ways do not seem to fully meet the obligation towards 
NATO.  
Even though the contributions would only partially meet the obligation towards 
NATO, however, it was possible for the Storting to make up for the wrongdoing of not 
participating by making different kinds of contributions to NATO. Making up for the 
broken promise, however, appears challenging, if not impossible. What kind of move 
towards the international community could possibly compensate for the harm that a 
threat of military intervention without a UN mandated represents?  
While keeping an important promise was possible without dissatisfying the 
obligation towards NATO altogether, fairness towards NATO was incompatible with 
 129
the obligation towards the international community. The particularity of this situation 
thus points Norway in another direction than the one it actually opted for: There was 
another solution to the dilemma that consisted in doing less harm. Hence, if the 
Storting had pursued the other possible course of action, it would have acted better.  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that deontology seems unable to come up with general 
principles for adjudicating conflicting deontological duties. Hence, it seemed that 
deontology could not order the two duties that apply to Norway. In order to determine 
whether one deontological duty is more decisive than another, I argued, one should 
consider the particularity of the situation. This should be done by exercising moral 
judgment, which requires that one makes use of the faculties of moral sensitivity, 
perception and imagination. In order to determine whether the Storting had adequate 
reasons for giving priority to the obligation towards NATO, I returned to the debate in 
the Storting before Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 was adopted. This account 
demonstrated that the members representing the Storting’s majority did not exercise 
moral judgment, as they passed Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 on incomplete 
considerations. Hence, the Storting did not demonstrate the existence of adequate 
reasons for giving priority to the duty towards NATO over the duty to towards the 
international community.  
Consideration of all relevant arguments in this particular situation demonstrated 
that the Storting could have done less harm by acting differently. While keeping an 
important promise was possible without dissatisfying the obligation towards NATO 
altogether, fairness towards NATO was incompatible with the obligation towards the 
international community. Hence, adequate reasons for giving priority to the obligation 
towards NATO to the detriment of the obligation towards the international community 
did not exist. For this reason, Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 should not have been 
passed in the adopted form.  
Since the Storting passed the vote upon incomplete considerations and did not 
pursue the best course of action available, I will conclude that it did not adopt a 





When passing Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06. 12 94, the Storting adopted a resolution that was 
not morally justifiable and made a decision that should not have been made. 
Nevertheless, the Storting did give priority to the duty towards NATO, and thereby 
promised its allies that Norwegian forces would participate in unlawful military 
operations. During the eight years that have passed since the Storting adopted the 
resolution, Norway has participated in two NATO out-of-area operations that lack 
formal Security Council authorisation: In Kosovo in 1999 and presently in 
Afghanistan. This implies that Norwegian authorities consider themselves bound by 
the promise made on 6 December 1994. The military operation in Kosovo was 
conducted with reference to humanitarian considerations. Although such 
considerations might suggest that the bombing was justified on moral grounds, it ran 
counter to the provisions of the UN Charter. The military operation in Afghanistan is 
being conducted with reference to the international legal right to collective self-
defence, but the permanence of NATO’s action in Afghanistan, for one thing, gives 
reason to question its lawfulness.  
Does the Storting’s promise towards NATO bind Norway to participate in 
unlawful military operations? While this thesis has assessed the justifiability of 
Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94, the question implies that the Storting cannot be obligated 
to undertake unlawful actions. This concerns the validity of the resolution, and I will 
therefore devote a few remarks to this issue. Can Norway be obligated to carry out 
actions that breach rules of international law?  
My review of the official report of the proceedings in the Storting and other 
official documents has not revealed any particular reason to believe that Beslutning S. 
nr. 2, 06.12.94 was passed as a consequence of NATO exercising pressure towards 
Norwegian authorities. Rather, my investigation has shown that the resolution was 
passed because the Storting felt an obligation towards NATO to make this contribution 
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to the alliance. There is thus reason to suppose that the promise towards NATO was 
voluntary.  
Is Norway obligated towards NATO to carry out unlawful actions when the 
promise to do so was voluntary? A common principle of law states that an individual 
is never bound by a promise to carry out unlawful actions and thus suggests that 
Norway is not obligated towards NATO in this respect.   
If the Storting’s promise towards NATO implies that Norway should undertake 
actions that are evil, this principle appears straightforward and there cannot be doubt 
that Beslutning S. nr. 2, 06.12.94 does not bind. The reasons that were given for 
participation in non-UN-mandated out-of-area operations, however, were humanitarian 
considerations and collective self-defence. These are morally permissible, even praise-
worthy, actions. If the actions that follow from the promise are morally permissible or 
even praiseworthy, why should Norway not be bound by the promise? 
If a promise involves doing something unlawful, but morally praiseworthy, the 
only reason it should not bind is that upholding the law’s normative force is more 
important than performing morally good actions. At the international level, this means 
that the consideration of upholding the normative force of international law nullifies 
unlawful political declarations, even though they may express morally praiseworthy 
intentions.  
One possible justification for legislation to take precedence over actions that are 
morally praiseworthy is that it reflects a more comprehensive perspective on 
normative questions than morality alone provides (see Malnes 1994: 135). 
Contemporary rules of international law were designed upon the consideration that a 
too extensive right to the resort to military force might lead to a backslide: The rules 
were established to prevent that the cruelties of the Second World War would be 
repeated. Therefore the allowance for the resort to military force was to be strict.68 It 
might be tempting to break these strict rules for a good cause: The veto power within 
the UN Security Council, for example, could make it difficult for NATO to react 
timely and efficiently to international crises. In a long-term perspective, however, 
                                              
68 This is the slippery slope argument that I referred to in section 3.1.  
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neglecting the rules concerning the resort to military force in international law might 
lead to an undermining of these rules. This could produce uncertainty about the barrier 
for the resort to military force and unpredictability in the international society.  
These brief remarks imply that it is important to uphold the normative force of 
international law, which suggests that promises implying unlawfulness are invalid. 
Norway’s promise to participate in unlawful operations made towards NATO 6 
December 1994 should therefore not bind.  
During the last years NATO has undertaken two military operations of 
questionable lawful validity. The war against terrorism, which is a new and important 
dimension to NATO’s security policy, does not give reason to believe that NATO will 
refrain from such actions in the future. It seems that NATO could be in the process of 
developing a general practice that runs counter to international law. Such unlawful 
practices are a threat to the international community because they might cause the 
prevailing international norms system to be undermined. By participating in such 
operations, Norway contributes to this undermining. As a concluding remark: Not only 
has the previous discussion suggested that Norway’s promise towards NATO is 
invalid, these remarks also give reason to ask whether Norway even has a moral duty 
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